markdurie.com blog

Female Circumcision in the Maldives, the Islamic Movement and Islamophobia

2012-01-25T12:26:00.000-08:00

I was struck today by a comment from a Maldives women's rights activist about the direction her nation is taking. In a report published the Melbourne Age, which discussed female circumcision and the local practice of flogging female adulterers, Shadiya Ibrahim remarked:

"Being a woman is harder now. The religious Wahhabist scholars preach more forcefully than anyone else can. They have this backing of religion as a tool."
"No one can make the argument to have a more liberal, a more positive attitude towards women. Day by day, it is becoming harder for women to live in this country."

When Shaidya Ibrahim says that 'no one can make the argument' for a more positive attitude towards women I take it that she means is that no one can mount a persuasive argument on behalf of women on religious grounds. This is because the Islamic canon — the Qur'an and the Sunna (the example and teaching of Muhammad) — are heavily stacked against women. Consequently, Islam itself does not provide persuasive doctrinal support for a more 'positive attitude', wishful thinking notwithstanding.

This is why pious religious leaders in the Maldives are winning the argument for reducing women's rights: in a society which Islam trumps all other considerations — it is illegal for a citizen of the Maldives not to be a Muslim — no-one is able to counter their arguments. The increasing limitations on women's rights has 'the backing of religion', as Shadiya Ibrahim puts it.

What does this mean in practice? Consider the example of female circumcision. The Shafa'i school of Islam, which is followed in the Maldives, is the only one of the four Sunni schools which makes circumcizing females a compulsory religious obligation. Other Sunni schools of sharia regard female circumcision as recommended or preferred (sunnat). Ironically, if only the Maldives followed Hanbali jurisprudence (the school mainly followed by Wahhabis), they might practice female circumcision less. (In Saudi Arabia it is the minority Shafa'i areas where female circumcision is most prevalent.)

The reference in the article to 'Wahhabist' influence does not refer to strict adherence to Wahhabi teachings, but to a newly empowered and very self-confident revivalist approach to Islam, often backed by Saudi finance — which insists on the application of pure religious teachings, especially the authority of Muhammad's example, giving it priority over all other considerations, including medical evidence. As this argument becomes more compelling, on religious grounds, it empowers the traditional teachings of Shafa'i Islamic jurisprudence, including the obligation of female circumcision. Thus the women of the Maldives are called to bear the marks of Islamic revivalism on their very bodies.

The world is in the midst of global Islamic revival. This is actually a "reformation" in the sense that many of the world's Muslims are returning to Islam's roots. According to many Islamic activists, it is a matter of Muslim pride that global Islam is on a reform path to become more authentic, returning to its origins in Muhammad's life and teaching. This movement has been building momentum for over a century and it is far from exhausted.

Muslim women are among those (along with non-Muslims and Muslim dissenters) who bear the brunt of Islam's progress in the modern era. For example, see here for a recent discussion by a Muslim writer, Veli Sirin, of how the Islamic Movement is impacting women's rights in Turkey.

Mary Robinson, in an infamous speech given to the UN Human Rights Commission way back March 15 2002, stated:

"No one can deny, from a historical perspective, the revolutionary force that is Islam, which bestowed rights upon women and children long before similar recognition was afforded in other civilizations. … And no one can deny the acceptance of the universality of human rights by Islamic States."

If Robinson's thesis were correct, states which make it illegal for their citizens not to be a Muslim (such as the Maldive or Saudi Arabia) and which officially give priority to Islam above all other values ought to be world leaders in protecting the rights of women (and one might add, the rights of girls). Sadly, the opposite is the case.

The UN official media reported Robinson's speech as "UN’s top human rights official urges action to combat ‘Islamaphobia’". This is a prime example of how anti-Islamophobia rhetoric can be used — albeit at times unwittingly — to gloss over and provide a cover of denial for human rights abuses.

Robinson argued that "Islamic communities need to become more active in countering ignorance through offering positive information on Islam and Islamic beliefs," yet of course this is exactly the recipe being followed in the Maldives, where Muslim leaders are teaching 'forcefully' with the 'backing of religion' as they counter 'ignorance' by providing what they consider to be 'positive information' about Islam, such 'positive information' including the great value of circumcising girls and stoning adulterers.

The proven principle, lamented by moderate Muslims all over the globe, which should by now be clear to all, is that the more Islamic a state, the worse the plight of its female citizens becomes. This is because of, not in spite of Muslim leaders 'countering ignorance through offering positive information on Islam', as Robinson put it. It is a grotesque, Orwellian distortion to call naming such truth 'Islamophobia', and the first — but not the last — victims of this lie are Muslims.

Outlawry in Egypt: the disturbing case of Sayyid Al-Qemany, friend of freedom

2012-01-05T19:23:00.000-08:00

Things are not going well for lovers of freedom in Egypt.

Egypt is under a moral and spiritual siege. Freedom of speech is deteriorating rapidly, because of rather than in spite of the 'Arab Spring'. A recent incident illustrates the critical state of affairs for free-thinking Egyptians.

Sayyid Al-Qemany is a well-known 64 year old prize-winning intellectual and writer on religious and political topics who has emphasised the importance of critical thinking, and opposed Islamic radicalism. He has argued for the separation of religion and state and demanded the repeal of article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, which stipulates that the Islamic sharia is the main source of the nation's legislation.

Al-Qemany identifies as a Muslim, but believes the Islamic faith should apply to the domain of personal belief and sacred ritual, not politics. He has also pointed out that not all the verses of the Qur'an are applicable today – such as laws permitting slavery and concubinage – and some are not even followed in any Islamic jurisdiction in the modern world.

In many ways Al-Qemany is representative of the kind of Islam which Western political leaders hope will characterize the faith of their growing Muslim minorities in their states.

For Western people, Al-Qemany's views would be regarded as 'normal' and rational. However in Egypt he is bitterly opposed by conservative Islamic leaders, thousands of whom have declared him to be a blasphemer.

Even the Dar Al-Ifta, the office of the Egyptian Grand Mufti, Ali Gomaa, issued a fatwa implying that Al-Qemany was a heretic and apostate from Islam. This was after he had been awarded a prize by the Egyptian state for achievement in the social sciences (the selection was made by a free ballot of Egyptian intellectuals). The Dar Al-Ifta fatwa states:

The statements [from Al-Qimni's writings] quoted by the [individual] who requested the fatwa are heretical, regardless of who wrote them; they remove their author from the fold of Islam… and [also] constitute a crime according to Article 98 of [Egypt's] penal code. If these depraved, loathsome, and invalid statements were indeed made by a specific individual, then this individual should be convicted rather than awarded a prize, and punished to the full extent of the law.

This fatwa was subtly written to allow Al-Qemany a way out by disavowing his writings, hence the wording: 'if ... these statements were indeed made by a specific individual'. The purpose of this fatwa is to intimidate Al-Qemany into retracting his views, for the charges made against him attract the death penalty under Islamic law. One of the principles of dealing with apostates in Islam is that they should be given a chance to repent.

It is not hard to understand why Islamic leaders oppose Al-Qemany, for he has been fearless in challenging them on many counts.

For example he exposed examples of Muslim leaders who have lied to Western media about Islam. Among other examples, Al-Qemany reported that:

When questioned by broadcaster Barbara Waters, the Saudi Foreign Minister expressed surprise and even denied the existence of a well-known tradition of Muhammad about trees which will cry out in the last days saying, "There is a Jew hiding behind me, kill him."

The Revd Jerry Falwell referred to Muhammad's marriage to Aisha when she was 9 and he was 52. Although this is a well-known fact of Islamic history, Hussein Ibish, spokesperson for the Armerican-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee 'vehemently denied' Falwell's statements and claimed he had slandered Islam. Al-Qemany pointed out that Falwell's report was accurate, that marrying girls as young as 9 is accepted in Sunni Islam as a result, and even Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi is reported to have taken a new wife more than 60 years younger than himself, younger even than his youngest granddaughter.

The high-profile American Muslim Nihad Awad, executive director of CAIR (The Council on American-Islamic Relations) and signatory of the Common Word letter, boasted that he had successfully lobbied a publisher to remove from a school textbook a(n accurate) reference to Muhammad's "marriage" to the Jew Safiyya after killing her male relatives including her husband, on the grounds that the reference was Islamophobic. Al-Qemany commented that this historical erasure made a 'mockery' of America's democracy: "The Americans, out of respect for Muslims and their religion … ordered that the story be expunged from the [school] book, and even accused its authors of ethnic extremism."

Al-Qemany pointed out that such mendacious strategies, far from defending the honour of Muhammad and Islam, in fact manifest contempt for Islam and embarrassment about Muhammad because they attempt to deny and conceal matters which are well-known and not disputed in the religion. Such 'protection' through lies implies a fundamental lack of confidence in Islam.

The question today is how much longer thinkers like Al-Qemany will be able to exist in Egypt, given the rise of expectations that strict sharia must regulate public discourse. Al-Qemany is a key voice for the anti-sharia opposition: he has spoken out against a culture in which 'one group is in possession of the absolute truth, and is obligated to correct the others, or, if it can't correct them, to destroy them...'.

On January 2, 2012 a debate was filmed between Al-Qemany and popular Al-Azhar sheikh and celebrity television presenter Kaled al-Gindy (see here). Al-Qemany had agreed to the debate on the grounds that it was to be a dialogue with Al-Gindy to discuss their differences in a respectful manner. However the interview, in which the 'moderator' was Fadel Soliman, turned into a kind of trial, in which videos of Al-Qemany's past statements were repeatedly aired, and it was demanded that he respond to them. This was in essence a trial designed to prove that Al-Qemany is a murtad or apostate from Islam. Al-Gindy kept using very derogatory, contemptuous language towards Al-Qemany, which would be very inappropriate to use towards a respected fellow Muslim.

Al-Qemany felt ambushed by this approach. It was not what he had agreed to. Initially, for the sake of the viewers, he did respond, but eventually, in protest, he broke off the interview.

Al-Qemany later reported that as he was leaving the studio, the moderator, Fadel Soliman, struck him from behind on the back and the back of his head with a mug full of water, and threatened his life. Al-Qemany is reported to be undergoing treatment for head and back injuries in a Cairo hospital. (An interview with Al-Qemany - in Arabic - is posted here, in which he speaks of his shock at what is happening in Egypt.)

What should make this incident especially attention-grabbing for Western readers is that Fadel Soliman, the alleged assailant, has been a well known interfaith speaker in the West who claims to promotes harmony through peaceful dialogue. A member of Al-Qaradawi's International Union of Muslim Scholars, Soliman heads up Bridges Foundation, which claims to bridge the gap between Muslims and non-Muslims: "Bridges Foundation aims to bridge peoples from different religious and ethnic backgrounds through educational interfaith activities, like power point presentations, gatherings, discussions etc…" Its website reports that Soliman offers workshops on how to present Islam to non-Muslims and 'refute misconceptions' about Islam. Soliman has given presentations on Islam to more than 65,000 people in the USA, including in churches, universities, and to government departments, such (see here; and also here for testimonials, including from a US lieutenant colonel, a member of congress and a Christian pastor).

One of the 'misconceptions' Soliman addresses in his workshops is that Islam is a violent religion (see here). He 'strongly believes that educating each other about our differences is the best way to bridge peoples and facilitate the peacemaking process, because people do not fight when they communicate with each other' (see here).

The idea that violence can always be prevented by communication may appeal to some. Of course talking can sometimes help prevent violence, but it is no silver bullet against it. And many people do not regard using violence and communicating to be mutually exclusive activities!

To appreciate the implications of the verbal attacks on Al-Qemany, it is essential to grasp the religious context. There are precedents in Islamic law when Muhammad exonerated people who took the law into their own hands to kill his critics, including one incident in which a man killed his own wife for disparaging Muhammad. (A discussion of whether such vigilantism is lawful in Islam, which cites the text of this and some other relevant traditions, can be found here).

Although some authorities insist that only the caliph has the authority to execute apostates, the point is that for an ordinary Muslim to do so is not considered murder. Thus, according to the Shafi'i sharia manual, The Reliance of the Traveller, killing an apostate without lawful authority at worst attracts a minor disciplinary action, for 'arrogating the caliph's perogative and encroaching upon his rights' (p.596 of the Keller translation). More than this, some scholars judge killing an apostate to be a righteous act, especially when the state is unwilling to apply the sharia's rulings. Consider for example the remarkable outpourings of support for convicted assassin of Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer, including a scene in which hundreds of Pakistani lawyers showered the killer with rose petals.

Al-Qemany understands all this. He himself has remarked that the allegation of his defection from Islam 'means, in our country, that I could be slain; any citizen is allowed to kill me and be awarded by God in Paradise'.

Of course the concept of outlawry — of declaring an open season on a human person — is rejected by modern legal thinking, for reasons which do not need to be explained here. It may have been good enough in the era of the Vikings and Robin Hood, but it won't wash in Europe today (although the Third Reich did made heavy use of the concept). The thing is that conservative Islam has not made this adjustment. (To which statement an optimist might add the word 'yet'.)

The Islamic version of outlawry means that an accusation of heresy made by a respected Muslim authority leaders can be tantamount to a threat against a person's life by proxy. For example, the fatwa issued by the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta against Al-Qemany gives a justification for anyone who takes Al-Qemany's life to claim immunity from prosecution before an Islamic court. These are lethal words.

In a Western country, if someone says about another in a debate 'you should be taken out and shot,' it would be considered rhetorical or at best a joke. But if an Islamic leader declares in a debate that his opponents' views are heretical or he is a blasphemer, this is in effect signing a warrant for the person's execution, as well as issuing a get-out-of-jail-free card for whoever performs the deed.

It is very difficult for those who are outside a sharia-oriented Islamic context to understand the intensity of the fear generated by such tactics. Let no-one be so unrealistic as to imagine that the Egyptian state would prosecute those who incite the killing of others through allegations of apostasy. Dr Ali Gomaa, the official Chief Mufti of Egypt could never be charged for the deadly fatwa issued from his office against Al-Qemany. And how could the state prosecute anyone else for saying the same thing as the Chief Mufti? There is no likelihood that Al-Qemany's assailant will be prosecuted, for Al-Qemany already bears the mark of the outlaw, inscribed upon his life by his zealous Muslim fellow citizens.

Of course the fact that the sharia encourages and licenses incitement to murder under certain circumstances, extolling it as righteousness, makes an absolute mockery of the international campaign to prohibit 'Islamophobia', and fools of Western leaders who would partner with Muslims in this misguided project.

When will the West heed the wise counsel of Al-Qemany, and many others, to develop a healthy skepticism towards those who claim to speak for Islam, but conceal and deny its clearly established principles? When will they comprehend how ridiculous – and tragic – their gullibility is?

When will Western political leaders – some of whom pride themselves in being 'progressive' thinkers – stand up for the freedom and right to life of clear-thinking Muslim progressives in our increasingly sharia-compliant world?

Today some Western leaders profess high hopes that Islam can reform itself. The White House has even promoted the idea that the Muslim Brotherhood, a radical and thoroughly Islamic institution, will become more moderate as it enters the political mainstream. But how can reform take place if the West does nothing to support progressive Muslim thinkers?

See here for Al-Qemany's 2009 'Appeal to the Conscience of the Word', in which he calls out to "the conscience of all humanity in the free world to come to my and my children's rescue by providing moral support and the condemnation and denunciation" of incitement against him and his family. He writes "This is a distress call to all bodies and individuals; a call to the consciences of every free individual in the world."

Are our consciences so seared by false ideas and failed, politically correct notions that we cannot heed this call? Shall we be silent while brave voices like Al-Qemany's are snuffed out one by one?

If this is so, what right do we have to claim our own freedom, or the freedom of our children's children?

Boko Haram, the Arab 'Spring', and the radical Islamic Revival

2011-12-30T05:22:00.000-08:00

This past week, as I read the grim news of Christmas killings in Nigeria, there came back to me the words of Shaikh Khalid Yasin, an African-American convert to Islam and globe trotting preacher, who visited Australia back in 2003. The context was an interview on ABC radio with John Cleary. Cleary asked Yasin about what sharia meant to him, and in response Yasin waxed lyrical about the Nigerian experience:

"If we look at the evolution of the Sharia experiment in Nigeria for instance. It’s just a wonderful, phenomenal experience. It has brought about some sweeping changes, balances, within the society, regulations in terms of moral practices and so many things."

Cleary referred to the case of Amina Lawal (a Nigerian Muslim who was sentenced to be stoned to death for getting pregnant out of wedlock) and asked the following question:

"Let’s talk about that Nigeria for example for a moment, because you’ve got a country there which has a large Christian population and a large Muslim population; how do you reconcile that? Do you think that the Sharia should prevail and Christians can live under the ambit of the Sharia, or do you think there should be a secular state which allows room for both Muslims and Christians to practice under their own religious codes?"

To which Yasin responded:

"Well let me ... take that question into a broader historical spectrum, and let’s look at it in that light. What did the Sharia provide for the Christians who are living in Spain, what did the Sharia provide for the Muslims who were living in Turkey, I mean historically. What did the Sharia provide for Muslims living in the Islamic state in Medina? What did the Sharia provide? Always dignity, protection, and the religious rights? Co-mingling, respect of their properties? So historically, Islam has always shown tolerance, dignity, protection for the non-Muslims living in the Muslim state. So from a historical perspective, I say that the Nigerian experiment is one where they are trying to get back to that model..."

Here is the nub of the matter. Yasin is appealing to Muslims' dream of a benevolent, tolerant Islam from a golden past era when non-Muslims were afforded 'dignity, protection', 'tolerance', and 'religious rights' under Islamic rule, which is to say, after Muslim conquest. (In fact he is referring to the sharia system of dhimmitude, in which non-Muslims as conquered people are granted the right to practice their faith as long so they submit to discriminatory laws laid down in a dhimma or pact of surrender. It is on this basis that sharia law affords the right to non-Muslims to keep their heads in an Islamic state.) Yasin opines that Nigerian Muslims are 'trying to get back to that model'.

Which brings us to the recent horrific murders of Christian worhippers across Nigeria on Christmas day. Of course such events give the lie to the claim that Islam 'always' provides dignity and protection. In reality the increasing violence against Christians in Nigeria (and in many other states around the world) is a direct product of the very same global sharia revival which Yasin was so enthusiastic about. The reality is that Christians are being killed in Nigeria because of the sharia revival, not in spite of it.

The perpetrators of these atrocities in Nigeria are known colloquially as Boko Haram. Their official Arabic name is rather longer. It means 'A Group of People of the Sunna (the example and teaching of Muhammad) for Da'wa (proclamation or Islamization) and Jihad'. The Boko Haram nick-name for the group refers to their objection to the Latin alphabet, which has become dominant in Nigerian education, including for writing Hausa: the Hausa word boko (from English book) refers to the Latin alphabet. It can also refer more generally to non-religious education. The Arabic word haram means a 'forbidden' or 'prohibited' practice according to Islam. So the phrase boko haram could mean 'secular learning is prohibited for Muslims'.

This nick-name reflects a desire to Islamicize the indoctrination of young Muslims. The will of Boko Haram is to exclude all values and information which are not in conformity with pure Islam, symoblized by the use of Arabic script and the Arabic language.

The world is in the middle of a global sharia revival. From Auckland to London, in recent decades Muslims have becoming more religiously observant. Hopes for establishing Islamic political governance are rising. The sharia movement has been gaining strength everywhere.

What the Islamic movement has achieved in the past half-century would have seemed inconceivable only 30 years ago. One of the most visible symbols of this achievement is the veiling of women. Raymond Ibrahim recently contrasted the present-day Muslim enthusiasm for veiling women, shared of course by Khalid Yasin (see here, here and here) with the contempt once shown for this idea by Gamal Abdel Nasser. In 1953 the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader told Nasser that they wanted to enforce the hijab, to which Nasser commented that the leader's very own daughter was refusing to wear the thing:

Graduating Class, Cairo University 1978

"Sir, I know you have a daughter in college—and she doesn't wear a headscarf or anything! [laughter] Why don't you make her wear the headscarf? [laughter] So you can't make one girl, your own daughter, wear it, and yet you want me to go and make ten million women wear it?!" [burst of laughter and applause]

To which Raymond Ibraham wryly remarked, "Half a century later and none of this is a laughing matter." He also reproduced a cartoon (above right), in which the Muslim Brotherhood is overseeing the transformation of women's rights as a result of the misnamed 'Arabic Spring'.

It is truly remarkable how much the Muslim revivalists have achieved, especially since the 1980s. Contrast the veiling of women in the graduating class of Cairo University in 2004 with the unveiled graduates of the class of 1978.

Graduating Class, Cairo University 2004

The global Islamic movement is no new phenomenon. This is a loaf that has been rising for a very long time. The revival has been underway for the best part of a century, and in full swing for the past 40 years. In every place around the world, the engine which has driven its progress is spiritual formation, which is to say, religious education. Wherever Muslim presidents have permitted Muslim revivalists free access to a nation's young people, there has been a steady rise in radicalism, resulting in religious violence and the deterioration in the human rights environment for women and non-Muslims alike. A good example is Pakistan, where millions of young men are indoctrinated each year in the sharia-revival curriculum through the Islamic madrassah system, which has expanded 200-fold over the past 60 years, partly due to direct government assistance. In Pakistan this manifestation of the 'boko haram' principle has been the official policy of the government, as, instead of promoting secular education, it has put its young into the hands of religious radicals. This intense effort has generated countless recruits ready for jihad, and growing misery for non-Muslim Pakistanis, who can only watch helplessly as their nation drifts far from its constitutional origins as a secular state.

What is important to grasp is that devotion to the example and teaching of Muhammad and to the Qur'an is never greater than in the curriculum of the Islamic movement revivalists. When Boko Haram signals adherence to the Sunna of Muhammad in their official name, they are undoubtedly entirely sincere. It is revivalist Islam which provides the fertile seed bed for dreams of restoring Islamic political power, and consequently for dawa and jihad, two primary instruments in the sharia revival tool kit.

This is why Abul A'la Mawdudi, in a series of compelling sermons preached in 1938, taught that the fundamental basics of Islamic religious observance provide the foundation for political dominance of the world by Muslims:

"The Prayer, Fasting, Almsgiving and Pilgrimage [i.e. the core fundamentals of Islamic spiritual observance] at their deepest level provide preparation and training for the assumption of just power. Just as governments train their armies, police forces and civil services before employing them to do their job, so does Islam, the Din given by Allah. It first trains all those who volunteer for service to God before allowing them to undertake Jihad and establish God's rule on earth." (Let Us be Muslims).

Maududi's sermons, delivered seventy years ago to poor farmers in the Punjab, were destined to become a classic of the radical Muslim revival. Reprinted countless thousands of times, they lay out in compelling terms a program for the assumption of power through religious renewal, leading up to and including jihad.

The key to understanding the seemingly sudden sweeping victories of the Muslim Brotherhood across the Middle East is the long, slow process of Islamic instruction and guidance — of da'wa — at which the Muslim Brotherhood's footsoldiers have worked hard and sacrificially for decades. Again and again the doctrinal gurus of this spiritual revival have stressed the need for patience and taking a long-term view.

In October 2002 the Arabic-language quarterly Al-Manar Al-Jadid Magazine (published under the auspices of the Ann Arbor-based Islamic Assembly of North America) included a biographical essay by Muhammad ‘Abduh on the achievements of Abdul-Hamid ibn Badis, who was active in Algeria in the period leading up to WWII. The essay bore the title ‘The Understanding of Abdul-Hameed Ibn Baadis of the Phases of Da‘wah’. Ibn Badis was praised for his skilful, long-term vision for establishing political Islam in Algeria. He was especially admired for deceiving the French when he assured the colonial government that the Agerian Islamic movement's goals were apolitical:

"We are Algerian Muslim people in the colonial province of the French Republic. So because we are Muslims we act for the preservation of the traditions of our religion. And indeed, a government who is ignoring the people’s religion cannot manage it properly. We are not intending by this to mix religion and politics into all of our matters … And because we are a colony, we seek to fasten the bonds of friendship between us and the French nation. And we call on France to adhere to its three foundational Freedom, Equality and Brotherhood."

Ibn Badis' program was a painstaking one, extending for decades, which began with religious education, a strategy which Muhammad 'Abduh described as 'his plan ... to encircle [colonialism] and to destroy [it] … step by step (see here for an archived English translation, posted in 2003 by a Muslim group in Melbourne, Australia).

Boko Haram's objection to secular education is entirely consistent with the pre-WW II example of Ibn Badis, or the pre-WW II guidance of Mawdudi: religious formation in the principles of Islam provides the necessary foundation for establishing political Islam, up to and including an Islamic state. This is why, when Anwar Sadat allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to focus on charitable works and spiritual formation of the population, he was handing the future of Egypt over to them.

The most disturbing thing about all this — the Islamic movement's sweeping successes in education, and persecutions unleashed by the rise of devotion to the sharia across nations like Pakistan and Nigeria — is the phenomenon of denial.

On the one hand radical Muslims conceal the truth about the dhimma as an intended outcome of the Islamic revival, insisting that the dominance of non-Muslims by Muslims, by force, is synonymous with 'dignity', 'tolerance' and 'protection' for all. Jihad, the God-given means to achieve this utopia, is supposedly a struggle for justice, a noble effort to remove oppression.

On the other hand, so many Western leaders and journalists seem determined, heads firmly planted in the sand, to ignore the religious character of the violence plaguing Nigeria and so many other places where the global Islamic Movement has taken root. It is misleading to call such attacks 'senseless', or to remark that they 'initially appear to be terrorist acts', as the White House Press Secretary's statement said on December 26. Equally irrelevant is the UK foreign office's remark that the attacks, which included suicide bombings in which jihadis deliberately sacrificed their lives, were 'cowardly', or the New York Time's suggestion that attacks on churches are a 'new, religion-tinged front'. (Again, read Raymond Ibrahim's level-headed analysis which explains that Boko Haram's attacks have always targeted Christians).

Such rhetoric conceals the fact that the Nigerian attacks on Christians derive credibility and inspiration from a religious curriculum which demonizes non-Muslims. This curriculum appeals to passages taken from the Qur'an and the example and teaching of Muhammad to demand that it is a religious duty for Muslims wage war against infidels (that is, to kill them) to establish Islam, and that dawa and jihad go together hand in glove as the preferred Islamic method for establishing the glories of Islamic rule. This is supposed to usher in an Islamic Utopia for which non-Muslims could only be grateful. This Utopia is what the sharia will 'provide' for Christians, as Khalid Yasin put it.

These bloody attacks were not senseless. They had a purpose. They were intended to intimidate Christians in Nigeria into making political concessions to radical Islam. Above all they are intended to pave the way for Muslims to establish the dominance of the sharia as a political and legal force in that land. The sub-text of the attacks is 'Give us power, and you will be safe': 'protected', to use Khalid Yasin's words. This intention is not a new idea: it is a very old one. It was Muhammad himself who used to say to non-Muslims: aslim taslim 'Submit and you will be safe'. This use of terror is an idea acquired through religious instruction.

Of course not all Muslims adhere to such beliefs. There are other interpretations of Islam. A great many Muslims even detest at least some of the beliefs outlined here, and are appalled that anyone could link murderous acts to their personal faith. But such beliefs do exist, and what is more important, they do matter in today's world. They make a difference. For this the evidence is overwhelming.

It must also be admitted that not all the motives of those who go for jihad are religious. But the driving force, the compass that guides the sharia revivalist ship, is entirely its doctrinal base. It is faith nurtured in the very bosom of Islam itself which lays the groundwork for these horrendous attacks. It is real-life Muslims, who aspire to go on the Hajj to Mecca, pray five times and day, and recite the Qur'an in pious devotion — it is men such as this who cherish hopes of political ascendancy for Islam. These are the hands which are ready to act to hasten the day. And it is men such as these who pass on these ideals to the young.

These are bad, deadly ideas, which as they take hold, mete our despair and destruction, not only to non-Muslims and women, but also to Muslims. The sooner Western elites wake up and find a language for talking about all this, and gain the courage to accept that they do not have to sacrifice their own humanity along the way, that facing up to what is true does not mean one has become a hater or a bigot, the sooner rational policies can be put in place to respond to the manifold challenges posed by the world-wide sharia revival.

The question is not whether the radical Islamic revival is in full swing, but what can be done about it. But not much will be done until the thing is acknowledged for what it is. And until that happens there will be no will to resist, and no intellectual capacity to seek out and weigh up possible solutions.

MyPeace on Australian TV and "Islamic Values"

2011-10-28T05:50:00.000-07:00

mypeace.com.au is an Australian dawah (i.e. missionary) website. It is designed to invite people to convert to Islam. Disingenuously it states that it exists to "address the many misconceptions about Islam".

MyPeace is unashamed in declaring the superiority of its beliefs. For example mypeace.com.au characterizes Christian beliefs as 'blasphemous', 'distorted' and 'extreme'. It also speaks of the Islamic Christ, who when he returns will, by military force destroy all other religions, and usher in a utopia of Muhammadan sharia law across the earth. Furthermore, 'only Muslims today actually follow Jesus and his true teachings. Their way of life is much more in tune with the way of life Jesus practiced than any of the modern day “Christians."' In order words, Islam is the true Christianity.

This is an example of how MyPeace 'addresses misconceptions' about Islam.

MyPeace grabbed national attention with a series of billboards in Sydney earlier this year.

This week it is about to launch a TV ad campaign. The ad can be viewed here.

The text of the ad is:

[Qur'an:]
"To save one life is as though you have saved all of humanity". [Sura 5:32]
"Show kindness to your parents, just as they cherished you in childhood." [Sura 17:23-24]
[Muhammad:]
"Give in charity of the good things you earn"
"Even a smile is charity"

"Explore the real values of Islam at mypeace.com.au"

The text is read by a man with a broad Australian accent over scenes of:

a lifesaver saving a young boy in the Australian surf,
an elderly (unveiled) woman who has a shawl put around her shoulders to warm her, and
someone giving charity to a destitute young man.

Islam is based upon the Quran and the teachings and actions of Muhammad. The ad neatly reflects this. Australians should be more aware of both the Quran and Muhammad's life and witness.

In the interests of 'addressing misconceptions' about Islam, I offer the full text of Sura 5:32-34, which is the first passage from which the TV advertisement quotes:

For this reason [i.e. Cain killing Abel] did We prescribe to the children of Israel that whoever slays a soul, unless it be for manslaughter or for mischief in the land, it is as though he slew all men; and whoever keeps it alive, it is as though he kept alive all men; and certainly Our apostles came to them with clear arguments, but even after that many of them certainly act extravagantly in the land.

The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His apostle and strive to make mischief in the land is only this, that they should be murdered or crucified or their hands and their feet should be cut off on opposite sides or they should be imprisoned; this shall be as a disgrace for them in this world, and in the hereafter they shall have a grievous chastisement.

Except those who repent before you have them in your power; so know that Allah is Forgiving, Merciful. (Sura 5:32-34)

This cheery text includes a quote, somewhat altered, but still unmistakeable (in bold above) from the Talmud:

"Whoever destroys a soul, it is considered as if he destroyed an entire world. And whoever saves a life, it is considered as if he saved an entire world. Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 4:1 (22a)

There is multiple irony in MyPeace's advertisement. First the 'life-saver' verse is in fact a Jewish text. Second this verse is followed by and conjoined to a verse which calls for apprehending, killing, crucifying, and chopping off fingers and limbs of those who oppose Allah and Muhammad 'in the land'.

In reality verse 32 aims its message against Jews (and perhaps also Christians), of whom it is said that Allah's 'apostles came to them with clear arguments'. What should happen to such as these who 'make mischief in the land'? (v.32). The answer is found in the next verse: those who behave badly 'in the land' should be killed, mutilated or crucified. Well, except for those who convert to Islam (i.e. those who 'repent' see Ibn Kathir on verse 34): it is acceptable to let those who convert keep their fingers, arms, legs, lives and liberty.

Ibn Kathir goes on to report the view that this verse is in fact a warning against taking the life of a Muslim (but not of non-Muslims, because their lives are not protected in Islam like the lives of Muslims):

He who allows himself to shed the blood of a Muslim, is like he who allows shedding the blood of all people. He who forbids shedding the blood of one Muslim, is like he who forbids shedding the blood of all people

This is not a Nice Verse.

MyPeace is to be commended for bringing such an interesting and important passage to the attention of the Australian public. But they did not go far enough: let them present the whole passage to ordinary Australians, together with the interpretations of great Muslim scholars (such as Ibn Kathir) so that popular misconceptions about Islam can be eradicated in Australia.

Or else, if MyPeace's goal is just to give a positive spin to Islam, they might like to reconsider leading with another verse, and stay clear of Sura 5:32.

Muslim Persecution of Christians: September, 2011 by Raymond Ibrahim

2011-10-19T01:30:00.000-07:00

Muslim Persecution of Christians: September, 2011

by Raymond Ibrahim
October 12, 2011 at 5:00 am

This is a repost of an article published in Hudson New York.
See HERE.
An especially busy month in the persecution of Christians in the Muslim world, September also witnessed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton release the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom. Ironically, aside from Iran and Sudan, none of the countries that habitually appears in this series was designated among the "countries of particular concern," defined by the State Department as countries that are "engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom."

Egypt, for instance—which this year alone has seen over fifty Christians killed, their many churches burned or bombed, and their daughters kidnapped and forcibly converted—was not listed as a "country of particular concern," despite the fact that the U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedom, an independent, bipartisan federal government commission, has recommended that the State Department designate it so.
Neither was Pakistan cited as a "country of particular concern." According to CNS news, "Clinton did not designate Pakistan even though the State Department's own report stated that Pakistani law calls for the death penalty for people who commit 'blasphemy' against Islam or who convert from Islam to another religion—and even though the report listed multiple instances of the Pakistani government using the law to persecute Christians."
September alone saw the following in Pakistan:

Blasphemy

A Christian student was expelled from school because she misspelled an Urdu word that, instead of praising, insulted Muhammad, leading to accusations of "blasphemy," which carries the death penalty. After the teacher beat her, the principal was notified and Muslims staged demonstrations "demanding registration of a criminal case against the eighth-grader and her eviction from the area." As riots and violence were about to erupt, the military intervened: "They bundled the family in an ambulance and took them away..."
"A Christian high school teacher has suffered false accusations of blasphemy by a student and some Muslim professors, because of dislike, revenge and hatred towards Christians. He was forced to leave his job and hide; he appealed to Court, but the laconic sentence of the judge of first instance invited him to 'leave the country'…. Married and a father of three, he has been uprooted and is in hiding."
A 30-year-old Christian man accused of blasphemy and imprisoned, died in his cell from a treatable disease, "after officials denied him proper medical care." While in prison, he and others "accused of blasphemy, were kept in solitary confinement without access to a toilet, water or electricity."

Abuse of Christian Women

A Christian mother of five was raped by two Muslim men, who "tend to assume they will not be prosecuted if their victims are Christians"; she and her family are being threatened with violence unless they drop the charges.
A Christian nurse was raped by a Muslim colleague who filmed the act in an attempt to blackmail her into renouncing Christianity and marrying him: "[he] raped me while his friend filmed the entire incident. They ruined my life completely."
Accordingly, a new report estimates that some 700 Christian girls annually are abducted, forced to convert to Islam and marry their Muslim abductors.

Categorized by theme, the rest of September's batch of Muslim persecution of Christians includes, but is hardly limited to, the following accounts, listed according to theme, and in alphabetical order by country, not necessarily severity.

Attacks on Churches

Egypt: Muslims threatened Christians near Aswan for fixing a dilapidated church, even though the repairs had been authorized. They demanded that the church not have a cross, dome, bells, or even be called a "church"; weeks later, after Friday prayers, thousands of Muslims attacked the church, burning it to the ground, and demolishing its domes, as Egyptian security watched.
Indonesia: A Muslim suicide bomber attacked a packed church, killing himself and wounding at least 27 worshippers, some critically. Security received advance warning but, as often happens in Muslim majority countries, left their post at the time of the attack.
Tunisia: Around 20 Muslims attempted to transform a Christian church into a mosque "in an ominous sign of the growing threat to the country's small Church in the wake of the revolution." The police dispersed them, but "they have been invited to make an official request to the faith ministry" to transform the church into a mosque.

Apostasy

Indonesia: Under accusations of encouraging Muslims to convert to Christianity, an American family (husband and wife, two sons) were attacked by a Muslim mob who set fire to their property and vehicle. "Only the intervention of police saved the[ir] lives" from "an enraged mob spurred by a local religious leader."
Iran: A Christian pastor remains incarcerated awaiting execution for refusing to renounce Christianity. The government of Iran, under international criticism, now claims that he is getting the death penalty, not because of religion, but because he is a "Zionist," a "rapist," and other new charges, even though its own court documents clearly assert his crime is apostasy.
Somalia: A Muslim convert to Christianity was abducted and decapitated, his body dumped in the road, by Muslims from al-Shabaab, "a militant group with ties to al Qaeda" that has "vowed to rid Somalia of Christianity." According to a leader of the underground church: "It is usual for the al-Shabaab to decapitate those they suspect to have embraced the Christian faith, or sympathizers of Western ideals."
Sudan: 129 people in southern Sudan were arrested and charged with apostasy, which "carries a maximum sentence of death." The plaintiff maintains that while the defendants may be familiar with the Koran, they are not upholding the "Sunna ]path] of Muhammad": "Given the track record of the Government of Sudan, it is possible that Article 126 [which outlaws apostasy] is being used to suppress ethnic minorities and those who the state perceives as potential sources of opposition."

"Dhimmitude" (Abuse, Debasement, and Suppression of Christians)

Egypt: A 14-year-old Christian girl was prevented from entering school because she refused to wear a veil: "The school management described her as a 'flaunt' for not covering her hair"…. Coptic students were forced to obey for fear of the school management's threats" except the girl and her parents, who "refused this decision because it is inconsistent with religious freedom and a blatant Islamization of education."
Iraq: Three Christians were kidnapped: According to police sources, "Gunmen in a modern vehicle blocked the Christians' way, set their white Landrover [car] on fire, killed their hunting dogs and led them to an unknown destination." This abduction comes "after several other anti-Christian attacks in recent weeks, including a car bomb that exploded in August near a church in central Kirkuk..."
Iran: Along with the aforementioned Christian pastor awaiting execution, five Christians, including a "heavily pregnant woman," were ordered to "report to prison immediately to serve a one year prison sentence," after being convicted of "crimes against the Islamic Order." Also, an adopted child was confiscated from its Christian parents, as a way to pressure them to testify against fellow Christians: "If you want your child back, you must file a complaint against your fellow Christians in prison."
Kazakhstan: "Lawmakers in Kazakhstan have voted for 'controversial legislation' that Christians and rights activists say will further limit religious freedom in the mainly Muslim Central Asian state." Among other things, the new law "makes[s] it more difficult for churches to worship freely," and bans "house churches."
Philippines: In Mindanao, "the Christian minority is suffering harassment and pressure from the Muslim population. Government officials are forcing Christians to sell their land to make room for Chinese industries. According to sources, the climate of impunity, the abductions, the continuing clashes between the army and extremist Islamic groups and the economic crisis have created an unbearable atmosphere for the Christian population, who are afraid to express their faith in public."
Sudan: A Catholic priest was beaten for allegedly "preaching against [the] Islamic government and opposing its teaching and rules." Likewise, Muslims sent text messages to at least 10 church leaders in Khartoum saying they are planning to target Christian leaders, buildings, and institutions: "We want this country to be purely an Islamic state, so we must kill the infidels and destroy their churches all over Sudan," said one recent text message circulating in Khartoum.

Incitement Against, and Killing of, Christians

Egypt: In a circulated video, the grand mufti of Al Azhar, Ali Goma'a, referred to Christians as "infidels"; in the same vein, Wagdi Ghoneim, a popular cleric and former U.S. imam, called Copts "Crusaders" on Al Jazeera television, insisting that they do not deserve equal rights with the Muslims in Egypt; Abu Shadi, a representative of the Salafis, told Tahrir News that the Copts must either convert to Islam, pay jizya [an increased tax for not being a Muslim], and assume an inferior status, or die.
Nigeria: Over 100 Christians have been killed by Muslim militants, many hacked to death, aided by the military; "among them was a pregnant woman who died with a child in her womb." Similarly, Muslim militants "went to shops owned by Christians at a market at about 8 p.m., ordering them to recite verses from the Quran." If they were unable to recite anything, the gunmen shot and killed them.
Syria: An anti-Assad Muslim preacher urged Muslims through sermons televised in Syria to "tear apart, chop up and feed" the meat of Christians and others who support the regime "to the dogs."

About this Series

Because the persecution of Christians in the Islamic world is endemic, on its way to reaching epidemic proportions, "Muslim Persecution of Christians" was developed in to collate some—by no means all—of the most offensive instances of Muslim persecution of Christians that surface each month. It serves two purposes:

To document that which the mainstream media does not: habitual, if not chronic, Muslim persecution of Christians.
To show that such persecution is not "random," but systematic and interrelated—that it is ultimately rooted in a worldview inspired by Sharia Law.

Accordingly, whatever the anecdote of persecution, it typically fits under a specific theme, including hatred for churches and other Christian symbols; sexual abuse of Christian women; forced conversions to Islam; apostasy and blasphemy laws; theft and plunder in lieu of jizya; overall expectations for Christians to behave like cowed dhimmis [second-class citizens]; and simple violence and murder. Often it is a combination thereof.
Because these accounts of persecution span different ethnicities, languages, and locales—from Morocco in the west, to India in the east, and even throughout the West, wherever there are Muslims—it should be clear that one thing alone binds them: Islam—whether the strict application of Sharia, or the supremacist culture born of it.
Previous Reports:
August, 2011
Related Items:
Why 'Christian' Persecution?

Related Topics: Raymond Ibrahim receive the latest by email: subscribe to the free hudson new york mailing list

Australian Parliament Calls for an End to Coptic Persecution in Egypt

2011-10-13T04:16:00.000-07:00

Today, the House of Representatives honoured Australia’s commitment to religious freedom with a clear endorsement of a historic private member’s bill addressing the ongoing persecution of the Coptic Christians of Egypt.

On 19 September, Mr Craig Kelly MP, Liberal Federal Member for Hughes moved the following:

That this House:

(1) recognises that Coptic Christians in Egypt are suffering ongoing and increasing persecution;

(2) condemns the recent attacks on Coptic Christians in Egypt;

(3) expresses its sympathy for Coptic Christians who have been victims of recent attacks in Egypt; and

(4) calls on the Government to:

(a) issue a public statement condemning the ongoing attacks against the Coptic Christian minority in Egypt;

(b) make immediate representations to the United Nations to end the persecution of Coptic Christians in Egypt; and

(c) strongly urge the Egyptian Government to provide equal rights and protection for all Egyptian citizens regardless of race or religion.

Speaking to his private member’s bill, Mr Kelly noted that Egypt “is currently experiencing a period of unprecedented transition, the success of which hinges on full respect for the rule of law and compliance with international human rights standards including freedom of religion”.

At 10:00am today, Mr Kelly’s motion was passed by all members of the House.

With approximately 30 Coptic Christians observing proceedings from the Gallery, Mr Kelly acknowledged the presence of His Grace Bishop Suriel, Rev. Father Johnathan Isaac, Rev. Father Gabriel Yassa and former Sutherland Shire Councillor Magdi Mikhail.

In his statement to the House, following the passing of his motion, Mr Kelly referred to the brutal military violence against Coptic Christian demonstrators on 9 October 2011, which left at least 24 dead and at least 270 injured. He stated the motion just passed could not have been more timely. He was right.

Mr Kelly urged members of the House to view videos demonstrating armoured military vehicles ploughing into unarmed Christian protestors, “although graphic and horrific.. to understand the gravity of the situation.”

In an emotional recount of a young Christian woman’s testimony, the House heard of how Miss Vivian Magi, tried to protect her dead fiancé’s body from soldiers after he was run-over an armoured vehicle. She told Egyptian TV:

“His body was in the middle of the wheels. His legs were torn. His head hit the pavement, breaking his skull. Soldiers gathered around us and started to beat him up. I begged them to leave him.. Then a soldier with a red cap came, shouting, cursing and hitting me with a stick then tried to beat him up. I threw my body on him (her fiance) … and the soldier said to me: ‘You infidel, why are you here?’”

Mr Kelly condemned the violence of the military, the very body that was meant to be protecting its civilians. He said that on that fateful day, the army had committed “mass murder” in Cairo. He also referred to the role that Egyptian State television played by instigating the violence, calling on so-called “honest Egyptians” to rush to the defence of the military who were under the attack of Coptic protestors, when in reality, it was the Copts who were being gunned down and beaten.

He spoke to the role of the international community, stating:

“Now is not the time for silence or appeasement from the international community, for as the Copts go so may go the entire Middle East. If a Christian minority cannot live in a country with a Muslim majority population without suffering persecution and institutionalised discrimination our future looks bleak.

…The moderate voices in Egypt must be put on notice in the strongest terms to root out any anti-Christian element in the army and to give equal rights to all Coptic Christians and to ensure their protection.”

The Australian Coptic Movement (ACM) thanks Mr Kelly for voicing the concerns of Australian Coptic Christians and for bringing the plight of the persecuted Christian minority of Egypt to the attention of the Australian Government. After attending a protest held by the ACM earlier this year, Mr Kelly did more than appreciate the extent of ongoing persecution that the Coptic Christians have suffered for decades. He did more than just offer words of sympathy. It is because of his tireless efforts that the result of today’s vote in that Chamber went the way it did.

The ACM also thanks each member of the House of Representatives today for doing the right thing by passing the motion.

The House of Representative’s endorsement of Mr Kelly’s motion sends a clear message to the Egyptian caretaker Government and indeed the world, that Australia does not and will not stand by in silence, whilst innocent Christians are being persecuted for their faith.

The Australian Coptic Movement
Sydney, Australia

http://www.auscma.com/2011/10/13/australian-parliament-calls-for-an-end-to-coptic-persecution-in-egypt/

More on the Recent Massacre of Copts in Cairo

2011-10-12T11:19:00.000-07:00

In my last blog post I emphasized the role of the Egyptian military in killing Copts last Sunday. However it seems that most of the killings may have been done by gangs of Muslim men who took to the streets. In my previous post I had noted that one of the men's bodies in the morgue had had his throat cut, a mark of a religious ritual slaying which pointed to the activity of religious civilians rather than to soldiers. An important eyewitness account by Reva Bhalla throws light on what was happening:

As I neared the crowd, scores of mostly young Muslim men pushed their way past me carrying large wooden sticks and whatever rudimentary weapons they could fashion out of household kitchen items. Walking in groups of three or more with a confident swagger, they told everyone along the way that Copts were killing Muslims and soldiers and called on others to take revenge. The reality at this point did not matter; the mere perception that Copts were killing soldiers and Muslims was all that was needed for Muslim mobs to rally. While this was happening, state media was broadcasting messages portraying the Copts as the main perpetrators.

The crowd in Maspero was only about 1,500 people by my estimation, but a growing Muslim mob was pushing it deeper into downtown toward Tahrir Square. From where I and several other observers were standing, many of the Muslim rioters at first seemed able to pass through the military barricade to confront the Copts without much trouble. After some time had passed and the army reinforcements arrived, the military started playing a more active role in trying to contain the clashes, with some footage showing an armored vehicle plowing through the crowd. Some rioters claimed that Salafists from a nearby district had arrived and were chanting, “Islamiyyah, Islamiyyah,” while others parroted state media claims about “foreign elements” being mixed in with the demonstrators. As the night wore on, the scene of the riots split into roughly three sections: the Muslims on one side, the military in the middle and the Copts on the other.

This was not the best environment for a woman, especially one without an Egyptian ID card. A member of the security forces put a gun to the chest of a young, Egyptian-born female reporter, accusing her of being a foreign spy, before a group of young men came between her and her assailant, pulling her back and insisting she was Egyptian. The Muslim mob badly beat at least two young Coptic women in the crowd, after which throngs of young Coptic men gathered to take revenge.

A Copt alone on the wrong side of the army barricade became an immediate target, and I watched as scores of Muslim men carried one Coptic man after another into dark alleyways. These men likely contributed most to the final civilian death count. Cars with crosses hanging from their rearview mirrors were attacked with incendiary devices, their windows smashed.

In the light of this testimony, it is deeply shocking that Egyptian government officials and state media were so quick to stoke anti-Christian enmity (for example by putting out a subsequently discredited report that soldiers were being killed by Christians). This gives more than enough cause for Western governments to call upon Egypt's rulers to protect Egypt's Christians and not sacrifice them to the mob.

A perfect example of a very shabby response to these events is the press release put out by the Whitehouse:

The President is deeply concerned about the violence in Egypt that has led to a tragic loss of life among demonstrators and security forces. The United States expresses our condolences to the families and loved ones of all who were killed or injured, and stands with the Egyptian people in this painful and difficult time. Now is a time for restraint on all sides so that Egyptians can move forward together to forge a strong and united Egypt. As the Egyptian people shape their future, the United States continues to believe that the rights of minorities – including Copts – must be respected, and that all people have the universal rights of peaceful protest and religious freedom. We also note Prime Minister Sharaf's call for an investigation and appeal to all parties to refrain from violence. These tragic events should not stand in the way of timely elections and a continued transition to democracy that is peaceful, just and inclusive.

For security forces were not killed - this was part of the misinformation put out by Egyptian authorities which incited the killings of Copts. Shockingly President Obama has given official credence to the very reports which have caused innocent people to have their throats cut in dark allies.

Samuel Tadros' bitter complaint seems more than justified:

Perhaps I ought to join the president in his concern and call for restraint: I call upon the security forces to refrain from killing Christians, and upon Christians to refrain from dying.

A Double-Bind Upon the Copts: dhimmitude in action

2011-10-10T13:38:00.000-07:00

Over the weekend, violence on Cairo's streets resulting in the deaths of dozens of Copts and the wounding of hundreds more. The killings occurred when the Egyptian military dispersed a protest against a recent incident of church destruction in Elmarinab village, in Aswan province. Videos, including footage shown on Egyptian television, protray military vehicles deliberately running over bystanders (here and here), and another taken in a morgue shows a man whose throat had been cut.

The church destruction took place on 30 September when a mob of thousands of Muslim men went on a rampage after attending Friday prayers at local mosques in the village. Father Salib of St George's church said that his church was destroyed, along with some homes and other property belonging to local Copts, after a local Imam told Muslims to 'take matters into their own hands' (see here). The trigger for the attack was officially approved renovation work on the church building, which had become so dilapidated that it had been declared unsafe (see here). Reports indicated that the military looked on while the destruction was taking place. Afterwards Egyptian media reports denied the incident: for example the Governor of Aswan provide went on state television to deny that the building had been a church.

Why would restoring a church have caused Muslims to be enraged?
Why would church renovations be a topic for a Friday sermon in a mosque?
Why would Egyptian military stand by and do nothing? Or run over protestors?
Why was the attack denied and covered over by the media?

The answers are theological: they involve Islamic political theology.

For many secular western people, the word 'theology' carries little meaning. The term could be better rendered as 'ideology', but one which is based upon spiritual presuppositions and beliefs.

These days many critics of Islam are stating that Islam is not a 'religion' at all, but an 'ideology'. There are 184,000 hits on Google for the phrase "Islam is an ideology". See for example Geert Wilders explaining that Islam is 'not just another religion' but is 'an ideology'.

It is not necessary to turn to Islam's critics to hear this view. An article posted by Muslim students on the Student Association website of Northern Illinois University is entitled 'Islam is an ideology'. It explains that Islam requires that all legislation must be god-given, which means laws are to be based upon the Qur'an and the life of Muhammad (the Sunnah): "Islam forbids for any legislation to be taken other than that contained in the Qur'an and Sunnah". Moreover the very practice of Islam itself requires that the state must be Islamic, for 'our worship of Allah is incomplete' without the full application of the five pillars of Islam, and each pillar "remains suspended in part while the Islamic state is not existent, as they depend upon the state for their full implementation."

What this is saying is that Islam demands that the state - indeed any state - must be regulated according to sharia law, and unless and until Islam dominates in the public sphere, Muslims will not have true freedom to practice their religion. The Northern Illinois State University article also counts it a failure of Christians and Jews, that they have submitted to other authorities besides God (for example in a democracy, where the people have power to determine the government): such submission is idolatry (shirk) "the very mistake that the Christians and the Jews have made until the present day."

I do not agree with those who say that Islam is not a religion. It is a religion. But both Geert Wilders and the Muslim Student Association of Northern Illinois University are also correct. Islam classically demands a political realization, and specifically one in which Islam rules over all other religions, ideologies and competing political visions. Islam is not unique in having a political vision or speaking to politics - most varieties of Christianity and Judaism have a lot to say about politics - but it is unique in demanding that it alone must rule the political sphere.

Today, the root of massive human rights abuses being suffered by the Copts is entirely theological. Their difficulties are grounded in an Islamic vision for society which affords a clearly defined place for non-Muslims and specifically including Christians. Not all Muslims are seeking to implement this vision, but many are, and there is no coherent alternative vision being offered to Muslims in Egypt today.

The Islamic political vision, which is the root of the Copts's sufferings, demands that non-Muslims accept a place defined for them by Sharia law. This is the status of the dhimmi, who is permitted to live in an Islamic stated under terms of surrender as laid out in the dhimma pact. These terms are a well-established part of Islamic law, and can be found laid out in countless legal text books (see for example here, Ibn Kathir's commentary on Sura 9:29).

The pact of surrender of non-Muslims is understood in Islamic law to include a series of conditions, which conquered Christians (such as the Copts) have endorsed. For example, the Pact of Umar, established after conquest with the Christians of Syria, stated:

"These are the conditions that we set against ourselves and followers of our religion in return for safety and protection. If we break any of these promises that we set for your benefit against ourselves, then our Dhimmah (promise of protection) is broken and you are allowed to do with us what you are allowed of people of defiance and rebellion."

These conditions include:

"We made a condition on ourselves that we will neither erect in our areas a monastery, church, or a sanctuary for a monk, nor restore any place of worship that needs restoration."

The 'crime' of the Copts in Aswan province was simply that they wished to repair their church. This is opposed by the (theological) logic of the dhimma pact, which states that non-Muslims are not allowed to repair places of worship, on pain of being treated as 'people of defiance and rebellion', from whom 'safety and protection' has been withdrawn. In other words, such a person can be killed and their belongings plundered (because they are entitled to no protection under Islamic law).

For some pious Muslims in Egypt today, the act of repairing a church is a flagrant provocation, a breach of the peace, which amounts to a deliberate revocation of one's rights to exist in the land. This becomes a legitimate topic for sermons in the mosque, as the faithful are urged to use their hands to uphold the honor of Islam. It is seen as no injustice, and even a duty, to destroy the church and even the lives of Christians who have the temerity to repair their churches. Likewise those who go to the streets to protest church destruction are also rebels who have forfeited their rights to 'safety and protection'.

It is this theological worldview which motivates both the church destruction, and the killing of protestors by members of the military chanting 'Allahu Akbar' (Allah is greater).

Such ideas are not new. They are as old as Islam itself. However for obvious reasons - the sheer offensiveness of Islam's ideological treatment of non-Muslims - the dhimma is concealed and its provisions denied.

On the one hand the dhimma is denied by many in the West. Emblematic of this denial was President Obama's claim in his Cairo Speech in June 2009 that "throughout history, Islam has demonstrated through words and deeds the possibilities of religious tolerance and racial equality". Western denial explains the reluctance of Western media to give coverage to the present-day sufferings of the Copts, for to look too closely at the pattern of these afflictions will bring into the light of day the underlying cause, which is the dhimma. If the dhimma must be denied, then its manifestations must be denied as well. To do otherwise is just too threatening for comfortable Western leaders and opinion makers. The consequences of openly acknowledging the existence and persistence of the dhimma system are just too overwhelming.

On the other hand, some Muslims who to varying degrees share the dhimma worldview have proved themselves to be masters of misdirection and concealment. For example, although St George's church had official documents approving its renovation, the Governor of the Aswan Province went on air to state that the building was a "guest home" and not a church, and the fault of the Copts was that they built it 13 meters high instead of 9 meters. In response Father Salib of St George's said that the Governor had signed the approval for the renovations himself in 2010. The Governor's comments are most revealing. He is in fact appealing to the dhimma worldview, because restrictions on the height of buildings are part of the dhimma pact: non-Muslim buildings are required in Islamic law to be lower than Muslim buildings. (Even in Melbourne, Australia, Muslims have been known to protest when they considered plans for a Christian Community Centre to be too high.) The Governor was in fact defending the destruction of the church with reference to dhimma criteria: how dare those Christians build their church so high! How understandable that local youths wanted to tear it down!

Also when the Governor spoke of 'reconciliation' meetings between the Muslims and Christians in Elmarinab, he was indulging in a common piece of deceptive terminology for what has often turned out to be standover tactics designed to compel Christians - under threat of violence, kidnapping or destruction to their possessions - to accept that none of the attackers will be prosecuted. Here another feature of the dhimma legal system comes into play, namely that non-Muslim testimony against Muslims is invalid in a court of law, so Christians have no effective way of bearing testimony to what Muslims have done to them. The Governor's account must be accepted over that of the Christians because he is a Muslim and they are not. This asymetrical view of the worth of human testimony encourages systemic abuses against the truth.

There are many other ways in which the manifestations of the dhimma are denied and concealed in Egypt. Initial Egyptian media reports of the October 9 demonstration reported the killing of soldiers by protestors, and not the dozens of Copts who were killed. There were also reports that the military attacked a television station to prevent it from reporting on the killings (see here). Such local 'filtering' of abuses functions to confuse and dull the minds of the Western media observers. So Western media reflects the bias of the dhimma worldview.

It must also be acknowledged that Egyptian Muslims who act from a dhimmitude mindset vary a great deal in the degree of their commitment to the dhimma, and in the degree to which they will support an explicit revival of the dhimma. Some Egyptian Muslim leaders have been unashamed in making public calls for full reinstatement of the dhimma system, including the disciminatory jizya tax, but many other Muslims simply subscribe to the worldview of dhimmitude because they absorbed it as part of their mother's milk. It just seems normal not to prosecute Muslims who attack Christians and burn their churches. It just seems normal to disbelieve Christian testimony. It just seems normal to rejoice that a Christian girl, kidnapped, raped and coerced into marrying a Muslim, has converted to Islam, and is now under his guardianship and cut off from her family. Such prejudice is just normal.

Meanwhile the Copts are in a double bind. If they protest against the abuses brought upon their heads by the dhimma system, they are treated as rebels, and the value of their blood and possessions discounted accordingly: the more they protest, the less right they have under Islamic law even to exist. On the other hand, the more they acquiesce, the more voracious and emboldened their persecutors will become. This is what happened in Elmarinab: after the Christians made major concessions, their radical Muslim neighbors just demanded further concessions.

At the same time, Western praise for the "Arab Spring", and the recent waves of protest across the Middle East is giving the Copts hope that the world just might pay attention to their plight. They are no strangers to suffering and martyrdom - endurance of persecution has run in their veins for two thousand years - but yet they are hoping the world has the moral integrity to pay attention. They take to the streets out of the conviction that, although it should cost them their lives, they must speak out and be heard.

In this light, I do commend the Australian Coptic Community, under the leadership of Bishop Suriel, for their courageous stand, in calling on the Australian government to expel the Egyptian diplomats (see here):

Bishop Suriel, head of the Coptic Orthodox Church in Australia, is demanding the expulsion of the Egyptian Ambassador, and two Egyptian Consul Generals. In a Statement issued today, Bishop Suriel notes:

“Their presence in Australia is of no meaning to the Coptic community in Australia, in light of the events which have occurred in Egypt, and their subsequent failure to act in a capacity which represents the interests of both the Coptic and Muslim dynamic of the community. They have failed to take a proactive approach to advocate for the rights of the Coptic people in Egypt or to speak out against the atrocities and intense persecution the Coptic people in Egypt are facing.”

The international community will be held accountable if they do not act swiftly on the brutal attacks towards Egypt’s Coptic Christians who are suffering under a modern day form of apartheid where institutionalised discrimination and deadly attacks have a become a way of life for Egypt’s 15 million Copts.

Such a response would be timely and appropriate to the desperate injustices faced by Christians in Egypt today.

Egypt: Destroying Churches, one at a time

2011-10-10T08:31:00.000-07:00

by Raymond Ibrahim
Hudson New York
October 10, 2011

What clearer sign that Egypt is turning rabidly Islamist than the fact that hardly a few weeks go by without a church being destroyed, or without protesting Christians being attacked and slaughtered by the military?

The latest chaos in Egypt—where the military opened fire on unarmed Christians and repeatedly ran armored vehicles over them, killing dozens—originates in Edfu, a onetime tourist destination renowned for its pharaonic antiquities, but now known as the latest region to see a church destroyed by a Muslim mob.

This church attack is itself eye-opening as to the situation in Egypt.

Read further at: http://www.meforum.org/3065/egypt-destroying-churches

Do We Worship the Same God? A Review by Mark Durie of Miroslav Volf's "Allah".

2011-09-04T04:20:00.000-07:00

“Do we worship the same God?” This has become a hotly contested and divisive question, posed in these troubled days by many Christians about Muslims and Islam. Influential theologian Miroslav Volf, who is Henry B. Wright professor of Systematic Theology at Yale, offers an answer in his latest book, Allah: a Christian response (HarperOne 2010). Volf’s influence is considerable, and this book deserves careful consideration.

Three influences and one agenda

Volf comes to this question with three formative influences, and an agenda.

His first influence is a long-standing engagement with the theology of reconciliation and conflict resolution, out of which he wrote his acclaimed Exclusion and Embrace. This engagement was shaped by growing up as a Pentecostal Croatian Christian in communist Yugoslavia, and through reflection on the Yugoslav wars of 1990-1995.

Volf’s second formative influence is his intensive dialogue with Muslims in recent years, particularly through the Common Word[1] initiative.

Volf’s third influence is his admired father, to whom his book is dedicated, and who taught Volf from his earliest years that Christians and Muslims do indeed worship the same God.

The agenda Volf pursues is one of political theology. He asks, “Can religious exclusivists, adherents of different religions, [i.e. most Muslims and Christians] live comfortably with one another under the same political roof?” (p.220). Volf’s answer to this question is ‘yes’: on the basis of a shared belief in the one God.

The ‘Commonalities Approach’

To fully appreciate Volf’s argument – and its limitations – we must take careful note of his ‘commonalities approach’. His rules of engagement with the other are: 1. “Concentrate on what is common,” and 2. “Keep an eye out for what is decisively different.” (p.91)

At the heart of Allah are a handful of claims about God which Volf contends are shared by ‘normative’ Islam, and ‘normative’ Christianity (p.123). He argues from these shared convictions to propose a political solution for how the two religions can live together in peace.

Volf’s six core beliefs of monotheism are: (1) There is only one God. (2) God created everything that is not God. (3) God is radically different from everything that is not God. (4) God is good. (5) God commands us to love God. And (6) God commands us to love our neighbours as ourselves.

The first four beliefs, Volf says, establish his claim that, when people say God (or Allah), they refer to the same object, while the final two reinforce this claim (p.110).

Volf also distinguishes between referring to and worshipping God, and proposes that ‘To the extent that Christians and Muslims strive to love God and neighbor, they worship the same true God.’ (p.124). The Allah of whom the Qur’an speaks, Volf argues, is the God of the Bible, and this one God ‘requires Muslims and Christians to obey strikingly similar commands as an expression of their worship.’ (p.124)

Volf is an advocate of religious freedom, and argues that common belief in the one God requires both Muslims and Christians to support the impartiality of the state toward all religions (p.238), and specifically to embrace freedom of religion, without interference by the state, including the freedom to leave or change one’s religion. (p.234). This conclusion rests crucially on Volf’s claim that Muslims and Christians both accept God’s command to love one’s neighbour.

Packed with Interesting Perspectives

A ‘hot and spicy’ dish, as Volf calls it, Allah is jam-packed full of interesting ideas and perspectives. Volf’s reflections on what Nicholas of Cusa and Martin Luther had to say about Islam are rich (chapters 2-3), as is his discussion of the Trinity in chapter 7, in which he argues that what Muslims deny when they reject the Trinity is also denied by orthodox Christianity, and ‘Christians affirm what Muslims affirm’ about God’s oneness (p.143).

Another engaging feature of Allah is Volf’s capacity to point out that Christianity has had a history of perpetrating the very abuses which some present-day Christians attribute to the God of Islam, such as persecution of apostates, or the use of warfare to impose religious observance.

Blind Spots: Warfare against Unbelievers

Volf’s statements about Islam betray large blind spots, in part because he relies too uncritically on the testimony of his dialogue partners. This problem is particularly acute in his discussions of warfare against unbelievers, which is an important issue for peaceful coexistence.

Martyrdom Operations

For example, in a brief discussion of martyrdom operations, Volf cites the Amman letter to Pope Benedict[2] as his evidence that ‘normative’ Islam condemns what he calls ‘suicide terrorism’ (p.112). Yet there is no reference to or discussion of suicide terrorism in the Amman letter.

One of the points Volf makes is that Islam rejects suicide. Yet he seems to be unaware that among the Amman’s letter’s signatories are several who have endorsed what they refer to as martyrdom operations (i.e. suicide bombings). These scholars do not consider these operations to be acts of suicide:

• Shaikh Ali Jumu’ah, Grand Mufti of Egypt and Amman letter signatory has stated, “The one who carries out Fedaii [martyrdom] operations against the Zionists and blows himself up is, without a doubt, a Shahid [martyr] because he is defending his homeland against the occupying enemy who is supported by superpowers such as the U.S. and Britain."[3]

• The second signatory to the Amman letter, Professor al-Buti, has said martyrdom operations are completely legitimate if the motive is to spite the enemy.[4]

• Another signatory, Shaykh Ahmad Al-Khalili, Grand Mufti of Oman, has stated, “We are quite sure that the Jews are in their way to extinction, this is the promise of Allah ... Suicide is human boredom of life and his intention to kill himself, those Palestinian mujahideen are not bored with life and their intention was not to kill themselves: instead, they wanted to spite their enemy."[5]

The truth is that a great many leading Muslim scholars endorse ‘martyrdom operations’,[6] while rejecting the view that these are acts of ‘suicide’ on the grounds that if the intention of the bomber is to attack a legitimate enemy, blowing himself up is not an act of suicide at all.

Aggressive Jihad

A more serious blind spot shows when Volf alleges that the use of military force to extend Islam is ‘rejected by all leading Muslim scholars today’ (p.210), again citing the Amman Letter.

However, nothing in the Amman letter rejects aggressive jihad. What this letter rejects is killing people simply for the sake of their faith, and the use of force to compel conversion. It does not reject the use of warfare to extend the political dominance of Islam over unbelievers.

As Haykal’s magisterial 1993 survey of jihad in Islam shows, many leading scholars, both past and present, endorse jihad to make Islam dominant in the world.[7] That the purpose of military jihad is to extend Islam is supported by the consensus view of classical scholars, including the Shafi’i jurist al-Ghazali, of whom Volf states ‘he is in many ways the most representative Muslim thinker you’ll find, from any period’ (p.169).

Aggressive jihad is also supported by many Saudi scholars, such as Shaykh Muhammad al-Munajid, who has said, “Undoubtedly taking the initiative in fighting has a great effect in spreading Islam and bringing people into the religion of Allaah in crowds."[8]

Even among the signatories of the Amman and Common Word letters can be found advocates for aggressive jihad. For example, M. Taqi Uthmani, one of the leading Muslim jurists in the world today, and signatory to both these letters, has taught that “Aggressive Jehad is lawful even today... Its justification cannot be veiled … we should venerate ... this expansionism with complete self-confidence”.[9]

Muhammad Salim Al-Awwa, a prominent Egyptian cleric, is another prominent scholar who signed the Common Word letter.[10] He has pointed out that the word for Islamic conquests in Arabic is futūh ‘openings’. Al-Awwa explained that the purpose of conquest in Islam is ‘to clear the way between Muslims and the invitation to Allah without the obstruction of the [non-Muslim] rulers’. In other words, conquest opens up a land to Islam by removing political obstacles to the Islamic mission.[11]

The Killing of ‘Innocents’

At some points Volf seems almost gullible. He recites the oft-repeated claim that Islam forbids ‘the killing of innocents’, whereas in fact what sharia jurisprudence forbids is the killing of those whose lives Islamic law does not allow to be taken. The classical view is that the blood of disbelievers not living under a dhimma pact is halal (i.e. it is permitted to kill them).

While it is true that the laws of jihad forbid the killing of women and children – these should be enslaved rather than killed – it is permitted for infidel adult males to be put to death, ‘innocent’ or not. Even killing women and children is allowed as collateral damage. For example, Volf’s favoured authority al-Ghazali wrote ‘[O]ne must go on jihad at least once a year… one may use a catapult against them when they are in a fortress, even if among them are women and children. One may set fire to them and/or drown them.'[12]

An Ungenerous Reading of an Opposing View

On the one hand, Volf gives too generous an interpretation to his dialogue partners, finding rejection of objectionable aspects of sharia where there is none. On the other hand, he misrepresents a view which is opposed to his own. In my book Revelation I argued that when comparing the God of the Qur’an and the Bible, one must consider differences, not just similarities. Volf interacts with this part of Revelation, but misrepresents it, saying:

Durie … maintains that if you don’t have a complete match between descriptions of God in Islam and Christianity, you don’t have identity. To find out whether the God of the Qur’an is a genuine or false God, the procedure should be the same as when trying to figure out whether a banknote is genuine or counterfeit. If there are any differences from the banknote you know is genuine, then it’s counterfeit’. (pp.91-92 – Volf’s emphases)

This is a straw man. In reality I nowhere said that there must be a complete match to have identity, nor that finding any difference establishes that the God of the Bible and the Qur’an are not the same. I argued that while differences are important, the mere listing of differences is not enough to disprove identity. Instead one must focus on the deeper, fundamental attributes of God, and I then devoted a series of chapters to discussing deeper differences.

A Crucial Blind Spot: Love for which Neighbours?

The crux of the matter is Volf’s claim about the love of God. Absolutely pivotal for Volf’s argument is a hadith (a tradition of Muhammad) which he claims is a command to love ‘all’ neighbors (p.182), including non-Muslims. Volf appears to have derived this insight this from the Common Word letter, which makes use of an edited version of this tradition.

Because this is such a key point in Allah, I reproduce the exact text of the tradition (in the English translation of Abdul Hamid Siddiqui), including its chapter heading:

Chapter 18: CONCERNING THE FACT THAT IT IS ONE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF IMAN [Faith] THAT ONE SHOULD LIKE THE SAME THING FOR ONE'S BROTHER-IN-ISLAM AS ONE LIKES FOR ONE'S SELF

§72: It is arrested on the authority of Anas b. Malik that the Prophet (may peace and blessings be upon him) observed: one amongst you believes (truly) till one likes for his brother or for his neighbour that which he loves for himself.

§73: It is narrated on the authority of Anas that the Prophet (may peace blessings be upon him) observed: By Him in whose Hand is my life, no, bondsman (truly) believes till he likes for his neighbour, or he (the Holy Prophet) said: for his brother, whatever he likes for himself.

(Sahih Muslim, The Book of Faith (Kitab al-Iman) [13]

The first thing to note about this hadith is that the chapter heading in the very source Volf cites makes clear that the tradition is about loving one’s Muslim neighbour. The second thing to note is that the preferred reading (listed first) is ‘brother’, understood in Islam to refer to a fellow Muslim. Also the version of the tradition in the even more revered Sahih al-Bukhari reads: “The Prophet said, "None of you will have faith till he wishes for his (Muslim) brother what he likes for himself."[14]

It is also striking that Volf is unable to cite a single verse of the Qur’an to support the idea that God commands love for one’s neighbour. What can be found in the Qur’an are disturbing instructions on how to deal with non-Muslim neighbours, such as Sura 9:123 “O you who believe! Fight [to kill] those who are near to you of the disbelievers, and let them find harshness in you. And know that Allah is with those who fear him.”

Loving God?

Also questionable is the phrase Volf uses to justify his claim that Islam ‘commands us to love God with our whole being’ (p.104). He cites Allahu waḥdahu ‘God alone’, translated rather grandiosely as ‘God, One and Only’.

However the verse in question, Sura 39:45, literally says: “When God alone is mentioned, the hearts of those who do not believe in the hereafter shrink back with aversion; but when those besides him [i.e. other gods] are mentioned, behold, they rejoice.” It is hard to read this as a command to ‘love God with our whole being’, for the intent of this verse is simply to condemn those who worship a multiplicity of gods, in the context of future judgment.

It is about More than Love

It is disappointing that Volf goes no further in considering God’s character than ‘God is love’. Certainly for Christians, the claim that ‘we worship the same God’ demands agreement on this above all, but there are other salient attributes of God in the Bible, which it would have been fruitful to investigate in dialogue with Islam, such as his holiness, his covenantal faithfulness, his divine presence, and his creation of human kind in his image.

Leaps of Logic and Selective use of Evidence

The impression given throughout Allah is of someone who is keen to achieve his stated agenda of establishing a political theology for mutual coexistence. So keen that he is blind to contrary evidence, even when this is readily available, and makes unwarranted logical and rhetorical leaps in reaching for his goal.

For example, Volf cites verses to show that the God of the Qur’an loves (p.101), but then, without explanation, he immediately transforms this into ‘God is good’. These two claims are not the same, and the first is much easier to justify from the Qur’an than the second: ‘The Good’ is not one of the famous 99 names of Allah found in the Qur’an.

Another example is Volf’s claim that the Qur’an’s commands are similar to the Ten Commandments of Moses. What is problematic is that there are other commands in the Qur’an which contradict the Ten Commandments, specifically in the context of relations with non-Muslims. For example there are verses which command killing disbelievers (e.g. Sura 9:5); a verse which endorses sexual intercourse with (non-Muslim) married captive women (Sura 4:24; see also 4:3, 23:6, 33:50, 70:29-30); verses which encourage Muslims to take booty from disbelievers (e.g. Sura 48:20); a verse and associated hadith which encourage Muslims to disrespect their non-Muslim parents if they are hostile to Islam, Sura 60:8-9; and verses which incite deceiving disbelievers under certain circumstances (e.g. Sura 3:28).

Proof by Contradiction?

Volf’s method does not engage objectively with Islam in a rigorous way, carefully examining the weight of evidence for and against his various positions. Instead he zeroes in on commonalities to secure his six principles, backs each these up with a verse or two taken in isolation, and then constructs his argument on this foundation, seemingly in splendid isolation from Islamic theology and jurisprudence.

The weight of evidence is significant. It is not enough to just point out that something can be found somewhere in the Qur’an. One should also ask how central this theme is in the whole book. For example, the statement that God is loving is attested only twice (Sura 11:90, Sura 85:14). Scores of other attributes are far more more central, being mentioned more frequently (such as The Creator or The Omnipotent). The paucity of references to the love of God contrasts with the hundreds of references to God’s love in the Bible, including central descriptions of the character of God, such as God’s revelation of himself to Moses in Exodus 34:6.

An example of the isolation of Volf’s argument, in the light of Islamic thought, is that, although he advances an argument that the monotheism of ‘normative’ Islam should favor political inclusivism, rather than reinforcing exclusivism (p.246), Volf devotes no space to considering on what grounds Islam bases its unreciprocal treatment of the dhimmis, non-Muslims living in an Islamic society.

The result is that Volf’s conclusions are at odds with normative Islamic beliefs and practices. This gap is so great – on such topics as freedom of religion, treatment of apostates, and the political status of non-Muslims in an Islamic state – that he virtually mounts a proof-by-contradiction against himself, in which his premises are undermined by his conclusions.

What about Muhammad?

Perhaps the biggest blind spot of all in Allah is Muhammad. Islam is not only based on the Qur’an – it is also based upon Muhammad himself. The sharia, as a system for all of life, is constructed, with painstaking care, upon the details of the life of Muhammad, whom the Qur’an itself repeatedly commends as the ‘best example’ to follow. A problem with this is that Muhammad’s example includes many instances of the ill-treatment and subjugation of non-Muslims, in contrast to many exhortations for Muslims to treat fellow-Muslims with respect.

If Muhammad did not love his non-Muslim neighbour as himself, and his is the best example for Muslims to follow, how can Islam overlook the moral force of this example? Volf’s assumption that Islam should base its political vision on a few principles about the character of God – some of which are rarely if ever mentioned in the Qur’an – naively ignores this reality.

Because Volf turns a blind eye to Muhammad, he also completely underestimates the sharia as the most pressing issue for coexistence between Muslims and non-Muslims.

This appears to be the reason why Volf has nothing to say about growing pressure from Muslim groups to establish parallel legal systems in Western nations.[15] Muslim communities all over the lands of immigration have been asking and even demanding that non-Muslim governments recognise plural legal jurisdictions in order to accommodate the sharia. In our day, as sharia courts are springing up everywhere from London to Sydney, this is one of the most practical challenges to Volf’s vision of a common political roof for Muslims and Christians. Yet without engaging with the issue of Muhammad and his sharia, Volf can have nothing of importance to say about the real world of religious coexistence.

It has also to be emphasised that sharia implemention is not specifically a Muslim–Christian issue. The sharia raises much broader human rights issues, which impact severely upon Hindus in Pakistan, Zoroastrians in Iran, Ahmadiyyas in Indonesia, apostates from Islam in just about any nation, and, of course, Muslim women everywhere. The question is not how Christians and Muslims can live together, but how Islam can coexist with non-Islam. In the prescient words of William Montgomery Watt in 1993:

There are undoubtedly some Islamic states which treat non-Muslim citizens in ways which can only be described as oppressive … It is of the utmost importance that Muslim jurists should consider whether such treatment of non-Muslims is in accordance with the Shari’ah or contrary to it. More generally, does the Shari’ah allow Muslims to live peaceably with non-Muslims in the ‘one world’ … To have an answer to these questions may be a matter of urgency in a few years time.[16]

In reality, what Muhammad, the Qur’an and normative Islam consistently teach – which is nothing to rejoice over – is that Muslims should strive to achieve political dominance over the adherents of other religions, for example Sura 48:28 states “He [Allah] has sent His messenger with the guidance and the religion of truth, that He may cause it to triumph over all religion.” This belief is expounded in countless commentaries, legal textbooks and writings of Muslim scholars, past and present. It is a core part of normative Islam, which has not been renounced by the Islamic mainstream. It is upon this rock that Volf’s whole thesis founders.

Even-handedness or Tu Quoque Reasoning?

One frustrating aspect of Allah is Volf’s subtle reliance on tu quoque reasoning, which works to deflect attention from core issues. For example, Volf only mentions the idea of the dhimmi –which is so central for Muslim-Christian coexistence – in a discussion of 16^th century Christian religious compulsion (p.225). His seemingly even-handed presentation underscores Volf’s emphasis that intolerance is a universal human problem, but it conceals a refusal to engage with the Qur’anic basis of theological non-reciprocity in Islam. Thus Volf nowhere engages with Sura 9:29, which is perhaps the most crucial verse for determining the status of Christians in Islamic political theology.

Beware the Blurb

The reader should also beware of attributing what the cover blurb says to Volf himself. The cover, prepared by the publisher, states that ‘a person can be both a practicing Muslim and 100 percent Christian without denying core convictions of belief and practice’. This is an unfortunate misreading, for Volf in fact only says that a person can be 100% Christian while following certain Muslim practices (p.199) such as fasting during Ramadan, or calling Muhammad a ‘prophet’ with what is a non-religious meaning of that word.

It would have been more helpful if Volf had explained why belief in Muhammad as a prophet, in the orthodox Islamic sense, is inconsistent with Christian faith. Indeed through the whole book, the reader should be careful not to read implications into Volf’s text which he does not actually make explicit, for in the effort to maximize common ground, he sometimes sails very close to the wind, not making explicit the boundaries he will not cross.

Who is Allah really written for?

There is a tension concerning who is the intended audience of Allah. On the one hand, Volf repeatedly claims that he has written this book for Christians. However, it is Muslims who most need to be convinced about his proposed common ‘roof’ for coexistence.

Although Volf argues at length that normative Islamic and Christian monotheism should both support principles of religious freedom, most modern Christians do not need to be convinced about these principles as far as their own understanding of God is concerned. On the other hand, if Volf’s claims about the God Muslims believe in are not compelling for Muslims, what difference will it make what Christians think about the God of the Qur’an?

Volf has announced a party, under a common political roof, of love for God and neighbour. In a sense, the Christians are already at the party: for them the roof is already in place. The Muslims, by and large, are not there yet. In Allah, Volf has written a book to persuade Christians that Muslims ought to come to the party, but in the end this will make little difference to whether the party actually takes place. The important thing is for Muslims to turn up, not for Christians to be convinced that they must.

If Volf is wrong about Islam – and I believe he is – and the whole Christian world were to think like him, the outcome could be that Christians do nothing to counter resurgent Islamic supremacist ideology, all the while being convinced in themselves that ‘normative Islam’ supports principles of equality and freedom. This could be a recipe for a long steady spiritual decline, leading to political surrender.

For Western Christian eyes only?

Allah is very much pitched at Western Christians. However for Christians who currently live under Islamic dominance, even in countries where some of Volf’s dialogue partners are in a position of leadership, his book could cause great pain and offense, for it denies oxygen to a coherent understanding of the roots of the non-Muslims’ plight in Islamic theology and jurisprudence. To Volf’s claim that belief in a common God of the Bible and the Qur’an should produce conditions for reciprocity and freedom, persecuted Christians will respond with shocked incredulity. They are all too familiar with the verses of the Qur’an which Muslims use to justify such ill-treatment, and to them Volf’s rhetoric could sound like a form of abuse (i.e. the dhimmi syndrome), in which non-Muslims are only allowed to pursue peace by praising Islam.

Love trumps Truth

Volf’s Allah is a good-hearted attempt to forge an interfaith theology for political coexistence and peace under ‘the same political roof’ (p.220). Although his edifice is constructed on a profound knowledge of Christianity, warts and all, it relies upon blind spots and wishful thinking about Islam. Volf takes irenic delight in focusing on what is good and similar in the other. This is commendable in itself, but his method fails him badly, as he repeatedly overstates what is common and overlooks what is different. His loving gaze upon Islam is a heuristic failure.

Volf looks upon Allah through Christian eyes, seeing the God of the Bible in the pages of the Qur’an, but is often blind to contrary evidence. His image of Islam is thus fundamentally skewed.

This is a form of prejudice, not one born of a hostile fear of the other, but rather of the fear of excluding the other. This is a fear of being found to be less than Christian. Unfortunately, in Volf’s method, and – it must be conceded – against his avowed intent (see p.259), love trumps truth. Caveat lector.

Mark Durie is an Anglican vicar and human rights activist. He is the author of three books on Islam, including The Third Choice: Islam, Dhimmitude andFreedom (Deror Books 2010).

This review was published first in the July-August edition of Quadrant.

[1] http://www.acommonword.com.

[2] http://www.ammanmessage.com/media/openLetter/english.pdf.

[3] http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/961.htm.

[4] http://www.dorar.net/book_index/270.

[5] http://www.buraimi.net/vb/showthread.php?t=10232.

[6] See for example the list of scholars given at: http://www.palestine-info.info/arabic/fatawa/alamaliyat/alfatawa.htm.

[7] Al-Jihad wa-l-qital fi al-siyasa al-sharia’iyya ‘Jihad and Fighting according the the Shar‘i Policy’; see overview in David Cook’s Understanding Jihad, pp. 124-127.

[8] http://www.islam-qa.com/en/ref/43087/jihad.

[9] Islam and Modernism pp. 138-139.

[10] An image of his signature can be found here: http://www.acommonword.com/lib/sigs/Dr. Muhammad Saleem Al Awwa-Egypt.pdf.

[11] http://www.islam-qa.com/en/ref/43087/jihad.

[12] Andrew Bostom, The Legacy of Jihad, p.199.

[13] Sahih Muslim, The Book of Faith, Chapter 18 http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/muslim/001.smt.html - 001.0072. This interpretation is also backed up by commentaries on Sahih Muslim: see http://acommonword.blogspot.com/2008/02/notes-for-christians-on-understanding.html and http://acommonword.blogspot.com/2008/03/more-on-loving-ones-muslim-neighbour-in.html.

[14] The word ‘Muslim’ is added by the translator in brackets to make the meaning clear. http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/bukhari/002.sbt.html - 001.002.013.

[15] See for example the submission of the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils to a national inquiry into multiculturalism: http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/mig/multiculturalism/subs/sub81.pdf.

[16] Review of Bat Ye’or, Les Chrétientés d’Orient entre Jihâd et Dhimmitude. Journal of Semitic Studies, 1993.

European 'No-Go' Zones for Non-Muslims Proliferating "Occupation Without Tanks or Soldiers"

2011-08-22T18:19:00.000-07:00

In a lecture presented to a young Muslim audience at the University of Western Sydney on Friday 30 March 2001, the prominent Australian Muslim leader Dr Zachariah Matthews was discussing the role of 'migration' (Hijrah) in the 'phases' of dawah (i.e. the stages involved in proclaiming and establishing Islam). One of the aspects of establishing Islam through migration, he argued, is to secure local sovereignty, as modeled by the Muslim community when they migrated from Mecca to Medina. Matthews taught:

"The Hijrah ['migration'] to Madinah provided the Islamic Dawah with one very important thing, land, or a territory over which Muslims could have political sovereignty. The Hijrah made the Muslims Masters of their own internal affairs, external relations and matters relating to war and peace." (The Hijrah: a necessary phase in the Dawah)

What does it mean in practice when migrant communities establish local territory in which Muslims are masters of their own internal affairs? Is the theological principle of establishing local sovereignty the ideological wedge which is so successfully subverting multiculturalism throughout the lands of migration?

The following article by Soeren Kern suggests that the answer to this question may well be 'Yes'.

By Soeren Kern

August 22, 2011 at 5:00 am

http://www.hudson-ny.org/2367/european-muslim-no-go-zones

Islamic extremists are stepping up the creation of "no-go" areas in European cities that are off-limits to non-Muslims. Many of the "no-go" zones function as microstates governed by Islamic Sharia law. Host-country authorities effectively have lost control in these areas and in many instances are unable to provide even basic public aid such as police, fire fighting and ambulance services.
The "no-go" areas are the by-product of decades of multicultural policies that have encouraged Muslim immigrants to create parallel societies and remain segregated rather than become integrated into their European host nations.

In Britain, for example, a Muslim group called Muslims Against the Crusades has launched a campaign to turn twelve British cities – including what it calls "Londonistan" – into independent Islamic states. The so-called Islamic Emirates would function as autonomous enclaves ruled by Islamic Sharia law and operate entirely outside British jurisprudence.

The Islamic Emirates Project names the British cities of Birmingham, Bradford, Derby, Dewsbury, Leeds, Leicester, Liverpool, Luton, Manchester, Sheffield, as well as Waltham Forest in northeast London and Tower Hamlets in East London as territories to be targeted for blanket Sharia rule.
In the Tower Hamlets area of East London (also known as the Islamic Republic of Tower Hamlets), for example, extremist Muslim preachers, called the Tower Hamlets Taliban, regularly issue death threats to women who refuse to wear Islamic veils. Neighborhood streets have been plastered with posters declaring "You are entering a Sharia controlled zone: Islamic rules enforced." And street advertising deemed offensive to Muslims is regularly vandalized or blacked out with spray paint.

In the Bury Park area of Luton, Muslims have been accused of "ethnic cleansing" by harassing non-Muslims to the point that many of them move out of Muslim neighborhoods. In the West Midlands, two Christian preachers have been accused of "hate crimes" for handing out gospel leaflets in a predominantly Muslim area of Birmingham. In Leytonstone in east London, the Muslim extremist Abu Izzadeen heckled the former Home Secretary John Reid by saying: "How dare you come to a Muslim area."

In France, large swaths of Muslim neighborhoods are now considered "no-go" zones by French police. At last count, there are 751 Sensitive Urban Zones (Zones Urbaines Sensibles, ZUS), as they are euphemistically called. A complete list of the ZUS can be found on a French government website, complete with satellite maps and precise street demarcations. An estimated 5 million Muslims live in the ZUS, parts of France over which the French state has lost control.

Muslim immigrants are taking control of other parts of France too. In Paris and other French cities with high Muslim populations, such as Lyons, Marseilles and Toulouse, thousands of Muslims are closing off streets and sidewalks (and by extension, are closing down local businesses and trapping non-Muslim residents in their homes and offices) to accommodate overflowing crowds for Friday prayers. Some mosques have also begun broadcasting sermons and chants of "Allahu Akbar" via loudspeakers into the streets.

The weekly spectacles, which have been documented by dozens of videos posted on Youtube.com (here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here), and which have been denounced as an "occupation without tanks or soldiers," have provoked anger and disbelief. But despite many public complaints, local authorities have declined to intervene because they are afraid of sparking riots.
In the Belgian capital of Brussels (which is 20% Muslim), several immigrant neighborhoods have become "no-go" zones for police officers, who frequently are pelted with rocks by Muslim youth. In the Kuregem district of Brussels, which often resembles an urban war zone, police are forced to patrol the area with two police cars: one car to carry out the patrols and another car to prevent the first car from being attacked. In the Molenbeek district of Brussels, police have been ordered not to drink coffee or eat a sandwich in public during the Islamic month of Ramadan.

In Germany, Chief Police Commissioner Bernhard Witthaut, in an August 1 interview with the newspaper Der Westen, revealed that Muslim immigrants are imposing "no-go" zones in cities across Germany at an alarming rate.

The interviewer asked Witthaut: "Are there urban areas – for example in the Ruhr – districts and housing blocks that are "no-go areas," meaning that they can no longer be secured by the police?" Witthaut replied: "Every police commissioner and interior minister will deny it. But of course we know where we can go with the police car and where, even initially, only with the personnel carrier. The reason is that our colleagues can no longer feel safe there in twos, and have to fear becoming the victim of a crime themselves. We know that these areas exist. Even worse: in these areas crimes no longer result in charges. They are left 'to themselves.' Only in the worst cases do we in the police learn anything about it. The power of the state is completely out of the picture."

In Italy, Muslims have been commandeering the Piazza Venezia in Rome for public prayers. In Bologna, Muslims repeatedly have threatened to bomb the San Petronio cathedral because it contains a 600-year-old fresco inspired by Dante's Inferno which depicts Mohammed being tormented in hell.
In the Netherlands, a Dutch court ordered the government to release to the public a politically incorrect list of 40 "no-go" zones in Holland. The top five Muslim problem neighborhoods are in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht. The Kolenkit area in Amsterdam is the number one Muslim "problem district" in the country. The next three districts are in Rotterdam – Pendrecht, het Oude Noorden and Bloemhof. The Ondiep district in Utrecht is in the fifth position, followed by Rivierenwijk (Deventer), Spangen (Rotterdam), Oude Westen (Rotterdam), Heechterp/ Schieringen (Leeuwarden) and Noord-Oost (Maastricht).

In Sweden, which has some of the most liberal immigration laws in Europe, large swaths of the southern city of Malmö – which is more than 25% Muslim – are "no-go" zones for non-Muslims. Fire and emergency workers, for example, refuse to enter Malmö's mostly Muslim Rosengaard district without police escorts. The male unemployment rate in Rosengaard is estimated to be above 80%.
When fire fighters attempted to put out a fire at Malmö's main mosque, they were attacked by stone throwers.

In the Swedish city of Gothenburg, Muslim youth have been hurling petrol bombs at police cars. In the city's Angered district, where more than 15 police cars have been destroyed, teenagers have also been pointing green lasers at the eyes of police officers, some of whom have been temporarily blinded.
In Gothenburg's Backa district, youth have been throwing stones at patrolling officers. Gothenburg police have also been struggling to deal with the problem of Muslim teenagers burning cars and attacking emergency services in several areas of the city.

According to the Malmö-based Imam Adly Abu Hajar: "Sweden is the best Islamic state."

When Speaking on Sensitive Topics

2011-08-15T19:34:00.000-07:00

This blog post is about how to speak reasonably about sensitive topics, and specifically ones which can give rise to charges of vilification.

In ideal world, speech would be free, and everyone would use their freedom responsibly. But human nature being what it is, speech is never completely free, and human beings often act up in bad ways.

How then can we talk about difficult and reactive topics, such as destructive forms of religion, or the negative attributes of particular classes of people such as nations, cultures, races or tribes?

One of the challenges to freedom of speech in the west today is the emergence of so-called hate-speech laws, also known as (racial or religious) vilification laws. These laws are built upon the concept of incitement. They attempt to make illegal certain forms of speech which could incite or provoke others to have bad feelings towards particular groups of people. An example in Victoria, Australia, is the oddly-named Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, which aims to ban conduct that incites 'hatred', 'serious contempt', 'revulsion' or 'severe ridicule' against classes of people on the basis of their religion or race.

One problem with the concept of anti-incitement laws is that some realities about human beings' attributes really are beyond the pale, and deserve robust critique precisely because they should incite strong negative emotions. A bad effect of anti-incitement laws is that they can make a person who speaks about such things responsible for the negative emotions which could and even should arise from their subject material. For example if I accurately describe the actions of communists under Pol Pot, including their genocidal slaughter of the Khmer population, this should incite feelings of revulsion towards the Khmer Rouge. Irrespective of whether that is a good thing, it would still be incitement. Usually anti-incitement laws provide a way around this. The Victorian law includes escape clauses known as 'exceptions' which mean that under specific circumstances, a person will not be held accountable for their incitement. These escape clauses involve acting 'reasonably and in good faith' for a specific purpose, such as an academic or scientific purpose, giving comment on something in the public interest, or creating a work of art.

Another problem with anti-incitement laws is that truth is not a defense in the way it is for anti-defamation laws. You cannot defame someone by speaking the truth about them. But you can incite hatred, contempt etc against a group by speaking the truth about them, if the truth itself is unpleasant. So a problem with anti-incitement laws is that they can make speaking unpalatable truths illegal. That can be a big problem. There is however usually a partial protection for truth tellers, in that getting your facts right can help demonstrate that you have acted 'reasonably and in good faith'.

I'm no fan of anti-incitement laws, whatever name they go by (whether 'hate crime' laws, 'anti-vilification laws' or 'defamation of religion' laws). For one thing they can inflame tensions between groups by inciting complaints and court cases. These are inciteful laws which can easily provoke racial and religious tensions.

But my purpose here is not to complain about anti-incitement laws. The purpose of this post is to suggest a few principles which speakers and writers might be wise to follow when dealing with sensitive topics. These principles, if followed, may help to provide some protection against complaints of incitement.

Essentially these are tips for acting reasonably and in good faith, or to put it another way, for cooperative communication.

(Please note that I am not a lawyer, but a cleric and a linguist, and I offer no guarantees about the effectiveness of these principles!)

State your purpose and stay on topic.
If you want to criticize the Khmer Rouge, don't stray into a diatribe against Stalin.
If you want to criticize Islam's treatment of women, don't stray into criticizing the clothing preferences of Arab men. There is nothing like gratuitous off-topic insults for giving the impression that you are up to no good. Don't fall into the trap of 'too much information!'.
Often it is very helpful to state your purpose up front, e.g. "I am writing about the evils of the Hindu practice of suttee".
Check your facts.
That one is obvious.
Don't say things you don't have adequate evidence for.
Obvious again.
When you have a choice, take your information from the most authoritative and original source you can.
"The Bible says X" will trump "my granny says the Bible says X". "The Australian Bureau of Statistics reported X" is better than "The Readers Digest said X". Always go to and check up a more original source if you can. Don't rely on third-party information (hearsay) if you can avoid it. For example if you want to make a claim about Muhammad, look up and check the original Islamic sources for yourself, even if it is in English translation.
If your source has some limitations (and most do) be aware of this and if necessary acknowledge it.
Part of due diligence is assessing the reliability of your source you do use, and being aware of its limitations, e.g., are you quoting from a translation? Do you speak the original language of your source? Do others accept your source as authoritative? You can't be the world's expert on everything, but you can exercise due diligence with the information you use, not only in using the best source, but also being aware of the limitations of your source.
Be dispassionante and avoid emotive judgements.
It can be hard to restrain yourself, but really it is better to let people make their own emotive judgements about information they receive. Offer people your arguments and evidence rather than your emotive perspectives. For example, it is one thing to explain that Muhammad married a five-year old girl and consummated the marriage at 9 years old, and quite another thing to call Muhammad by derogatory words usually reserved for people who might want to do things like that today. Let the hearer or reader come to their own conclusions about such labels. Don't command people's emotions. There are some exceptions of course. If your whole presentation is to communicate a specific negative judgement (e.g. 'modern-day Mormon polygamy abuses women') then that judgement can be stated up front and central (point 1 above). But don't sweat all the value judgements along the way. Hold your emotional fire for when you really need it, and have confidence in your audience to make up their own moral minds. People want to be informed, not coaxed. If something deserves contempt, you usually don't need to tell people 'this deserves contempt'. This can often just come across as 'shouting'. Your audience probably won't like it, and it will come across as coercive. Let the evidence speak for itself.
Avoid stereotyping.
Stereotyping is all about attributing to the group the attributes of the few. Don't say 'Christians believe X' unless you are really, really sure that virtually all Christians do believe X. Be especially careful about attributing intentions to groups, e.g. 'Christians want to take over the world'! Or 'Muslims don't tell the truth'. There are many ways to avoid stereotyping. One is to use the words of representative voices and explaining their standing. For example, you might say "The Archbishop of Canterbury, spiritual leader of Anglicans around the world has said X." This is better than "Anglicans believe X". Another way of avoiding stereotyping is to acknowledge contrary voices. E.g. 'The pope says X, but many Catholics disagree'. Another way when speaking about religious matters is to make a clear distinction between what texts or authorities say, and what individuals believe and do. E.g. 'The Qur'an says "Kill the unbelievers" but many Muslims don't believe that applies to them.' Another technique is to make a clear distinction between practices and beliefs. Someone can believe something, but not act upon it. (Be aware also that stereotypes can be negative or positive, and both types of stereotyping can be unhelpful.)
Refer people to original sources, so people can check things for themselves.
If at all possible, always point people to a way to check what you are saying for themselves. Some specific contexts don't allow this, but there are ways around this. For example if you have published a book on a subject, with the sources clearly acknowledged, you could have more freedom to make claims in an interview, knowing that an audience could check things in your book and look up the sources for themselves.
Take appropriate responsibility for inferences others may come to.
There are things you actually say, and things people think you said, because they inferred it from what you said. Part of the due diligence of communicating with others in a reasonable way is to be aware of how they might interpret what you say, and taking an appropriate degree of responsibility for this. You should make what you say as informative as required. If you leave key points open to interpretation, that probably means you didn't give enough information.
Be clear.
One of the most important things when talking about sensitive subject is just to be clear and orderly in the way you present your material.

Much of the above points are expressions of Grice's Maxims of communication and the cooperative principle. It's all about being a responsible, cooperative communicator. And Mark Durie's fifth maxim of anti-incitement communication is that the more sensitive and inflammatory a topic is, the more careful and 'cooperative' you need to be in addressing it.

Finally, one must acknowledge that there are many complications surrounding this subject. One is that victims of abuse have rights. One of their rights is to have strong feelings about their experiences of abuse. Demanding that they be dispassionate about being raped, tortured, killed etc can be inhumane. The advice given above is designed for the careful communicator. But the testimony of first-hand witnesses can rarely afford such luxuries. When victims are speaking, the audience has responsibilities too. And one of these responsibilities is to allow that the testimony of victims is often not orderly, dispassionate, well-sourced, verifiable, to the point, bleached of stereotypes etc. A listener has a duty of compassion to listen carefully to the testimony of victims.

Of course there are those whose sense of victimhood is out of all proportion to reality, and their testimony can demand that their audiences make the most unjustified allowances to uncooperative and unreasonable communications - let the reader beware.

2UE Radio Host Michael Smith's Comments on Muhammad's Marriage to Aisha

2011-08-14T07:25:00.000-07:00

Today the Sydney Morning Herald reported that Michael Smith, 2UE Radio Host, is being investigated by the Australian Media and Communications authority "over his assertion that the prophet Muhammad 'married a nine-year-old and consummated it when she was 11'".

It would be excellent if Australian authorities did look into Muhammad's marital arrangements with his young wife Aisha, because it is a significant human rights issue which will not go away.

Accuracy in reporting is always important, and all the more so because Muhammad's example is regarded as perfect by pious Muslims, and a model for all humanity to follow. The circumstances of Muhammad's marriages provide a fundamental point of reference for sharia law. They determine, for example, the marriage age for girls in societies which seek to comply with the Islamic sharia.

The fact of the matter is that Michael Smith got his facts wrong. The matter is worse than he said. According to the most authoritative Islamic sources, Muhammad married Aisha when she was 6, and he consummated the union when she was 9. He was 53 at the time.

The following accounts are from the most highly regarded sources on Muhammad's life, the Sahih al-Bukhari and the Sahih Muslim. These are considered to be reliable and authoritative by pious Muslims. Several other highly-regarded sources confirm these reports.

Narrated 'Ursa: The Prophet [Muhammad] wrote the (marriage contract) with 'Aisha while she was six years old and consummated his marriage with her while she was nine years old and she remained with him for nine years (i.e. till his death). (Sahih Bukhari 7.88)

Narrated 'Aisha: I used to play with the dolls in the presence of the Prophet, and my girl friends also used to play with me. When Allah's Apostle used to enter (my dwelling place) they used to hide themselves, but the Prophet would call them to join and play with me. (The playing with the dolls and similar images is forbidden, but it was allowed for 'Aisha at that time, as she was a little girl, not yet reached the age of puberty.) (Sahih Bukhari 8.151)

Muhammad explained that he had to marry Aisha because he dreamed about her:

Narrated 'Aisha: Allah's Apostle said to me, "You were shown to me twice (in my dream) before I married you. I saw an angel carrying you in a silken piece of cloth, and I said to him, 'Uncover (her),' and behold, it was you. I said (to myself), 'If this is from Allah, then it must happen.' Then you were shown to me, the angel carrying you in a silken piece of cloth, and I said (to him), 'Uncover (her), and behold, it was you. I said (to myself), 'If this is from Allah, then it must happen.' " (Sahih Bukhari 9.140)

Furthermore, one can note that Aisha's ages are given in lunar years, following the Islamic custom. In fact the '6 years' could have been as young as 5 years and 10 months in Western reckoning. And '9 years' could have been as young as 8 years and 9 months.

The subject is discussed on pp.52-53 of my book The Third Choice, where I explain:

Based on this example, and the Quranic verse Q65:4, Islamic scholars even developed regulations for remarrying young girls, namely that a divorced prepubescent girl would need to wait three months before remarrying (this waiting period is known as the ‘idda). Thus the Sahih al-Bukhari includes the following passage in the Book of Marriage:
(39) CHAPTER. Giving one’s young children in marriage (is permissible)
By virtue of the Statement of Allah ‘… and for those who have no (monthly) courses (i.e. they are still immature) (V.65:4).
And the ‘Idda for the girl before puberty is three months (in the above Verse).
5133. Narrated A’isha that the Prophet married her when she was six years
old and he consummated his marriage when she was nine years only, and
then she remained with him for nine years (i.e. till his death). [Tafsir Ibn Kathir. Commentary on Q65:4. Vol. 10, p.43 - or visit www.tafsir.com]
Ibn Kathir, in his commentary on Q65:4 [Chapter 65, verse 4 of the Qur'an] states:
The same is for the young, who have not reached the years of menstruation.
Their ‘Iddah is three months like those in menopause. This is the meaning
of the saying ‘and for those who have no courses’ [Q65:4]
Such reports of Muhammad’s life are found in the hadith and sira, and should be well known to trained scholars of Islam, but they are not meant to be discussed publicly, especially not before non-Muslims.

Nevertheless they have enormous practical consequences. Setting a marriage age of nine for girls is no matter of obscure theological interest or polemical debate, but an intensely practical issue of enormous consequence for the lives of countless young girls in Muslim nations.

The Ayatollah Khomeini, then in his late 20’s, married Batoul Saqafi Khomeini when she was eleven years old, following his prophet’s example. Today some Muslim countries make 9 the minimum age of
marriage for girls, and in others such marriages are not prevented, even though they may be illegal. Countless thousands of young girls’ lives are affected by Muhammad’s example in marrying Aisha.

One hopes that the Australian Media and Communications authority corrects Michael Smith's error, and informs the public of the actual marriage age of Aisha – as reported in authoritative Islamic sources. They could also explain to the public the human rights implications of this well-documented fact.

The right of Australians — Muslims and non-Muslims alike — must be respected, to comment upon Muhammad's life freely and openly, because it impacts the human rights of millions of fellow human beings. This is not about sacred history, but about the lived conditions of people all over the globe.

Everyone has a right and a duty to inform themselves about Muhammad, and to speak up to discuss the interesting and important challenges which his life presents to people living in the world today.

Archbishop of Dhimmitude? A press release from Lambeth

2011-06-14T16:23:00.000-07:00

The following press release from Lambeth Palace, issued on Tuesday June 14, has some positive features, including its concern for religious freedom and religious rights. However it has grave weaknesses, quite apart from the mis-naming of the OIC (it is the Organisation for the Islamic Conference, not 'of Islamic Countries').

1. It is true neither of Christianity nor Islam that 'both traditions had been traditionally committed to the path of peaceful co-existence'. In a moment of extreme irony the release speaks of more violent interpretations as 'revisionist'. The opposite is true. On the one hand, in terms of theology, some Christians have espoused violent theologies in the past (e.g. the Holy War of the Conquistadors) but there are no Christian theological revisionists pushing for such theologies to be returned today. On the other hand, jihad and its evil twin, the dhimma, are well-established core institutions of classical Islamic ideology and political practice. To claim that these two components of sharia, with their millions of casualties, represent the 'path of peaceful co-existence' is to promote an ugly falsehood. Christians living in Islamic societies would be justly aggrieved by this revisionist claim.

2. Key terms in the statement are ambiguous because they mean very different things in the two traditions.

One is 'persecution', which in Arabic translates as fitna. It is precisely objection to fitna which is the basis in Islamic law for punishing apostates from Islam. This objection is also used by Muslim theologians to justify the worst features of the dhimma pact. Radical Muslims object to 'persecution' – i.e. to fitna – understanding it to be the evil which anti-blaspemy and anti-apostasy laws are designed to combat. As the Qur'an says (twice!): 'fight them until there is no persecution (fitna)' and 'persecution (fitna) is worse than slaughter'. From this perspective of 'persecution', does the Archbishop of Canterbury really want to appear to be lending tacit support to the tradition of Islamic 'fighting' and 'killing' as measures to eliminate 'persecution'?

The phrase 'unjust persecution' is particularly regrettable Does this imply that 'just persecution' is supportable?

Another ambiguous term is 'protection' of other religious communities, such as religious minorities. In Islamic political ideology this refers to the dhimma. To imply that the dhimma is a model for peaceful coexistence shows contempt for justice and human rights.

=====

Press release from Lambeth Palace

Tuesday 14th June 2011

For immediate use

Archbishop meets with Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Countries

The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, met this morning with the Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Countries, Professor Ekemeleddin Ihsanoglu, at Lambeth Palace. Baroness Warsi, Minister without Portfolio in the Cabinet Office, joined the meeting. Though wide-ranging, their discussion focused in particular on the importance of continuing to build understanding, and personal and community relationships, between Christians and Muslims (and members of other faiths), and particularly among younger members of the faith communities.

In the meeting, it was said that while both traditions had historically been committed to the path of peaceful co-existence, some modern revisionist and extremist tendencies had attempted to replace this with a path of confrontation and violence - this had to be resisted. It was said that the most positive way forward was to emphasise the duty of every faith community to work for the protection of every other. Religious freedom, and freedom from religious persecution - especially the persecution of minorities - were essential hallmarks of responsible government. For their part, religious leaders had a duty to speak out and stand side by side against the unjust persecution of those of other faiths.

Dhimmitude and Ibn Ajibah on the Death of the Non-Muslim Soul

2011-06-12T06:01:00.000-07:00

By Mark Durie

I first became intrigued by the situation of non-Muslims under Islam while doing linguistic field work in Aceh, Indonesia in the late 1970's and early 1980's.

This interest was piqued in the 1990's by reading Bat Ye'or's The Decline of Christianity under Islam. This led to research which culminated in The Third Choice: Islam, Dhimmitude and Freedom, published in 2010.

There are two stories about non-Muslims living under Islam, who Muslims call dhimmis. To caricature somewhat, one story is that dhimmis were the fortunate recipients of Islamic benevolence. The other story is that they had to buy their heads back each year in a legal system designed to degrade and belittle them, and ultimately to bring about their decline.

As I was doing the research for The Third Choice, I found plenty of primary sources which supported the second story. I was troubled however by the possibility that the sources I had encountered might not be representative. I mean no disrespect to Bat Ye'or or others, who had painstakingly collected many primary materials from Muslim and non-Muslim writers, but it is just common sense that when sources are selected, there is the possibility of selectivity, and if you must rely on the work of others who have searched out primary sources, you cannot know for yourself what they neglected to report among their findings.

As I was working on The Third Choice, and contemplating this problem of selectivity, a wonderful resource opened up before my eyes. I discovered that the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute of Islamic Thought had gathered together a collection of classical commentaries on the Qur'an, which they had published on the internet. This is The Great Tafsirs Project of the Holy Qur'an, at www.altafsir.com. On this site the Aal al-Bayt Institute has published 69 Arabic commentaries of the Qur'an. These are dated from the earliest centuries of Islam right through to the present day.

I was, I must admit, pleased to note that Aal al-Bayt could not be accused of being a radical or extremist group. After all this is the same organization which produced the Amman letter to Pope Benedict and the Common Word letter to the Christian world. The Great Tafsirs Project was not produced by a hotbed of radicalism. It is just about Islam, pure and simple.

The Great Tafsirs Project provided a wonderful research opportunity for me, as it enabled me to answer the question: What have Muslim commentators said about the dhimma system down through the ages? This was as simple as working through what the 69 commentaries had to say on one verse, Sura 9:29, which is the Quranic authority for the whole dhimmi system. Other verses in the Quran are revelant for the treatment of non-Muslims, but this is the key one, the lynchpin verse. In the translation of Pickthall, the verse is:

Fight against such of those who have been given the Scripture as believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, and forbid not that which Allah hath forbidden by His messenger, and follow not the Religion of Truth, until they pay the tribute readily, being brought low.

What I found in these commentaries was deeply disturbing. It was a full and complete endorsement of the 'second story' as described above, from the mouths of the most revered commentators of Islamic tradition. Virtually without exception these scholars have regarded dhimmi status as a punitive measure. Again and again they spoke of dhimmis owing a blood debt which had to be redeemed annually in a humiliating ritual involving a blow in the neck, and sometimes also a ritual strangling. The theology and political ideology projected by these commentaries, from the distant past through to the present day, came through with startling consistency and force.

The commentaries completely vindicated – from a theological perspective – the analysis of Bat Ye'or, and also the sources she had collected. It was all the more noteworthy that she had made comparatively little use of Quranic commentaries in her research.

A summary of what I found in these commentaries is reported in the sixth and seventh chapters of The Third Choice. I also explain there how the ideology of the dhimma pact, as expressed by Islam's greatest commentators, continues to exercise a powerful guiding ideological hand for the persecution of non-Muslims in Islamic societies today.

I am painfully aware that one can find unpleasant, indeed evil, statements in the writings of theologians regarded as great by Christian tradition. One's mind turns to Martin Luther or John Chrysostom on the Jews. Their statements are utterly repugnant. If you 'cherry-picked' your way through 2000 years of Christian theology, it would be possible to compile a house of horrors of objectionable statements by eminent Christians. But what I submit is that it is not possible to find any verse or passage of the Bible which has given rise to such sustained and exceptionless contempt for a category of fellow human beings as has Sura 9:29 in the tradition of Islamic commentaries.

A well-intentioned Christian scholar who approaches Islam while looking at it through the frame of the Christian theological tradition would find it impossible to imagine the character and force of Islamic commentary on this verse.

Here I offer just one of the 69 commentaries on Sura 9:29, in translation. This is the commentary Tafsir al-Bahr al-Madid fi Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Magid of Ibn Ajibah, who Wikipedia describes as an "18th-century Moroccan saint in the Darqawa Sufi Islamic lineage."

Although this commentary is quite typical in its approach to explaining Sura 9:29, what is noteworthy is the psychological analysis it gives of the intended outcome of the dhimma system, namely the 'death' of the dhimmi's soul.

NB: the bold text in curly braces is translation from the Qur'an. Material in square brackets is my interpolations. Indented material is my explanation.

Commentary of Ibn Ajibah on Sura 9:29. (The original Arabic can be found here.)

The truth [i.e. Allah] says to the believers:

{fight}: [i.e. to kill] the People of the Book from the Jews and Christians.

The Arabic word for 'fight' actually means 'fight to kill': see my post here

{who believe not in Allah}: for what is due to him [i.e. to Allah], for they associate him with Uzair and Isa [cf Sura 9:30] and they picture him as being incarnated,

I.e. Christians and Jews 'associate' others with Allah, and so cannot be considered to have true belief in him.

{nor in the last day}, because they deny the physical return, their faith in both respects is not a (true) faith,

It may seem strange to Christians to be told that they do not believe in 'last day' (i.e. in the physical resurrection of the dead). But this text is not written for Christians to read. Ibn Ajibah's point here is that the non-Muslims' beliefs are invalid.

{nor forbid which has been forbidden by Allah and his prophet} Muhammad, because they allow alcohol [as legal], eat the flesh of the dead animals [which had not been slaughtered correctly], blood, pork, and other things which the laws of Muhammad have not permitted,

Christians and Jews do not follow Mudhammad's guidance, of which Ibn Ajibah gives some examples such as eating pork and using alcohol.

{nor adopt the religion of truth} i.e. they do not embrace Islam, which is the [only] true religion, the religion which has abrogated and nullified all other religions.

Thus Ibn Ajibah explains the justification for fighting (to kill) Christians and Jews: it is because they reject Islam, which has abrogated their religions, making them invalid.

Then he exposes those he commanded to fight against by saying:

{of the People of the Book}: these are the Jews and Christians. When this [verse] was reveled, the prophet of Allah went out to fight [i.e to kill] Christians in the Tabuk raid. He reached the borders of the enemies’ land, and then he made a treaty with the people of Adruh and Ayla and others for tribute [jizya]. Then he left [them alone] in obedience to the verse.

Here Ibn Ajibah references the example of Muhammad, who went to fight Christians at Tabuk. This is regarded as the context in which Sura 9:29 was revealed. The Christians accepted to pay tribute, and so were spared the sword. Ibn Ajibah is pointing out that Muhammad's actions agree with Sura 9:29.

Allah said:

{until they pay jizya} i.e. what has been determined for them to pay, according to Malik: four dinars for the wealthy, forty dirhams for the poor. This is to be taken for each head. The scholars have agreed that jizya is to be accepted from the Jews and Christians, followed by the Zoroastrians, in accordance with the saying of Muhammad, “Apply to them the rules of the People of the Book”: because they have [the benefit of] the doubt of having had a book, they are to be joined with them [Jews and Christians]. They [the scholars] have disagreed on accepting jizya from idol worshipers. Malik said it is to be taken from every infidel with the exception of the apostate, also it is not to be taken from women, young male children, and the insane.

Here Ibn Ajibah gives a neat summary of who is included in the phrase 'people of the book', noting disagreements between the schools.

Allah said:

{out of hand} i. e. he proceeds to give it with his own hand; he does not send it with another person; and does not delay payment: as you might say “hand to hand”, or out of submission and subjugation; or as you might say, “X has given his hand”.

{and feel themselves subdued}: humiliated and despicable. Ibn Abbas said: jizya is to be taken from the dhimmi, he should be struck on the neck, i.e. struck with a hand on the neck.

Ibn Abbas was a cousin and companion of Muhammad: he is a significant early authority on Qur'anic interpretation. Many commentaries cite Ibn Abbas in to justify striking the dhimmi on the neck in the tribute collection ritual

It is a standard feature of Qur'anic commentaries to describe the tax collection ritual for dhimmis in terms of a ritual beheading, in which the non-Muslim is struck on the side or the back of the neck.

The first verb for 'strike' (w.j.') means to strike with a hand or a knife. At this point the phrasing is ambiguous: it could mean 'he should be beheaded'. The ambiguity is cleared up with the second verb for strike (s.f.‘), which specifically refers to striking with the hand. (Arabic lexicographers have disagreed over whether this means with a fist or an open hand.)

This means: the insolent one [or audacious, rebellious – marid ] [i.e. the dhimmi] …

Ibn Ajibah first characterizes the dhimmi as an arrogant upstart (marid), someone who has exalted himself from his proper position (by rejecting Allah). Lane defines this as: ‘he went to such an extreme as thereby to pass from out of the general state [or category] of that species [to which he belonged].’ The word marid thus implies that the dhimmi has audaciously and insolently exalted himself above his proper station in life, for which he is to be rightfully humbled under the dominance of Muslims.

[the dhimmi] is commanded to put his soul, good fortune and desires to death. Above all he should kill the love of life, leadership and honour… [He] is to invert the longings of his soul, he is to load it down more heavily than it can bear until it is completely submissive. Thereafter nothing will be unbearable for him. He will be indifferent to subjugation or might. Poverty and wealth will be the same to him; praise and insult will be the same; preventing and yielding will be the same; lost and found will be the same. Then, when all things are the same, it [the soul] will be submissive and yield willingly what it should give.

Ibn Ajibah is explaining the purpose and meaning of the jizya payment ritual, including the blow on the neck. This ritual, he says, represents the death of the dhimmi's soul.

[Only] then is it [the soul of the dhimmi] to be preserved and looked after.

The purpose of this soul suicide is to ensure that the dhimmi will give everything to the Muslims that he is supposed to as a grateful service. Ibn Ajibah makes the point that protection of the dhimmi by Muslims (including from jihad attack) is only to be provided if the dhimmi has put his soul to death by this means (i.e. he is utterly submissive).

Then he [Allah] mentions the reason for jihad against the people of the Book [in the next verse Sura 9:30]: it is the corruption of their belief...

This is the reason for fighting Christians and Jews: it is because their belief is corrupt.

Multiple by 69 times, and the reader will have quite a good idea of what Muslim commentators have to say about Islam's policy on the treatment of non-believers in an Islamic state, at least according to the commentaries included in the Great Tafsirs Project of the Aal al-Bayt Institute.

It is of course possible for individual Muslims to take a different view about the dhimma system. But my point is that the tradition of Qur'anic interpretation – which is tremendously important in stabilizing Islam and establishing its whole ideological framework – leaves little or no room for regarding the dhimma system as a blessing for non-Muslims.

This lack of a genuine tradition of benevolence or grace in dealing with non-Muslims is one of the key ideological problems confronting Islam – and non-Islam – today. It will simply not do to sweep it under the carpet by a thousand sleights of hand which ignore or gloss over more than a thousand years of Qur'anic interpretation. The issue is too deep-seated and enduring to be dealt with so dismissively.

Nor will it do to simply wave one's hands and shout as loud as one can that anyone can find bad things in a religious tradition. The problem of the dhimma system is of a completely different order of magnitude from anything inter-religious polemics could conjure up.

Sharia Britain: the paradox of tolerance

2011-06-11T20:51:00.001-07:00

by Mark Durie

This week Baroness Caroline Cox launched a bill in the House of Lords to impose principles of gender equality upon the sharia courts of Britain.

This proposal reflects a growing groundswell of concern about the impact of these courts upon the lives of Muslim women.

This initiative is supported by a diverse coalition of human rights groups, including the Iranian and Kurdish Women's Rights Organisation, whose director Dianna Nammi devotes much of her work to assisting British women who are intimidated and discriminated against by the rulings of sharia courts.

The sharia is a system of rules for all of life.

Developed by Islamic scholars in the first centuries of Islam, it not only regulates prayer and worship, but also family relations, welfare, criminal matters, food, financial transactions, politics and even warfare.

The new bill aims to outlaw such practices as valuing a woman's evidence at half that of a man's; it seeks to prevent the intimidation and victimization of women who come before sharia tribunals; it requires religious tribunals to inform women that their sharia marriage or divorce may have no standing in British law, leaving them without legal protection; and it makes it a criminal offense to falsely claim legal jurisdiction.

A study by the think tank Civitas reported in 2009 that 85 sharia courts were operating across Britain, some of which have legal standing as tribunals under the alternative dispute resolution provisions of the 1996 Arbitration Act.

In a pattern being repeated across Western societies, from Sydney to Ontario, Muslim communities have been asking for legal recognition of sharia law, in the name of tolerance and pluralism.

Critics object that sharia courts discriminate against women, and their expansion in Britain is entrenching a system of parallel societies divided along religious lines.

In 2008 the Lord Chief Justice of England, Nicholas Phillips recommended 'embracing Sharia law', saying there was 'no reason' why it could not be used to alternative dispute resolution, and the Archbishop of Canterbury commented, 'it's not as if we're bringing in an alien and rival system'.

On the other hand, the Grand Chamber of the European Human Rights court found in 2003 that a plurality of legal systems which accommodates sharia infringes rights to religious freedom, because a state would thereby pressure individual Muslims to live according to religious rules with which they may not personally agree.

A 2004 report by Marion Boyd, Ontario's former Attorney General, supported Canadian Muslim groups' call for the use of sharia to settle family disputes.

However it was Muslim women such as Iranian immigrant Homa Arjomand who spear-headed resistance to the move, arguing that sharia law denies women equality before the law.

Few governments have been as forthright as Australia, whose Attorney General, Robert McClelland, recently declared that 'Sharia law has no place in the Australian legal system' because 'men and women are equal before the law irrespective of race, religious or cultural background.'

British sharia courts are conducted behind closed doors. Reports indicate that women are severely disadvantaged by their rulings.

It is easy for a Muslim man to divorce his wife under sharia law, for no reason. For a woman divorce is much more difficult.

She must apply to a court, and only on the basis of a limited set of reasons, which do not include domestic violence or rape by the husband.

Often she must pay the husband money in order to be granted her divorce.

Furthermore, under sharia law a divorced woman has no right to a share in family assets, and a father has sole custody of any children after they turn seven.

Women are further disadvantaged by the sharia laws of inheritance and evidence, which value a woman's worth at half that of a man's.

Such principles are not an invention of marginal religious radicals.

The International Fiqh Academy is a group of distinguished jurists which operates under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

In 2009 it issued a formal ruling on domestic violence which endorsed principles such as those being applied in British sharia courts, including the right of a husband to use force to compel his wife to have sexual relations, even if she is 'unwilling', and the right of a man to discipline his wife by what it termed 'non-violent beating'.

It is an irony that a woman can be more vulnerable to discriminatory treatment in a legally authorized British sharia tribunal than she would be in some Islamic jurisdictions.

Islamic states often pass laws to lessen the disadvantage suffered by women under sharia conditions.

For example, since 2000, Egyptian law allows women to divorce their husbands without having to give cause – but not without a financial penalty – and in 2005 a law was introduced to extend the period of a mother's custody of a child beyond the age determined by the sharia.

In Britain tribunals with legal standing dole out a purer strain of sharia.

The proposed new equality bill represents a significant escalation of resistance to sharia creep.

It can only succeed with government support.

If it fails, this will mean perpetuation of second class legal status for many British women.

It is a paradox of tolerance that legal inferiority might to be deemed to be 'good enough' for Muslim women, in the name of minority rights.

Mark Durie is an Anglican pastor and author of The Third Choice: Islam, Dhimmitude and Freedom.

This appeared first on Jenny Taylor's Blog on 10th June 2011.
Exclusive UK rights assigned to Lapido Media.

Shaikh Al-Qaradawi: Muslim 'Moderates' endorse aggressive jihad

2011-06-05T06:42:00.000-07:00

Two important modern reference works on jihad in Islam are Muhammad Haykal's Jihad and Fighting according the the Shar‘i Policy (Al-Jihad wa-l-qital fi al-siyasa al-sharia’iyya) and Yusuf Al-Qaradawi's Jurisprudence of Jihad (Fiqh al-jihad). Both these works give the lie to apologies offered by many western scholars for Islam's militancy, such as the claim that jihad is purely defensive.

As yet, neither work is available in English translation. Remarkably, Haykal attempts in his copyright statement to forbid anyone from quoting from or translating his work into any language other than its original Arabic. (However David Cook's Understanding Islam gives a useful overview of Haykal on pp.124-127).

The TranslatingJihad website has recently posted a translation from a key section in Al-Qaradawi's Fiqh al-Jihad (see here), which discusses the issue of whether 'moderate' Muslims support aggressive jihad. This was translated from a fatwa posted on IslamOnline.net. The fatwa is by Dr. 'Imad Mustafa, professor at Al-Azhar University, who relies upon a passage from Al-Qaradawi's Fiqh al-Jihad to support his ruling in support of aggressive jihad.

Al-Qaradawi is one of the most influential public intellectuals in the world today. He is a trustee of Oxford University's Centre for Islamic Studies, and his program on Al Jazeera reaches an estimate audience of 40 million world wide.

In the passage cited by Dr Mustafu, Al-Qaradawi defends 'moderate' Muslims from the charge, made by 'extremists', that they do not support 'offensive jihad', which is aggressive warfare to conquer non-Muslim territory for Islam.

That Al-Qaradawi feels the need to mount such a defense at all is in itself a matter of considerable interest.

Jihad is a highly prestigious concept in Islam. The traditional view has always been that Islam's conquest of non-Muslim civilizations was one of its greatest achievements, and certainly not something to be embarrassed about or to resile from. To accuse a group of Muslims of rejecting aggressive jihad is a tactic which will discredit them in the eyes of many other Muslims. Thus it is not surprising that Al-Qaradawi feels the need to defend 'moderates' – such as himself – from this charge. He writes:

I want to clarify here the difference between the moderates and extremists, or the "defensive (jihadists)" and "offensive (jihadists)", as they are called by some.
Some of the offensive (jihadists) have not been fair to those who hold the opposing view. They have put words in their mouths which they did not say, and accused them of that which they are innocent. They say: "They (the defensive jihadists) do not accept offensive jihad under any circumstance, in any form, or for any reason. They do not believe jihad is legitimate except in one condition, which is if Muslims are attacked in their homes and lands." This is how they depict the opinion of the moderates or the defensive (jihadists).
I think they are not being fair with the opposing side, and are not being precise or honest in presenting their views. Whoever reads their [i.e. the moderates'] opinions, will find that they accept offensive jihad, and attacking the infidels in their lands, for several reasons...

There is a great irony here. On the one hand, many Western scholars defend 'moderate' Islam on the basis that the concept of jihad is merely defensive, or not even militaristic at all. On the other hand, as prominent and influential a scholar as Al-Qaradawi feels the need to defend 'moderate' Islam on the grounds that it endorses aggressive jihad.

Al-Qaradaqi lists four conditions under which aggressive jihad would be supported by 'moderate' Muslims:

To remove all obstacles to the propagation of Islam.
Preemptive warfare in the interests of the Islamic state.
To rescue people (Muslims and non-Muslims) from oppressive rulers.
Religious cleansing of Arabia to eliminate all non-Muslim religions ('Allah's favour to the Arabs').

There is ample provision in these principles to support just about any jihad conquest of non-Muslim lands. Just as Hitler termed the conquest of Poland an act of 'liberation', since time immemorial ambitious rulers have used the language of benevolence and liberation to justify their acts of aggressive conquest.

Al-Qarawi's point number 1 alone is wide enough to drive a truck through. In his explanation of point 1, Al-Qaradawi states:

[Aggressive jihad is called for:] To ensure the freedom to propagate the call to Islam, to prevent fitna in the religion (of Islam), and to remove the physical obstacles which prevent the call to Islam from reaching the multitudes of people.

This was the reason for the conquests of the rightly-guided (caliphs) and the companions (of the Prophet), as well as those who followed them in righteousness. (They fought) to remove the power of the tyrants who controlled the necks and minds of men, and who said what Pharaoh said to those of his people who believed (in Islam): "Have you believed before I gave you permission to believe?" This is the embodiment of the goal expressed in the saying of the Almighty: "Fight them on until there is no more fitna."

Al-Qaradawi's citation of the Quranic verse 'fight them until there is no more fitna' deserves explanation. The key point is the meaning of fitna. I reproduce here my comments on this concept in The Third Choice (pp.96-98):

==================

The Arabic word fitna ‘trial, persecution, temptation’ is of crucial importance in understanding Muhammad’s metamorphosis, which was one of the spiritual fruits of the formative Meccan period. The word is derived from fatana ‘to turn away from, to tempt, seduce or subject to trials’. The base meaning is to prove a metal by fire. Fitna can include either temptation or trial, including both positive and negative inducements, up to and including torture. It could encompass seducing someone, or tearing them limb from limb.

Fitna became a key concept in theological reflection upon the early Muslim community’s experiences with unbelievers. The charge of Muhammad against the Quraysh was that they had subjected him and the rest of the Muslims to fitna – including insult, slander, torture, exclusion, economic pressures, and other temptations – in order to get them to leave Islam or to dilute its claims. Ibn Kathir reports that after the migration to Medina, the first verses revealed concerning fighting made clear that the whole purpose of fighting and killing was to eliminate fitna, because it could cause Muslims to turn away from their faith:

And fight in the way of Allah with those who fight with you,
but aggress not: Allah loves not the aggressors.
And slay them wherever you come upon them,
and expel them from where they expelled you;
persecution (fitna) is more grievous than slaying
.…
Fight them, til there is no persecution (fitna);
and the religion is Allah’s;
then if they give over [i.e. cease their disbelief and opposition to Islam],
there shall be no enmity save for evildoers.’ (Q2:190-93)

The idea that fitna of Muslims was ‘more grievous than slaying’ proved to be a significant one. The same phrase would be revealed again after an attack on a Meccan caravan (Q2:217) during the sacred month (a period during which Arab tribal traditions prohibited raiding). It implied, at the very least, that shedding the blood of infidels is a lesser thing than a Muslim being led astray from their faith.

The other significant phrase in this passage from Q2 is ‘fight them until there is no fitna’. This too was revealed more than once, the second time being after the battle of Badr, during the second year in Medina (Q8:39).

These fitna phrases, each revealed twice in the Quran, established the principle that jihad was justified by the existence of an obstacle to people entering Islam, or of inducements to Muslims to abandon their faith. However grievous it might be to fight others and shed their blood, undermining or obstructing Islam was worse.

Some Islamic jurists maintained a more limited and narrower interpretation, namely that ‘fitna is worse than slaughter’ simply meant fighting should continue ‘until no Muslim is persecuted so that he abandons his religion’. However most extended the concept of fitna to include even the mere existence of unbelief, so the phrase could be interpreted as ‘unbelief is worse than killing’. Thus Ibn Kathir equated fitna with what he called ‘committing disbelief ’ and ‘associating’ (i.e. polytheism), alongside hindering people from following Islam:

Since jihad involves killing and shedding of blood of men, Allah indicated that these men [i.e. polytheists] are committing disbelief in Allah, associating with Him (in the worship) and hindering from His path, and this is a much greater evil and more disastrous than killing. (Tafsir Ibn Kathir)

Understood this way, the phrase ‘fitna is worse than killing’ became a universal mandate to fight and kill all infidels who rejected Muhammad’s message, whether they were interfering with Muslims or not. Merely for unbelievers to ‘commit disbelief ’ – to use Ibn Kathir’s phrase – was a greater evil than their being killed.

On this understanding the concept of jihad warfare to extend the dominance of Islam was based. Thus Ibn Kathir, when commenting on Q2 and Q8, said that the command to fight means to go to war ‘so that there is no more Kufr (disbelief)’ and the Quranic statements ‘and the religion is Allah’s’ (Q2:193) or ‘the religion is Allah’s entirely’ (Q8:39) mean ‘So that the religion of Allah [i.e. Islam] becomes dominant above all other religions.’

The renowned modern jurist Muhammad Taqi Usmani (b. 1943) reports that religious authorities have universally accepted that jihad is warfare to make Islam dominant:

… the purpose of Jehad … aims at breaking the grandeur of unbelievers and establish that of Muslims. As a result no one will dare to show any evil designs against Muslim on one side and on the other side, people subdued from the grandeur of Islam will have an open mind to think over the blessings of Islam. … I think that all Ulema (religious scholars) have established the same concept about the purpose of Jehad. (Islam and Modernism, pp. 133-134)

OIC Fatwa on Domestic Violence and the Rights of Women in Islam

2011-05-29T08:53:00.000-07:00

In April 2009, the Islamic Fiqh Academy made a ruling entitled ‘Domestic Violence’. (See here, pp.15-18 of the PDF). This is a highly significant document which reflects a high-level consensus of leading Muslim scholars in the world today. It was clearly issued in the context of criticisms of Islam and Muslim societies for the treatment of women.

The Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA) was established by the Organization for the Islamic Conference in 1981. It is comprised of 43 scholars, who are elite Islamic jurists of their respective nations. Many are chief justices or grand muftis of their nations. IFA's resolutions are in Arabic, and they can be found on their website at http://www.fiqhacademy.org.sa/.

IFA's aims are:

to unite the Ummah (the global Muslim community, conceived of as a single nation, by conforming conduct to the norms of Islam at all levels (from individual to international);
to apply Islam to contemporary problems;
and to create a body of Islamic jurisprudence to meet the needs of modern life.

In IFA's deliberations, issues are subjected to extensive research, with prior distribution of papers, extensive consultation and discussion, before rulings are agreed upon and issued. These rulings are very distilled. The process “allows for a Muslim to see the final opinion without having to use up time and effort considering the research consultations that may extend to hundreds of pages”.

Undoubtedly IFA speaks for the Islamic mainstream. In the words of Dr Abdul-Salam Al-Abbadi, Secretary General of IFA, it is intended to function as the ‘supreme juristic reference for the Muslim world’. Furthermore, IFA's rulings have the backing of the OIC, which is one of the most significant groupings of states in the world today.

IFA's fatwa or ruling on domestic violence warrants detailed study. It is not possible to do justice to it in this blog post. A translation into English is given below. A few key features are:

This fatwa represents the unapologetic assertion of the absolute authority of the sharia over all understandings of human rights as they apply to women and the family, specifically including international human rights conventions and covenants. Islamic states are instructed to ignore every article of any convention or covenant which is inconsistent with the sharia.
The fatwa upholds the right of a husband to beat his wife: wife-beating is specifically excluded from its definition of 'domestic violence', as long as the beating conforms to sharia requirements. The memorable phrase 'non-violent beating' is coined to express this perspective. Note also the implied threat which warns against 'slander' in the context of resolving marital disputes (implying that a woman must not criticize her husband).
Here are some hadiths of Muhammad on wife-beating from Sunan Abu Dawud:
• Muhammad: 'When one of you inflicts a beating, he should avoid beating the face.'
• Muhammad: "A man will not be asked as to why he beat his wife." – this principle means that a man cannot required to answer to a sharia court for beating his wife.
• Muhammad: "Do not beat your wife as you beat your slave-girl."
• Muhammad: "They are not the best among you." – said of women who complained to Muhammad when he gave permission for their husbands to beat them.
This fatwa also upholds the right of a husband to rape his wife, for it is not 'domestic violence' for a man to insist upon his conjugal rights (section 2(F)). The key term ihsan 'preservation' is very difficult to translate into English. It is derived from the root h.s.n which means to fortify or make something inaccessible by building a fortified wall around it. A 'fortified' woman is a married woman who has a husband to protect her. He also has conjugal rights over her (as she is kept inside his fortress). The meaning of ihsan is defined by Lane as: ‘With the lawyers, ihsan means the act of coitus conjugalis in a case of valid marriage.’ This fatwa is written in legal language, so what 2(F) is saying is that it is not domestic violence for a Muslim man to 'fortress' his wife, and force her to have sex with him, even if she is unwilling.
The fatwa also upholds the right of a male guardian to contract the marriage of a virgin female (2(H)): he has the right to marry her to another. Muhammad said that a virgin gives permission to a marriage 'by her silence': in practice this often means the guardian has the sole say over who she will marry.
The fatwa also implicitly upholds the sharia's laws concerning the treatment of adulterers (2(A)).
The fatwa endorses a husband's guardianship over his wife: this means that he legally controls her in many respects.
There is implacable opposition to principles of equality between the sexes.
The right of women to move around freely in public without a supervising male is rejected as contrary to sharia law.
The fatwa upholds sharia law's non-reciprocal approach to divorce, which make it easy for man to divorce his wife, but hard for a women to obtain a divorce, except through a difficult legal process. (In fact Arabic has two different words for these: a divorce initiated by a man, and one initiated by a woman are regarded as two distinct things.) If a man divorces his wife, this is halal 'permitted' - although dispreferred – but if a woman divorces her husband without "just cause", this is a mortal sin:
• Muhammad said: "If any woman asks her husband for divorce without some strong reason, the odor of Paradise will be forbidden to her." (Sunan Abu Dawud).
This fatwa implicitly upholds many other aspects of sharia law which are opposed to women's rights. An example is the rule that if a woman sues for divorce for excessive beatings, she must return the brideprice he paid for her (i.e. she must pay him to win her divorce). Another is the shockingly humiliating law that a woman irrevocably divorced by her husband can only remarry him after she has married another, had sexual relations with the new husband, and been divorced by him (or he dies first). These regulations, and the way in which they work to deny women basic rights of safety and equality before the law have been well-documented by others and can be found in Islamic legal texts, but deserved to be better known. This fatwa upholds such conservative time-honored principles of sharia law without conceding an inch to modern understandings of human dignity or human rights.

I find it thought-provoking that this fatwa has been in circulation for two years, and it is backed by the most eminent and credible of Muslim jurists, yet is has received so little attention from non-Muslim commentators. Why this silence?

(Suggested improvements to the translation from Arabic are warmly welcomed.)

==============

THE TRANSLATION

==============

Domestic violence.

The Council of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy, an offshoot of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, held its nineteenth session in the Emirate of Sharjah (United Arab Emirates) from 1-5 Jamadi I, 1430 AH (April 26-30, 2009).

After reviewing the research brought to its attention on the subject of domestic violence, and after listening to discussions on the the subject, and after considering established religious principles for the necessity of establishing the family on the great basis of affection and love, and the provision of legislation which achieves stability and tranquility, and considering that deviations from this approach spread violence in the family, [the Council] have decided the following:

1. the concept of domestic violence

What is meant by violence is acts or words of violence committed by a family member against another member of the same family, which are characterized by severity and cruelty causing physical or mental harm to the family or one of its members, such conduct being prohibited [haram] because it contravenes the objectives of Sharia law for the protection of the soul and mind, and because it contradicts the Lord’s order, which is based on kindness and righteousness in relationships.

2. [the following] are not considered to be violence or discrimination from the Islamic perspective:

(A) Adherance to sharia rulings governing marital relationships, and the prohibition of illicit conjugal unions.

(B) Denying access to contraceptives for illegally married couples.

(D) The criminalization of homosexuality.

(E) A husband forbidding his wife from travelling alone, except with his permission and in accordance with the sharia.

(F) The legal Islamic right of husband and wife to maintain chastity [abstinence from extra-marital relations] and "preservation" [ihsan], even if one of them is unwilling.

(G) The women’s primary role in caring for children and the family home, and the husband’s responsibility of stewardship [i.e. maintenance and guardianship].

(H) Legal guardianship over a virgin female in (entering into a contract for her) marriage.

(I) What the shari’s has established regarding the division of inheritance and wills.

(J) Legal divorce in accordance with the shari’a.

(K) Polygamy based on justice.

3. The Islamic approach of settling marital disputes

When settling marital disputes, especially regarding a disobedient wife who has exalted herself against her husband [i.e. she disobeys him] the following Islamic legal standards are to be observed:

(A) Avoid insults, defamation and slander.

(B) Follow the sharia in dealing with the wife, commencing with preaching [admonishing her], then [sexual] abandonment [of the wife], and ending with non-violent beating, which [can be defined as] almost waving it without doing it. To resort to [beating] is the opposite of what is preferred, for [Muhammad] said: “those of you who are the best, shall not beat”, and [one should] follow the example of his action, that he did not ever beat a woman.

(D) Resort to the divorce system in accordance with rules established by sharia regulations (for revocable divorce, major or minor irrevocable divorce, and times of its occurrence), and regarding it as the worst of the halal [what is permitted] from Allah.

4. The council determines as follows

(A) At the level of the family:

i. Focus on bringing up children in a faith-based manner, as a pathway for nurturing them socially;

ii. Emphasize established rules of the sharia related to the construction of the family, such as cooperation, affection, compassion, kindness, righteousness, and kindness between the spouses.

iii. Adopt dialogue to resolve internal family issues.

(B) At the level of official institutions and departments:

i. Hold periodic workshops to raise the awareness of families about the risks of violence, and to establish the dialogue approach.

ii. Require educational institutions to teach [material which] addresses issues of domestic violence in its various forms and manifestations.

iii. Coordinate between relevant ministries and departments to adopt a unified and consistent policy, to preserve the fundamental principles of the nation [ummah] in the face of the westernizing trends aimed at the family.

iv. Provide guidance for the media to assume its responsibilities in a framework for the right path to social development.

i. It is necessary to submit all international conventions regarding women and children, as well as draft laws, to sharia specialists and legal scholars, before they are issued and signed into law. [They are] to be weighed against the sharia: what conflicts with the provisions and purposes of the sharia is to be rejected. It is necessary to call upon Islamic governments to review agreements that have been signed, to identify articles which are inconsistent with the sharia, and to reject those articles, without negating positive aspects which do not contradict the sharia.

ii. Reject any articles of international agreements and conventions which are contrary to the provisions of sharia law: [such as] call for the abolition of innate differences between the roles of men and women in society and advocate for full equality between male and female in all degrees of inheritance, and abuse the divorce system in the Islamic sharia, calling for the abolition of supremacy of men over the family, and other things which are established in the Islamic sharia.

iii. Reject all clauses contained in agreements which permit the violation of Islamic laws and natural instincts, such as allowing same sex marriage and sexual relations outside of a legal marrage, and mixing [of the sexes] in a way which is legally prohibited, and other clauses which contradict the provisions of the Islamic sharia.

iv. Call upon all legislative bodies to enact laws that criminalize all forms of violence between family members, on the grounds that sharia law has forbidden such acts.

v. Limit executive authority to the relevant judicial authorities.

vi. Emphasize a commitment to preserve the specifics of Islamic culture and sharia rulings, and respect the reservations of Muslim governments and their representatives concerning clauses which contradict Islamic law in covenants and conventions related to the family.

vii. Form a committee to prepare a code to regulate the rights and duties of members of the family, which will lead to the drafting of a Family Law Code compatible with Islamic law.

Australia Gets It Right on Sharia Implementation

2011-05-17T18:42:00.000-07:00

The Australian Government is holding a national inquiry into multiculturalism. The Australian newspaper yesterday reported that the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils has requested the introduction of Sharia law under the umbrella of multiculuralism (the AFIC submission can be downloaded here: other submissions are available here). However, Australian Attorney-General, Robert McClelland has stated that:

"Sharia law has no place in the Australian legal system."
"As our citizenship pledge makes clear, coming to Australia means obeying Australian laws and upholding Australian values."
"Australia's brand of multiculturalism promotes integration. If there is any inconsistency between cultural values and the rule of law, then Australian law wins out."
"People who migrate to Australia do so because of the fact we have a free, open and tolerant society where men and women are equal before the law irrespective of race, religious or cultural background."
"Indeed, all applicants for citizenship swear collective allegiance to the people of Australia, and undertake to respect our customs and abide by our laws. The values underpinning those principles will not be changing."

Arguments used by the Federation of Islamic Councils and its representatives for accommodating sharia law include:

Islam itself advocates legal pluralism, each religious community following its own laws.
Islam allows a role for customs or cultural practices, provided that they do not conflict with fundamental requirements of Islam.
The dhimmi system under the Ottomans allowed non-Muslims to be governed by their own law, giving them power and dignity in their own right.
Although modern scholars now reject the dhimmi system as unjust, Muslims in the West are treated worse than dhimmis, because they are compelled to live under Western law and are not granted their own 'Millet' or legally recognized religious community.
Islamic law is part of Muslims' culture, so multiculturalism should provide a place for Islamic law.
The Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Chief Justice of England have both endorsed religious pluralism through accommodations sharia law.
The Australian Government already actively supports accommodation to sharia law in the areas of halal food and Islamic finance: the Australian Assistant Treasurer, Nick Sherry, it is claimed, has 'pledged' to amend tax laws in order to attract more Islamic finance to the country.
It is inconsistent to rule out introducing sharia law while at the same time encouraging the development of Islamic finance and the government regulation of halal food.
Although some Muslims believe that sharia is immutable, many Muslim scholars do not agree, and "AFIC takes the position that Islamic law is changeable according to the requirements of
different places and times, and therefore, suits the values shared by Australian people."
A compromised is required between Muslims and Australia: "Muslims in Australia should accept the Australian values, and Australia should also provide a 'public sphere' for Muslims to practice their belief." This implies that for Muslims to actively support Australia as a concept, they need the quid pro quo of being provided with official public recognition of Islam through legal accommodation of sharia law: "This approach demands a compromise from Islam, which should be open to other values, and also to make a similar demand of Australia. It is not only Australian Muslims who should reconcile these identities, but also all Australians." This is what the submission called 'twin tolerations': the religion tolerates the state and the state tolerates the religion (citing Alfred Stephan). The submission states 'It takes two to tango.'

The AFIC submission is a request for Australian society to offer a kind of legal covering for Islamic sharia to exist in Australian society. In separate comments, AFIC spokesman advanced further arguments:

Sharia accommodation is already working well in Britain the the USA.
If the Government does accommodate, this will prevent 'extremists' within Islam from taking over the agenda.
What is being proposed at present are accommodations to divorce and family law, which will not affect non-Muslim Australians: "This is about personal issues about family, and won't affect any other Australian," and "It's about a system that does not impinge on the rights of any other Australian."

In a related news story, it has been reported that sharia courts are already functioning in Sydney, Australia. This is hardly surprising, and only mirrors a pattern which has been observed all throughout Western nations.

To which I make the following observations:

The Australian Government is wise and sensible to act quickly to reject sharia implementation. This is consistent with a series of statements made over the past decade by both Labor and Liberal governments.

It is a terrible irony that Muslims use references to the oppressive dhimmi system as an argument for implementing legal apartheid in Western nations.

The Muslims' suggestion that accommodating sharia law will combat extremism can be interpreted as a threat: "If you don't give us the sharia we want, then you'll have to deal with the extremists, who will 'take over' the agenda of the Islamic community." Does this an unstated threat of terrorism? It is important not to capitulate to such threats, in which 'moderates' exploit the threat of 'extremism' to advance their sharia agenda.

Requests for sharia implementation will never end. No matter how much is granted, more is demanded. There is hardly an Islamic state in the world that is not troubled with activists demanding stricter sharia observance. These groups often resort to violence. So it does not follow that granting more sharia someone mollifies the extremists. If that were so, then more sharia-compliant societies would have see violence from the extreme sharia advocates. In fact the opposite is true. In fact demands for sharia are a slippery slope: the more is given, the more is demanded. Better to draw a line in the sand now. The Australian Government is right to take a stand on this issue.

We should have one law for all. What AFIC is in effect asking for, is for Muslim women to be treated as second-class citizens under Australian law, because they will have less rights in a sharia court considering issues such as divorce and custody, than in a state court. It is self-serving for Muslim men to argue that Australia must respect the rights of Muslim women to chose live according to sharia law, when sharia gives men such advantages over women.

Islamic law discriminates against Muslims by compelling Muslims to live according to a legal code which their conscience may reject. For this reason, in 2003, the Grand Chamber of European Human Rights court upheld the dissolution of the Refah Party in Turkey. Refah had aimed to install a plurality of legal systems, under which each community would be ruled according to its own religious principles. The court found that a plurality of legal system is incompatible with human rights. This was against the European Convention of Human Rights, because the state would thereby compel individual Muslims to live according to religious rules with which they may not personally agree (See Paul Taylor, Freedom of religion: UN and European human rights law and practice, p.315).

Australian authorities should pay careful attention to AFIC's argument that halal food regulation and sharia finance are examples of accommodation to sharia, and seriously consider limiting the advance of these two practices in our nation, for this very reason. There is much that could be done. For example, it should be required for halal-slaughtered meat to be labeled clearly, so that customers may know they are buying the meat of ritually slaughtered animals, especially since part of the price they pay consists of certification fees paid to an Islamic agency.

Australia should monitor and introduce laws to limit the advance of unofficial sharia courts and other sharia practices. Sharia law, as it applies to family issues, discriminates against women, and is contrary to basic principles of justice and fairness. For example the state could make it illegal for licensed religious practitioners (who are licensed by the state as marriage celebrants and whose activities receive tax concessions and ) to officiate at religious marriages if these marriages are not also recognized by the state.

A particular issue is the coercion of people to go to sharia courts to settle matters. The state should explore the introduction of laws which protect the rights of Muslims - specifically and especially women - who choose to live in ways which are not sharia-compliant. For example if a woman obtains a civil divorce, she should not be subject to unfair discrimination and intimidation from other Muslims because her divorce is not an Islamic one. Clearly this is a complex area, and there are limits to the ways in which the state should intrude on religious issues, but it does need to protect the rights of individuals to live according to their consciences, without fear.

Australian authorities have been setting a good example to the world through their clear stand against sharia implementation. However much more could be done.

Of one thing we can be sure: religious requirements mean that the request for sharia accommodation will not go away, ever. The challenge is to just keep saying 'no'.

Final remarks by Geert Wilders at his trial in Amsterdam, May 2nd, 2011

2011-05-02T15:32:00.000-07:00

"Mister President, members of the Court. I recently tried to have Your Honors removed from the case for your refusal to register a statement of perjury against Mr. Hendriks. My challenge of the court did not succeed. I must accept that. I do wish to say, however, that I was more annoyed by another declaration of the President of the Court on the day of the official hearing of Mr. Jansen. He said that I was a free man, that I could not be compared to Mr. Nekschot because I was a free man.

Mister President, you could not be more wrong. For almost seven years now, I have not been a free man. I lost my freedom in 2004. I live as a prisoner with guards without you having convicted me. Without protection I am even less certain of my life than I am now. Mister President, you would not use the words “free man” if you could change places with me for one week.

Mister President, members of the court, I am here as a suspect again today. I have said so before: This penal case is a political trial. An attempt is being made here to silence a politician who speaks on behalf of one and a half million people and who already pays a heavy price for that every single day. Formally, only I stand on trial here, but in practice the freedom of speech of millions of Dutchmen is on trial.

This trial is not merely a political trial. It is also an unjust trial. When you look at the order of the court (to prosecute me) it is clear that the verdict has already been passed. The court has issued an order to prosecute me in which it concludes that I am guilty of incitement to hatred. The court has concluded that my statements as such are of an insulting nature. The court has concluded that I am guilty of the most serious charge: the incitement to hatred and discrimination. The court has concluded that it expects that the criminal prosecution will indeed lead to a conviction. Mister President, members of the court, the court has already done your job. Long before I was brought to trial before you, I was found guilty and was condemned. Hence my right to a just trial has been violated.

Alas, this is but the tip of the iceberg. Without any doubt, the judges who presided this case have conveyed a semblance of partiality. I have been denied 15 of the 18 witnesses whom I wanted to call. Every high representative of the judicial power has given his view on this case, and often to my disadvantage. But Counselor Schalken was the worst.

Counselor Schalken, who co-authored the decision to prosecute me, makes a habit of discussing my trial and arguing his case at elegant dinner parties for intellectuals. Counselor Schalken dined with my witness, Mr Jansen – note that he was one of the only three witnesses whom I was allowed to call – three days before Mr. Jansen was to be interrogated by the court. During this dinner Mr. Schalken TRIED to influence Mr Jansen. The fact that he did not succeed is irrelevant.

Mr. President, members of the court, stop this unfair, political trial. Respect our Dutch freedoms. If this trial continues, despite the fact that the principle of the presumption of innocence has been violated, and if I am convicted, not only my freedom will be infringed, but also the right of all Dutch people to hear the truth. The 19th century black American politician Frederick Douglass, the son of a slave, put it as follows: “To suppress free speech is a double wrong. It violates the rights of the hearer as well as those of the speaker.”

Mr. President, members of the court, I end with a quote of George Washington, who said: “If the freedom of speech is taken away then dumb and silent we may be led, like sheep to the slaughter.” Mr. President, members of the court, do not let this warning become reality. Stop this charade, this political trial where I have already been convicted by the court even before I was a suspect. Stop it now. If you do so, and I passionately hope you will, this will benefit freedom of speech as well as the respectability of the judicial power and the rule of law."

On the Difficulty of Reading the Quran, Part B: Fighting and Killing

2011-04-24T06:04:00.000-07:00

My previous post discussed the difficulty of reading the Qur'an. This post addresses a very specific challenging issue in Quranic translation, namely the meaning of certain 'fighting' verses.

There are many verses in the Quran which refer to fighting and killing. I would like to consider the difficulty inherent in reading verses which attempt to translate the verb qātilū, found, for example, in Sura 9:29 'Fight the People of the Book…'; Sura 2:190 'Fight in the path of Allah those who fight you' or Sura 2:193 'Fight them until there is no more temptation (fitna)'.

There is a difficulty with the English translation 'fight', as found in many published translations. The problem is that 'fight' is a deficient translation. To understand why this it is deficient, we need to 'slow down' our reading process to the extent of engaging with Arabic grammar.

To understand what the word qātilū means, one needs to recognize that it is based upon a root q-t-l which means 'kill'. (See the note at the end of this post on Arabic roots). From this root several other Arabic words are form for example qatala 'kill, murder'; qatīl 'someone killed, a casualty'; qatl 'homicide'; maqtal 'vital spot on the body (injuring which brings death)'.

The meaning of words for taking life are highly culture-specific. The modern English distinction between 'murder' and 'kill' goes back to early Germanic cultural norms in which it was regarded as a heinous and disgraceful crime to kill someone secretly. for example when they were sleeping. Such an act was 'murder' (Old English morðor). In contrast, killing someone openly in broad daylight was not a disgrace, if it was not concealed or denied, but the killing nevertheless could be subject to vengeance and demands for blood-compensation. Over time the meaning of murder evolved to reach its current meaning, which is intentional unlawful killing done with 'malice aforethought'. Throughout this evolution the very negative connotations of the word murder have endured.

In contrast to English, in Arabic there is no single distinct word for 'murder'. If you look up 'murder' and 'kill' in an English-Arabic dictionary, most likely the first option in both cases will be q-t-l. The semantic range of q-t-l covers both 'murder' and 'kill'. There is a distinction in Islamic law between lawful and unlawful killing, but both types of killing are referred to under the semantic range of the root q-t-l.

The form qātilū, which we are focusing on here, is known as a 'form III' verb. A feature of many form III verbs is that they denote an intentional, sustained activity directed towards an object, which may be in the context of a counter-effort. For example form I kataba means 'he wrote', but the form III verb kātaba means 'he kept up a correspondence with someone'. Form I ḍaraba means 'he hit' but form III ḍāraba means 'he fought against'. The form I verb ṭarada means 'he drove away, pushed away', but form III ṭārada means 'he assaulted, launched an attack, stalked, gave chase to.' Form I sāma means 'he offered for sale', but the form III verb sāwama means 'he haggled over a price'. (For an essay on the meaning of 'form III' verbs, see here - a PDF).

The form I qatala means 'he killed', but the corresponding form III qātala is the normal word used in the Qur'an for doing battle, hence the standard translation 'fight'. The fact that this is a form III verb would lead one to expect a meaning 'he engaged in intentional and sustained activity with the purpose of killing, in a context of a counter-effort to kill.' This is not the same meaning as English fight. In English, fight means to engage in a physical struggle for supremacy (with various non-physical, metaphorical extensions). Although fight could involve killing, it does not necessarily imply it. A contest between boxers is a fight, as is a wrestling match between boys in a school yard.

In contrast the Arabic form III qātala (qātilū in the 2nd person plural imperative), which is translated as 'fight' in English versions of the Quran, includes the meaning of killing.

The idea that the form III verb involves killing is expressed in the following verse, which justifies 'fighting' in the sacred month on the grounds that although 'fighting' (q-t-l form III) is a great sin, seducing Muslims away from Islam is worse than 'killing' (q-t-l form I). Therefore fighting (i.e. to kill) is justified because it is prevents a sin worse than such killing:

They ask you about fighting [q-t-l form III] in the sacred month. Say "Fighting [q-t-l form III] in it is a great (sin), ... but seduction is greater (worse) than killing [q-t-l form I]." (Sura 2:217)

Another verse in the Quran captures the meaning of form III of q-t-l as each side trying to kill the other:

Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their wealth; for theirs (in return) is Paradise. They fight [q-t-l form III] in his path; they kill [q-t-l form I] and are killed [q-t-l form I]. (Sura 9:111).

Arabic has another root '-r-k which can be used to describe conflict ranging from an argument between neighbors through to military battle, without the meaning of killing, but the words formed from q-t-l all have meanings which involve killing.

The form III of q-t-l is very difficult to translate into English. To simply translate qātilū as 'Fight!' is deficient, because the sense of 'killing' is lost in translation. However no word in English means 'intentional sustained activity directed at another with the purpose of killing, in a context of a counter-effort to kill'. None of the English expressions with meanings similar to fight – such as combat, assault, wage war, do battle or duel – include killing as part of their core meaning.

In contrast the form III of q-t-l implies that killing is involved. It suggests a kill-or-be-killed struggle, a 'fight' where death is in view, one way or another.

In English cultural understandings, the purpose of war is not to kill your opponents, but to defeat them (killing is merely a means of defeating the enemy). In contrast, the form III of q-t-l reflects a different understanding of combat, one which is ultimately based upon pre-Islamic Arab culture, in which the point of battle is either to bring one's enemies down to the grave, or to subjugate them, after which the vanquished owe you their lives.

Of course people who speak English are quite capable of deliberate killing, and all kinds of atrocities (history gives plenty of examples), and there can be a good deal of hypocrisy in English-language discussions of warfare, but the fact is that there is no word in the English language which captures the idea of 'deadly combat' which appears to be part of the meaning of the form III of q-t-l. In any case, to simply translate qātilū as 'fight' offers a watered-down reading which dilutes a core aspect of the meaning of the Arabic, and distances the text from its cultural context. It squeezes the Arabic text into the presuppositions of an English understanding of conflict.

When Sura 9:29 is translated as 'Fight the People of the Book', without any qualification, this misleads English speaking readers. Clearer might be 'Engage in a deadly fight with the People of the Book'. And when Sura 9:123 says 'O you who believe, fight the disbelievers who are close to you', this could be better translated as 'Fight a deadly war against the disbelievers'.

It must be stressed once again that form III of q-t-l is the normal way to refer to military fighting in Qur'anic Arabic. However this fact alone is not enough to make English fight an accurate translation, because the Arabic lexicon encodes a very different understanding of combat.

These observations have implications for understanding the Islamic sharia's rules of combat. They align, for example, with the observation that the sharia law allows adult male captives of war to be killed, since killing is integral to the meaning of qitāl 'fighting', and when you vanquish someone, their lives are considered to be in your hand. On the other hand, in English cultural understandings of 'fighting', killing unarmed captives is considered a criminal act.

This difference in understanding what 'fighting' actually is has a very practical impact on how battles are fought on the ground today. Jihadis in Iraq understand that if they capture American soldiers, they are free to kill them, but if they throw down their arms and put their hands in the air, their American enemies are not supposed to kill them, but are expected by their superiors to take the jihadis prisoner.

These cultural differences create the conditions for an asymmetrical war. American soldiers dislike the fact that if they are captured, they will most likely be killed, but if they capture and execute an enemy they could be found guilty of murder by a US military tribunal.

As another implication of these cultural differences, when in Sura 9:29 it says to 'fight [form III qātilū] the People of the Book' 'until they pay tribute out of hand and are humbled', the meaning conveyed by the use of qātala is that paying tribute and being humbled are what stops the deadly war, i.e. submission to the sharia rules for non-Muslims stops the killing.

This simple observation about the dynamics of Islamic conquest of non-Muslim peoples is amply confirmed by a large corpus of opinions of Islamic scholars on this verse, dozens of which are referenced in my book The Third Choice. The eminent commentator Al-Suyuti explained in relation to Koran 29:46 (the very same verse cited at the head of the Amman letter to the Pope, which was discussed in my previous blog post) that when non-Muslims reject the arguments of Muslims and refuse to surrender to Islam, "by fighting you and refusing to pay the jizya, then argue with them by means of the sword until they become Muslim or pay the jizya." (the Arabic text is here).

This is also relevant for understanding the theological background of recent massacres of non-Muslims in Muslim countries, in the context of claims being made by some that the non-Muslims do not enjoy the benefit of a 'covenant of protection' which grants them their right to life.

What is in a word? Quite a lot actually. The act of reading requires strenuous efforts to unpack the meaning of even a single word. I have described here some of the efforts needed to understand the word 'fight', as used in English translations of the Quran.

All this highlights the difficulty of reading classical Islamic texts, not least of all in translation. In part it also explains why Westerners, schooled in the linguistic norms of 'Standard Average European' languages, have so much difficulty understanding Islam, and why translations of the Quran into English are inadequate for comprehending its message.

PS In releasing this post I note that I welcome comments and clarifications, as it is quite likely there are aspects to this complex and sublte issue which I have missed or not understood fully.

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NOTE:
Arabic words are built up around consonantal roots. Most of these roots consist of three consonants, which can be used in a wide variety of combinations with vowels and consonants. For example the root k-t-b has to do with writing, and from it can be derived kataba 'write'; kitab 'book'; kutubī bookseller' miktāb 'typewriter' kātib 'scribe' etc. In Arabic script the root consonants stand out very clearly, and dictionaries are organized around them. For example maktaba 'library, bookstore' is listed in an Arabic dictionary under the entry for k-t-b.

On the Difficulty of Reading the Quran, Part A: from the Amman Letter to Yusuf Ali

2011-04-24T00:36:00.000-07:00

I am grateful to the linguist Alton L. Becker for drawing my attention to a principle that language is both exuberant and deficient. His words sank deep into my consciousness at the time of first reading them over twenty five years ago:

In the fifties, the Spanish Heideggerian philologist, José Ortega y Gasset (1959), began a seminar on Plato's Symposium with a discussion of "the difficulty of reading". To read a distant text – distant in space, time, or conceptual world – is a utopian task, he wrote, a task whose "initial intention cannot be fulfilled in the development of its activity and which has to be satisfied with approximations essentially contradictory to the purpose which had started it' (1959:1). In that sense, the activity of language is in many particular ways utopian: one can never convey just what one wants to convey, for others will interpret what they hear, and their interpretation will be both exuberant and deficient. As Ortega (p. 2) put it:
Every utterance is deficient – it says less that it wishes to say.
Every utterance is exuberant – it says more than it plans.

(From Alton L. Becker 'Beyond Translation: Esthetics and Language Description' [published in Translation: Essays toward a Modern Philology. 1995. University of Michigan Press]. The citations are from Ortega y Gasset's 'The Difficulty of Reading.' Diogenes 28 (Winter 1959).

The problem of exuberance and deficiency in language is particularly apparent and 'in your face' for the translator. Not only is the translator forced to deal with the utopian task of understanding a text in its original language, but the translation itself adds and subtracts meaning in a host of different ways.

The effect is amplified when dealing with what Ortega y Gasset referred to as 'distant' texts. For example, to translate a piece of French journalism into English is to plunge into a veritable sea of exuberance and deficiency, but this pales into insignificance compared to the difficulties which arise when a classical Arabic text such as the Quran is translated into a modern European language.

Viewed through the eyes of the modern Western reader, the faith of Islam is replete with 'distant' texts, which are far in time, place and conceptual world from the average Westerner, whose native language is what Benjamin Whorf called 'Standard Average European'. A great many of the concepts embedded in Islamic terminology are grounded in cultural practices and worldview of 7th century Arabia. This distance causes many challenges for understanding. Extracting even the most important ideas from Islamic texts can require great effort and care.

The discipline which Becker called 'philology' provides tools for the reader of distant texts. A good 'philologist' (or 'linguist' — Becker used these terms interchangeably) is trained to attend to the realities of difficult reading. He or she will be mindful, for example, of the utopian nature of translation. A wide variety of techniques can be used which allow the philologist to identify the many ways in which their own reading is exuberant and deficient, and thus to increase the accuracy of their reading.

One of the most important of these techniques is just to slow down and pay attention to particularities.

An example of the Difficulty of Reading: the Amman Letter

Let us consider as an example a single word from the 'Amman letter', written in English by a group of Muslim scholars to Pope Benedict in response to his controversial Regensburg lecture in 2006. At the head of the Muslims' letter a passage from the Quran is quoted. It reads:

"In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful,
Do not contend with people of the Book except in the fairest way …" (29:46)

The 'slowed down' reader, who is paying attention to particularities, will notice that word fairest in the second line of this quotation is multiply ambiguous in English. It could mean 'impartial, free from bias', or 'most beautiful'. In the context of disputation, the most likely interpretation of 'fairest' would be 'impartial, free from bias'. But is this what the Arabic means?

The alert reader might then decide to consult other translations to investigate this question. They would find that most use the word better or best where the Amman letter has fairest. For example, Marmaduke Pickthall renders the verse "And argue not with the People of the Scripture unless it be in (a way) that is better." Far from resolving the ambiguity, these comparisons would open the field of interpretation to still more possibilities, and the reader would be alerted that further efforts are called for to reach accurate understanding. At this point the Arabic original would need to be consulted.

The Arabic word being translated here is aḥsan. This is an elative form form of the adjective ḥasan 'good'. The elative implies preeminence, and it is often translated as comparative or superlative in English, which is why some translations of this verse say 'better', and others say 'best'. Moreover ḥasan can also mean 'beautiful', and in this case aḥsan could be translated as 'more beautiful' or 'most beautiful'.

At this point the ambiguity in the Amman letter can be resolved. The Muslim scholars who drafted this letter must have read aḥsan as 'most beautiful', and so they rendered it as fairest. This is, however, an obscure way to communicate this meaning, for although 'beautiful' was the original meaning of fair, this reading is now somewhat archaic and tends to be restricted to specific contents. The older meaning is still widely understood, from people's exposure to fairy tales, as in the famous line of Snow White's step-mother: 'Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the fairest [most beautiful] of them all?'

But now that we have resolved the ambiguity inherent in fairest, two others have arisen: Is this verse about a beautiful manner or a good manner, and should the English translator use a superlative or comparative? In other words, how do we chose between 'more beautiful', 'most beautiful', 'bettter' or 'best?

At this point, one could slow down the reading process even further, and consult commentaries on the Quran and their translations into English. There one finds that interpretations in terms of 'better' or 'best' are preferred. For example, the eminent commentator Ibn Kathir writes in his commentary (see also here and here for other commentaries translated into English).

"What is meant here is that anyone who wants to find out about religion from them should argue with them in a manner that is better, as this will be more effective." (Tafsir Ibn Kathir) [Ibn Kathir then goes on to say that for non-Muslims who 'turn a blind eye to clear evidence' and stubbornly reject Islam, Muslims should 'progress from debate to combat', and strike them with the sword.]

This example illustrates both the exuberance and deficiency of translation, and also the difficulty of reading. The Amman scholars' translation of Sura 29:46 is deficient in that it obliterates the usual interpretation of 'better/best', and it is exuberant because it suggests the meaning of 'impartial, free from bias' to the unwary English reader. A 'slowed down reader' can mitigate these problems by paying attention first of all to the fact that fairest is ambiguous, and this could then give them reason to investigate the original Arabic, as well as to ask how commentators and translators have dealt with the word, and thus, step by step, they can work their way towards a better understanding.

This exercise in reading also raises questions about the intent of the eminent Muslims scholars who composed the Amman letter. Why did they chose the word fairest, given that other translations such as better or best are available which seem clearer, are preferred in published translations, and which better match the commentaries? This is an entirely valid question if one wants to have a proper understanding of the meaning of the letter. Was this is a case of sloppy translation? Or should the reader consult a wider variety of commentaries to check whether 'fairest' has any supporters among the scholars?

Perhaps there was an intention to deceive or simply to present the 'best face' of Islam? (In this case the whole text could reasonably be examined for other evidence of 'spin': 'fairest' does seem more gracious than telling the Pope that Muslims should argue in a 'better' way, even if it obscures the original by introducing a possibility of misinterpretation.) Or, perhaps more charitably, one might explore whether this was this a rhetorical device, a misleading impression which the reader is meant to figure out. Consider for example what the commentator As-Suyuti says of the device of tauriyat in his discussion of Quranic rhetoric (in Al-Itqan fi 'Ulum al-Qur'an):

The Deception or Double Entendre (al-tauriyat) is to use a word with two meanings concurrently... one being immediate and the other, more distant to comprehension; that it is the latter meaning which is intended is implied by the former, more immediate meaning. Because of this, the listener too, harbors doubts, from the very outset.

Thus the efforts of the reader go on and on, as the task of reading grows ever more complex. Interrogating even a single word in a text can be like pulling on a piece of string – the more one looks into things, the more drawn out the whole exercise of interpretation becomes.

The Quran is difficult reading material

Reading the Quran presents many challenges. One is that the Arabic of the Quran is often just hard to understand. It contains many opaque words and expressions, and the mode of expression is often highly elliptical, leaving out material which the reader must infer.

Muslims can be reluctant to speak of translating the Quran itself. Instead they will use an expression like 'translation of the meanings', which are the literal words in the sub-title of the Saudi-sponsored Noble Qur'an. Some may put this down to Muslims having a very high regard for the Quran in its original Arabic form, as a kind of pious claim that the text is uniquely untranslatable because of its supposed divine origins.

However there is another reason speak of 'translating the meanings', which is that translators of the Quran do not so much translate the Arabic text, as the meaning of the text as it is explained by the commentaries. In other words, the translator reads the commentaries and translates what they say the text means. Thus Yusuf Ali states in the introduction to his translation 'In translating the Text, I have aired no views of my own, but followed the received Commentators.'

The result of this process of translation is a 'smoothed' text, which has lost a whole host of ambiguities and particularities, and bears a very complex relationship to the Arabic original. Similar 'smoothing' can also apply in Bible translations, however the challenge this presents for readers is — in my admittedly subjective impression – much greater for the Quran.

A further complication in Quranic translations is the value of the text for da'wa, or 'calling' people to Islam. There is pressure to make the translation more attractive and this influences translators' choices.

Such pressure seems to be behind Yusuf Ali's translation of iḍribūhunna as 'chastise them' in a passage from Sura 4:34 discussing how to maintain marital harmony. Although Yusuf Ali's footnote explains that what is meant is 'mild corporal punishment' (of the wife), the English word chastise can mean either 'punish by beating' or 'scold' (i.e. a verbal rebuke). This ambiguity does not exist in the Arabic: the Arabic root ḍ-r-b simply means 'beat, strike, hit'.

Muhammad Shakir's 'beat them', although an obvious and clear translation of what the Arabic actuallys says, was presumably avoided by Yusuf Ali because it was too confronting. The use of chastise, which offers an alternative interpretation – however misleading – softens the text, and makes it more appealing (or less unappealing) for the Western reader. Such considerations must be taken into account by the careful reader of Quran translations.

Or course bias in translation is not unique to the Quran. A passage in the book of Isaiah has been translated 'a young woman shall conceive' (Isaiah 7:14). However Christian translators have often preferred the inaccurate rendering 'a virgin shall conceive' (following the Greek Septuagint), because this strengthens the prophetic reference to the doctrine of Christ's virgin birth. Modern translators of the Bible have tried to eliminate theologically-driven translation choices, and thus the New Revised Standard Version reads 'a young woman'.

All this brings me round to a discussion of fighting and killing in the Quran, which will be the subject of my next post, and illustrates the considerable cultural complexities of translation.

The Dhimma Time Warp Returns for the Copts of Egypt

2011-04-11T16:39:00.000-07:00

In recent weeks a series of incidents in Egypt give evidence that, post-Mubarak, the Copts are being pressured to assume the time-warped status of dhimmis, a captive people in their own native lands, whose status is to be tightly circumscribed by traditional sharia law.

The ancient dhimma pact, which determined the status of non-Muslims after Muslim conquest and occupation, includes specific regulations limiting the construction, repair and maintenance of churches, as well as the public display of religious symbols and public performance of rituals. Muslim legal authorities based these regulations on the model of the Pact of Umar, a treaty attributed to the second Caliph, ‘Umar bin Al-Khattab, around the time of his conquest of Syria in 634-638. A version of this pact can be found in Ibn Kathir's highly respected commentary on the Qur'an (see here), from which various quotations below are taken.

Now, 1400 years later, a series of assaults on churches in Egypt have demonstrated the enduring power of this piece of paper to control the lives of Middle Eastern Christians today.

In one incident, Muslim radicals occupied the entrance to the church of St John the Beloved in the village of Kamadeer, praying and sleeping there, while thousands of local Copts stages a sit-in in front of the governor's offices in Minya, demanding the return of their building.

Why would Muslims not want Christians to use their church? The explanation can be found in the Pact of Umar. Back in the 7th century, the Christians of Syria agreed, as a condition of their surrender, that they would not build or repair any churches:

When you (Muslims) came to us we requested safety for ourselves, children, property and followers of our religion. We made a condition on ourselves that we will neither erect in our areas a … church … nor restore any place of worship that needs restoration …

In the Pact of Umar, Muslims also were given the right to occupy churches if they wished:

We will not prevent any Muslim from resting in our churches whether they come by day or night...

The Muslims who have occupied the church in Kamadeer this past week did so because they objected to a plan to repair it. As Mary Abdelmassih for the Assyrian International News Agency reported:

The problem started when the heavy rain in January 2011 caused the church, which is built of clay bricks and has a timber roof, to suffer severe cracks. The Copts requested from the military permission for repairs. Last week inspectors from the local council visited the church and confirmed the church is dilapidated and poses a threat to the parishioners and must be repaired.

When Muslims saw that the Copts were going to get permission to repair the building, they occupied it, saying 'we allowed you to pray here, but there is no question of any building work to be done, this will have to be over our dead bodies'.

Why would fixing a crack in a roof be a matter for which these Muslims are prepared to sacrifice their lives? The reason is devotion to sharia: the dhimma laws forbid Christians from repairing churches after Muslim conquest.

The Muslims in Kamadeer also demanded that the Christians move their church to another site, so, after a process of 'reconciliation' the Copts have been compelled to relocate to a site 200 meters away from the old church. The new building is to be strictly limited in size: it must be one story high – not two as the old one was – and must not have any recognizable signs, visible or audible, of being a church, such as a dome, cross or bell.

Why these specific conditions? The reason is that the dhimma demands them. As the Pact of Umar puts it, Christians living under Islam are to refrain from all public displays of their religion:

We will not … publicize practices of Shirk ['idolatry' - i.e. non-Islamic belief]… We will … refrain from erecting crosses on the outside of our churches and demonstrating them and our books in public in Muslim fairways and markets. We will not sound the bells in our churches, except discretely, or raise our voices while reciting our holy books inside our churches in the presence of Muslims, nor raise our voices [with prayer] at our funerals, or light torches in funeral processions in the fairways of Muslims, or their markets.

The restriction on the height of the new church is also determined by dhimma regulations, which demand that non-Muslims' buildings cannot be as high as the houses and mosques of Muslims.

In another incident, Muslims demanded that approved renovations to St. George's Church in Beni Ahmad, 7 KM south of Minya, be demolished, or else they will destroy the church. This also accords with the dhimma pact. The authorities have backed the radical Muslims, telling the Christians they must comply with these demands.

Part of the Pact of Umar is permission clause given by the Christians that if they breach any of the pact's conditions, they can be treated as rebels (i.e. killed, looted and enslaved):

These are the conditions that we set against ourselves and followers of our religion in return for safety and protection. If we break any of these promises that we set for your benefit against ourselves, then our Dhimmah (promise of protection) is broken and you are allowed to do with us what you are allowed of people of defiance and rebellion.

This is the threat which is forcing the Christians to accept such demeaning outcomes: if they attempt to pursue justice by appeals through the courts, and insist on their right to repair their churches, their whole community could be attacked, and the church destroyed and looted. Through acts of 'reconciliation' Copts are being forced to accept the demands of the Muslims for the delapidation or relocation of their churches, and the removal of overt Christian symbols from their buildings.

There is no justice here for the Christians, not in any reasonable understanding of the word. The Egyptian authorities have failed them, by acquiescing to the revival of the dhimma in the streets of Kamadeer.

This is the consequence of the collapse of the Mubarak regime, which devoted much of its resources to suppressing radical Islam. Now the suppression is gone, supporters of the Islamic revival are gaining confidence to restore sharia law, including implementing it on the heads of their Christian neighbours. With Mubarak gone, the state authorities seemingly have little will to stand in their way.

Of course, not all Egyptian Muslims wish to destroy Christian churches in this manner, so as to send the Copts back into the grim past! But those who do have enough self-confidence and aggression to intimidate the rest. Sadly, the worst is yet to come.

All across the Muslim world there are signs the dhimma is returning. The Copts of Kamadeer are not suffering alone. The whole point of the dhimma system, as the eminent (and mainstream) Pakistani jurist M. Taqi Usmani explained in his Islam and Modernism, is to demolish the 'grandeur' of non-believers, so that Islam will be attractive for all to follow. Such is the utopia which the Islamic revival movement offers to the world.

It would be completely irresponsible and misleading to refer to such events as the destruction of the church in Kamadeer as a manifestation of 'sectarian conflict', 'ignorance' or 'extremism'. Those who have worked for this outcome include trained religious scholars, and they have the solid backing of 14 centuries of Islamic jurisprudence behind them. It is entirely correct to call such people 'radicals', because they understand and wish to revive the the radix or 'root' of their faith.

The real problem is that this legal foundation remains unrenounced by so many of the leading Islamic jurists of our day, and unacknowledged too by so many among the scholarly and political elites in the West, including those church leaders who know more about interfaith schmoozing than about radical Islam.

Bringing the dhimma back is not extremism, but 'mainstream-ism' and it will remain so until both the Muslim and Western 'mainstreams' reject the dhimma comprehensively and without apology or camouflage, as an instrument of oppression best left to languish in the dark ages of Islamic history.

The destruction of the church in Kamadeer is a witness to the collusion of so many Western scholars and political leaders, who have proclaimed for more than a century that non-Muslims enjoyed unparalleled 'tolerance' living under Islamic rule. The dhimma, we have been told, provided for an enviable conviviencia between faiths in a golden past.

What we are seeing in Egypt gives the lie to such claims. To call the bitter dhimma conditions 'tolerance' only gives implicit support to such assaults as have been played out in Kamadeer this past week, for if the 'golden' Islamic past under dhimma conditions was the epitome of tolerance, then modern-day rigor in re-imposing these very same conditions on the heads of Egypt's Christians must also be quietly accepted as 'tolerance' too.

The demolition squad for the church of St John the Beloved is not only composed of the hot-blooded Salafi Muslims who have been rolling out their prayer mats in its entrance. It also includes a legion of others, the cheer squad of silence, pursuing respectable and irenic careers in the West.

The ahistorical cant which eulogizes the dhimma has become a poisoned chalice for the Copts of Egypt today.

Muslim violence a fact, not prejudice

2011-03-24T07:38:00.000-07:00

This opinion piece appeared in The Age newspaper of March 25, 2011

THOSE who denounce critics of Islam should allow that, like all global faiths, Islam has its detractors and a religion will be judged on what its followers say and do.

There is a debate going on about Islam. The question being asked is: Does Islam itself - not just poverty or social exclusion - provide ideological fuel for extremism and violence?

It is all too tempting to promote one-dimensional explanations of religious violence. Monash University doctoral candidate Rachel Woodlock said on this page on Wednesday that social exclusion was the root of Islamic radicalism.

On one hand, there are those who, like Woodlock, demand that critics of Islam be stigmatised as ignorant, right-wing racists. On the other hand, Islam's problems cannot be simplistically reduced to social or economic factors.

Violence in the name of Islam is well-attested in nations in which Muslims are dominant, and it is non-Muslim minorities that suffer the exclusion. It does not do to argue that religion has no relevance to such events.

In Muslim-majority Pakistan on December 3, Pakistani imam Maulana Yousuf Qureshi, in his Friday sermon, offered a $6000 bounty to anyone who would murder Asia Bibi, a Christian woman who has also been accused of "blaspheming Allah". Pakistani minister for minorities Shahbaz Bhatti and Punjab governor Salman Taseer were subsequently assassinated because of their opposition to Pakistan's blasphemy laws.

These laws are supported by Pakistan's Islamic elites. The killer of Salman Taseer, Mumtaz Qadri, was praised by religious leaders from mainstream schools of Pakistani Islam, and when he was being led to court on January 6, 400 Muslim lawyers showered him with rose petals, offering him their legal services free of charge.

There has also been a rush of recent assaults on Copts and their places of worship in Egypt, sparked by a wild tirade by a leading Egyptian cleric.

Closer to Australia, there have been well-publicised attacks on Ahmadiyah Muslims in Indonesia, including brutal murders. These were undoubtedly influenced by a theological belief that Ahmadiyah adherents are apostates from true Islam. Although prominent Indonesian leaders were quick to express abhorrence for the attacks, many Indonesian Muslims have called for Ahmadiyahs to be outlawed.

These events demonstrate the ugly effects of stigmatising minorities, and it would be deplorable to simple-mindedly extrapolate the religious views of Pakistani, Egyptian or Indonesian Muslims and apply them to Australia.

However, it is irrational to insist that any and everyone who seeks to expose the religious roots of such hatred must themselves be decried as haters.

All over the world, every religious belief is disliked by someone or other. Christianity has its prominent detractors, too, from Bertrand Russell to Richard Dawkins. A Google search for "Evils of Christianity" yields tens of thousands of hits.

Australians can be thankful for a culture of tolerance, which has been carefully nurtured over decades. Tolerance is strengthened when people are able to debate ideological issues freely - especially those which impact profoundly on human rights - without being shouted down.

Victorian Supreme Court Justice Geoffrey Nettle, in his findings on the case of the Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire, pointed out that criticism - or even hatred - of a religion should not be conflated with the hatred of people who hold those beliefs. It is one thing to promote tolerance, quite another to mandate it.

Perhaps the most powerful evidence against Woodlock's thesis - that it is exclusion, and not religion, that drives some Muslims to terrorism - is the fact that across the globe the most diverse religious minorities do not resort to violence, even when persecuted.

There are no Falun Gong terrorists in China, despite all the bitter persecution. The same can be said for persecuted Christians in many nations.

Even in Australia, many ethnic and religious groups have been subjected to disadvantage and exclusion, but none have produced the level of terrorist convictions of our own home-grown Islamic radicals.

It is a bitter pill for the vast majority of Australian Muslims to swallow that their faith has been linked, globally and locally, to religious violence.

Unfortunately, this link cannot be dismissed as the product of media prejudice or "Islamophobic" propaganda. It is in part an issue of some Muslims behaving very badly, and their often strident claim is that they do this in the name of religion.

Taking such claims seriously and debating them publicly must not be equated with stigmatising law-abiding and peaceable Australian Muslims.

Mark Durie is a Melbourne Anglican vicar, human rights activist, and author of The Third Choice: Islam, Dhimmitude and Freedom.

The Mufti of Egypt Stands up for Christians - Or Does He?

2011-03-24T07:30:00.000-07:00

In the context of the recent outpouring of hatred and violence against the Copts, and specifically the destruction of the ancient church in Soul, the Mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Ali Gomaa (or Jum'a) has issued a fatwa condemning violence against Christians and their places of worship. A report on this fatwa was published by youm7.com, a popular Egyptian news site, on March 12, 2011.

Fatwas are opinions issued by someone with a recognized authority in Islam. They are not binding, but may be used to guide Muslims. The Mufti of Egypt heads the Dar al-Ifta or 'Fatwa Institute' in Egypt, which regularly issues thousands of rulings on a myriad of topics. This particular fatwa was issued by this same office (see here).

In the context of discussing his fatwas on the status of Christians, it is important to note that Ali Gomaa is regarded as a moderate cleric. He was appointed by Hosni Mubarak and is reportedly strongly opposed by some radical Muslims. An example of one of Gomaa's moderate positions is his opposition to female circumcision (see here). (Gomaa's contribution to the female circumcision debate is analysed on pp. 75-76 of The Third Choice). Gomaa was a signatory to the Common Word letter from Muslim scholars to the Christians of the world.

Typical of Gomaa's approach to modern conditions is that he affirms the validity of traditional jurisprudence on the one hand, while allowing that changed conditions permit a different interpretation of Islamic law, subject to the application of reason. He believes that female circumcision was valid in the past, given the knowledge Muslims had then, but is invalid today, because of changed understandings. He places great importance on the contributions of reason and context to interpreting Islam.

Concerning wife-beating, Gomaa has argued that for a Muslim to beat his wife in Canada could be against Islam, because it is reasonable to take into account the culture of the surrounding society, whilst it would at the same time be a legitimate practice in a Muslim state, because of different understandings about domestic violence in the two contexts. Gomaa claims, for example, that in Muslim Arab societies women welcome and even desire beatings by their husbands, so the practice is not inconsistent with Islam (see here) but serves to safeguard the family.

My assessment of Gomaa is that he is an intellectual who straddles the traditional world of Islamic jurisprudence and the modern world of technological advance and changing social conditions.

In the rapidly changing political context in Egypt, a more radical Islamic government in Egypt would almost certainly appoint a more conservative Mufti than Ali Gomaa, with potentially significant consequences for the daily lives of Egyptian citizens.

Fatwas are typically issued as an answer in response to a specific question or set of questions. In this case the questions were: what is the legitimate Islamic ruling concerning attacks on churches and Christian places or worship, attacking them by arson or bombs; what is the legal ruling if there are people praying inside the church at the time; and is the claim valid which denies that a dhimmah (pact of surrender or protection) exists between Copts and Muslims at the present time?

Why would Muslims be asking about the dhimmah pact in the very period when Copts are being persecuted and killed, and their places of worship burnt and bombed? For understanding this, it is important to grasp the function of the dhimma pact. (The detailed functioning of the dhimma is described in detail in my book The Third Choice.)

Non-Muslims living under Islamic law are traditionally considered as dhimmis, or people of the dhimma pact of surrender. Islamic laws understands dhimmis, who include Christians, to be people who have surrendered to the forces of Islam under certain specific conditions.

These conditions include payment of the annual jizya heand tax, and acceptance of being made 'small' as Sura 9:29 of the Qur'an puts it. See for example, the explanation by Ibn Kathir of what being made 'small' means, which is laid out in a section of his commentary entitled Paying Jizyah is a sign of Kufr (infidelity) and Disgrace. Ibn Kathir states that non-Muslims living under Islamic rule are to be 'subdued', 'miserable', 'humiliated', 'disgraced', and 'belittled'.

Classical Islamic law included many debilitating restrictions on Christians living in an Islamic state, including, for example, prohibitions on building new churches or repairing old ones, restrictions on bearing arms, limitations on the height of houses, and legal disabilities in sharia courts.

Islamic jurists considered that dhimmis who paid the annual jizya tax were purchasing their life back for the year ahead. In effect, the non-Muslim who agreed to submit to these principles of Islamic law was allowed to live by virtue of paying his head tax. If the non-Muslim failed to observe the conditions of the dhimma, his head was forfeit, and his possessions (including wife, children, house and place of worship) could lawfully be confiscated by Muslims.

The eminent nineteenth Algerian Qur'anic commentator Muhammad ibn Yusuf at-Fayyish (d. 1914) explained the meaning of the jizya tax in his commentary of Sura 9:29.

It was said: it [jizya] is a satisfaction for their blood. It is said 'X' has sufficed … to compensate for their not being slain. Its purpose is to substitute for the duties (wajib) of killing and of slavery … It is for the benefit of Muslims.

Or as William Eton wrote in his compendious Survey of the Turkish Empire in 1799: 'the sum of money received [from non-Muslims] is taken as compensation for being permitted to wear their heads that year.'

The system of jizya payments was mainly dismantled in the 19th and 20th centuries across the Islamic world, under pressure from European powers.

Now here comes the point about the Mufti's fatwa.

Since it is the dhimma pact and observance of its conditions which is supposed, according to Islamic law, to guarantee the safety of non-Muslims living in the Islamic state, the contention is being mooted among radically minded Muslims, influenced by the worldwide sharia revival, that today's Christians, living in Muslim lands, are not protected by a dhimma pact, because they do not pay the jizya, and are not submissive to classical sharia conditions for dhimmis.

The inescapable logic of this line of argument is that Christians living in Egypt – and elsewhere in the Middle East – have no right to life: the men can lawfully be killed by Muslims, and their possessions, including women and children – can be confiscated. That is, as long as they are not under a full dhimma pact.

This perspective, which will seem outlandish and utterly pernicious to non-Muslims' minds, is precisely the issue which Egypt's Mufti is intending to address with his fatwa. In the context of attacks on Christian churches and homes, and repeated killings of Copts, the Mufti is rejecting the reasoning which says that the dhimma no longer applies to protect the Christians of Egypt.

The very existence of this fatwa is an important admission of the existence of the way of thinking, because the Mufti is trying to root it out. All the recent attacks on Copts – a list of which is given in my previous blog post, might be claimed to be justified by radically minded Muslims, on the basis of the contention that Christians without a pact are fair game.

So, for example, we could assume that the off-duty policeman who shot and killed a 71 year old Christian man on a train in January believed he had a right to kill Christians because the jizya as 'satisfaction for their blood', as At-Fayyish described it, is not being paid by them. Also the Coptic demonstrators who have been attacked and killed have presumably been considered to be acting arrogantly, and not 'submissively' as the dhimma demands of non-Muslims, for one of the conditions of the dhimma is that non-Muslims must not criticize Islam or Muslims. Likewise monks who have been attacked for building security fences were regarded as pact breakers because they were making modifications to a place of worship, which is forbidden by dhimma laws.

There are many references being made to jizya payments and the dhimma among radical Muslims in the Middle East today. The argument being put is that Christians will not be safe until they pay the jizya and submit to dhimma conditions, because then and only then will a religious obligation exist for Muslims to respect the right to life of Christians. Gradually, year by year, calls to bring back the jizya are emerging from the shadows into the light of day.

In the worldview of dhimmitude, non-Muslims have no inherent right to life. Muslims do have this right under sharia law, as it is a capital offence to kill a Muslim. However non-Muslims only have a conceded right to life, if they agree to redeem their life each year with jizya payments, and submit to the rules of the dhimma. (And even then, killing a dhimmi is not the capital offense that killing a Muslim is.) This is the worldview to which radicals like the Islamic Brotherhood wish Egypt to return.

Back to the Mufti of Egypt

How then can the Mufti address this pressing challenge, that some Muslims in Egypt think it acceptable to bomb and burn churches and Christian homes, and to kill Christians, because they no longer have a dhimma to protect them?

It seems to me that he could oppose this on two grounds. He could argue the universal brotherhood of all people, that all people have a right to life and liberty granted by their creator. He does not do this, perhaps because it is so far from mainsteam Islamic attitudes to non-Muslims. Normative Islam is based on lack of reciprocity and lack of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims.

What Sheikh Gomaa does instead is argue that being a citizen of a modern state gives an equivalent level of protection to the dhimma pact. The fatwa states:

... assaults on Christians living in Egypt are a breach to the citizenship contract, for [Christians] are citizens who have the rights to citizenship. They made a contract with Muslims, and have subjected themselves to a covenant to live together [with Muslims] in the land in peace and security. Assaulting them, or causing them harm, or terrorising them – in addition to killing them and destroying their churches – is a breach of this contract, and of the covenant that we [Muslims] have the duty to fulfil.

What Ali Gomaa is saying, quite explicitly, is that being an Egyptian citizen gives Christians the same protection which the dhimma gave. The fatwa states:

The state Mufi pointed out that the saying of some people that

“the covenant between us and them is the dhimmah pact, which lapsed in this [modern] era, therefore we are not bound (to them) by a covenant"

is a false saying, and lacks much understanding. Citizenship, in its agreed understanding, has been established within the Islamic world’s constitutions and laws, including the Egyptian constitution, which ... in its second article on the authority of the Islamic sharia ... acknowledges [the rights for] citizenship – as Muhammad did in the Medina Constitution. This has provided for the coexistence and cooperation between the children of the one homeland [i.e. Muslims and Christians] even if they differ in religion, and if there is no dhimma contract or jizya. Therefore, the [citizenship] contract is one of the legal contracts must must be fulfilled, exactly like the dhimma contract.

And:

[The Mufti] has made it clear that claiming the dhimma era has lapsed, and denying them [Christians] a covenant with Muslims is false talk.

The Mufti also cites some hadiths (traditions) which point to the special status of the Copts in Islam's destiny, and emphasizes that those who do violence against Copts only empower the enemies of Islam:

... acts of destruction distort the image of Islam in the West and the East, and they support the false image that Islam is bloodthirsty. This gives license to lurking enemies to interfere in our internal affairs...

Ali Goma also cites various Islamic canonical sources which address the issue of mistreating dhimmis, and argues that attacking them or their buildings is a terrible offense against Allah's laws, which will lead to a very bad outcome on judgement day. He considers attacks on churches accompanied by killing to be 'worse than murder, theft or adultery', which are already very serious crimes in Islam.

In comparison to the religious leaders who are baying for Christian blood in Egypt today, Ali Gomaa is acting like a decent man. He is trying to do what he can to avert a catastrophe. Nevertheless, his whole worldview presupposes the need for a 'covenant' to apply between Muslims and Christians if Christian blood is to be protected. He does not stand up for an inalienable right to life for all, irrespective of creed.

Gomaa is seeking, within the limited parameters of Islamic understandings of the rights of non-Muslims to propose a compelling argument to pious Muslims that they should not attack and kill Christians. Yet in order to do this he gives away the fundamental human rights of non-Muslims.

There is another problem with Gomaa's fatwa. In the dhimma pact system, there are multiple possibilities of pact violations. If a dhimmi steps out of line, their protection lapses. Gomaa appears to avoid this issue altogether. This is problematic, because some of those who have attacked Christians verbally have used arguments to show that Copts' actions have abrogated the protection which would have applied under dhimmi conditions. By this way of thinking, there could be no protection, even if the dhimma did apply. People whose thinking goes in this direction will not be convinced by Ali Gomaa's arguments, because he ommitted to address the issue of pact violations in his citizen pact model.

Hopefully I will be able, in another post, to explain how verbal attacks on Copts have invoked the concept of the dhimma pact. They have done this by making allegations which are obviously intended to be regarded as violations of dhimma conditions. Radical Muslims in Egypt have been accusing Christians of being pact breakers, and by this means putting pressure upon them to accept again the age-old form of servitude known as the dhimma. Up until now the Copts have been resisting this pressure, and continue to protest.

What the outside world needs to do is grasp these dynamics, so that it can make an fair and accurate assessment of what is going on in Egypt. It is necessary to grasp why the concept of the dhimma is central to understanding what is happening with the Copts of Egypt at this time. They are between a rock (violence) and a hard place (the return of the dhimma and fearful subservience to Islam).

A Tsunami of Persecution Against the Copts of Egypt

2011-03-24T05:05:00.000-07:00

Back on October 17, 2010, I commenced a blog post on Egypt. I had meant to title it Storm Clouds Gather over the Christians of Egypt. My first sentence was "We seem to be on the verge of witnessing a tragic, and even catastrophic assault by radical Muslims on the Christians of Egypt."

The reason for starting that post was a shocking interview on Al Jazeera of Egyptian Cleric Muhammad Salim Al-Awwa by host Ahmed Mansour, on the program 'Without Borders'.
This was broadcast on September 15, 2010.

At the time I was simply too distressed to continue with the post, and it was never finished. I regret this lack of courage, and the purpose of this post is to note the events which have happened since them.

After Al-Awwa's broadcast repeated mass demonstrations of Egyptian Muslims were staged. These threatened reprisals against the Copts and Pope Shenouda. There was also a string of articles in newspapers inciting hatred against Christians.

I kept track of incidents which were reported from Al-Awwa's broadcast to March 2011:

On 24 November 2010 around 5,000 soldiers attacked St. Mary and St. Michaels in Talbiya, Giza over an alleged building code violation. They used tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition. Three Copts were killed, and a young child died from tear gas thrown into a chapel. Hundreds were injured, and more than 150 Copts were arrested.
A devastating New Year's Eve suicide bomb attack on the Saints Church in Alexandria killed 23 worshippers and injured 70, the worst mass attack on Copts for a decade.
On January 11, an off-duty policeman used his service revolver to shoot Copts on a train. A 71 year-old man was killed, and five others were injured.
On February 19, 2011, the home of the Christian building contractor who was building the controversal St Mary and St Michael church in Talbiya was broken into, and his 18-year old daughter was abducted. The abductors wrote on the wall the Muslim Brotherhood slogan 'Islam is the solution' and "The Church has to be demolished'.
On 21 February 2011 the body of Rev Dawood Boutros was found, murdered two days earlier in Shotb, just outside Assiut City, southern Egypt. Journalist Ahmed Zaki Osman reported for Al-Masry al-Youm: 'According to the slain priest's neighbours, four people killed the Coptic cleric in his home while "chanting Islamic slogans". (Report by Elizabeth Kendal).
In multiple incidents from February 20-26, 2011 (see here, here, and here) Egyptian armed forces demolished fences which monks had erect to protect the monastery during a chaotic period when hundreds of criminals had escaped from prisons in Egypt. In one incident, when the monks tried to address the soldiers, they opened fire with live amunition, wounding six Copts. The soldiers were crying "Allahu Akhbar" as they demolished the fence, and prevented the monastery's car from taking the wounded to hospital. The Monastery of St Makarios of Alexandria was also attacked, where one monk was shot, and ten were wounded through being beaten by batons.
On February 28, 2011, the Governor of Minya ordered the demolition of ten homes belonging to Coptic families in the village of Saeed Abdelmassih, 30 km from Minya. The families had refused to pay a bribe to prevent the demolision, and to donate land for a mosque in the village, where no Muslims lived.
On March 5, 2011 a mob of over 4,000 Muslims attacked Coptic homes and burnt down an ancient Coptic church in Soul, near Cairo. The attackers played 'soccer' with the relics of the saints and martyrs taken from inside the church, and converted the site into a mosque, naming it the "Mercy Mosque". Later reports stated that the church is being rebuilt by the army.
On March 8, 2011, a mob of some 15,000 armed Muslims attacked a vastly outnumbered crowd of Christians on the outskirts of Cairo. The Egyptian army, which was called to restore order, shoot live fire, and Copts were wounded and killed with live ammunition. Witnesses report they saw the army killing Christians. Thirteen people were killed, and over 140 suffered injuries.
On March 14, 2011, Copts were shot at and beaten with electric batons by Egyptian soldiers, some of whom were crying Allahu Akbar during the attack. Fifteen Copts suffered injuries, including head wounds, broken limbs and burns. The Copts were part of a protest against the Soul attack of March 5 (see above).
A group of Muslims, including a policeman, said they were executing Islamic law when they amputated the ear of a Coptic man, Ayman Anwar Mitri, for leasing an apartment to two single women. The perpetrators also burned down his apartment and his car. After they finished they called the police and said "we have executed the law of Allah, come and apply your law". Mirti lodged a complaint with the police, but 'agreed' to withdrew his complaint and to 'reconcile' with his attackers after they threatened to kidnap his female relatives. (In Egypt, kidnapping of a Christian woman means her rape, forced conversion and marriage to a Muslim. The woman then becomes irretrievable. Under sharia law her new husband has the right speak on her behalf in any legal proceedings. Kidnapping of non-Muslim women is widely reported by dhimmi communities living under Islamic conditions.)
Some nine thousand Coptic villagers have been living in terror since the end of January in the Upper Egyptian villages of Badraman and Nazlet Badraman in Deir Mawas, Minya. A Muslim police informer and his gang of armed supporters have been terrorizing Christians in the area with rapes, kidnappings and extortion. Christians are beginning to move out of the area, having been made destitute by the regime of terror. Attempts to submit formal complaints to the police have not succeeded because of intimidation and threats, and the government has made no effective response to the crisis: instead they have been 'turning a blind eye' to these events since January.

No 'Revolution' for Egypt's Christians by Raymond Ibrahim

2011-03-22T13:42:00.000-07:00

This is an important report on what is happening in Egypt by Raymond Ibrahim.

No 'Revolution' for Egypt's Christians

by Raymond Ibrahim
FrontPageMagazine.com
March 22, 2011
http://www.meforum.org/2855/no-revolution-for-egypt-christians
(visit the above link for the full article, including all the links)

On March 5, Muslims attacked, plundered, and set ablaze an ancient Coptic church in Sool, a village near Cairo, Egypt. Afterwards, throngs of Muslims gathered around the scorched building and pounded its walls down with sledge hammers—to cries of "Allahu Akbar!" Adding insult to injury, the attackers played "soccer" with the relic-remains of the church's saints and martyrs and transformed the desecrated church into a mosque (a live example of history, which witnessed countless churches seized and transformed into mosques). As a result of Christian girls being abducted and raped and overall terrorization of the Coptic community, thousands fled the village. (See this letter to Egypt's military leadership signed by twenty congressmen discussing this and similar anecdotes.)

This latest church rampage was initiated by Muslims killing each other over an affair between a Christian man and a Muslim woman—and then transferring their violence onto the Copts of the region and their church.

Muhammad Hassan
Radical sheikh Muhammad Hassan, who was commissioned to investigate the incident, recently shared his "findings" on Egyptian TV. After insisting to Coptic viewers that "Islam is a religion of peace, mercy, and justice," he said that the "Muslim youth" who attacked the church never intended to do so; rather, they went there searching for a Coptic man. After invading the church, they discovered ancient liturgical books in the Coptic script, and papers with the names of Muslims. These were interpreted as "sorcery"—hence, they destroyed the church. (The fact is, some Muslims venerate St. Mary and often submit their names at churches for intercession.)

Not once did Hassan condemn the Muslim perpetrators. He even referred to the Copts as "dhimmis" and "pact-holders," prompting outrage among Egypt's indigenous Christian population, or as one Copt put it: "Hassan wants to make Dhimmis out of us… I thought we were living in [a] country with a constitution and a police force and not in Mecca or Medina, 14 centuries ago. Or maybe this is a first step to later subject Christians to Jizya for protection."

As medieval as this entire anecdote is—and as anachronistic as Hassan's rationale of "sorcery" is—none of this is surprising. What is disappointing, however, is that the Egyptian army—recently touted as the noble "savior" of the Egyptian people—and the Arabic media—which provided 24-hour coverage of the Tahrir Square protests—have both blatantly demonstrated their bias against Egypt's Christians.

Portrayed in the Western media as magnanimous for restraining itself against Egypt's civilians during the recent uprisings, not only did the Egyptian army allow the wanton destruction of the church to go unfettered, but it also opened fire on Christians protesting the burning of the church, killing nine and seriously wounding at least a hundred, some beaten with electric batons. Coptic activist lawyer Sherif Ramzy, who was among those assaulted, said that the soldiers also cried "Allahu Akbar" before attacking the Copts, adding, "This only shows that the army is infiltrated by Islamists."

Nor was this the first time since Mubarak was ousted that the military attacked Copts: in late February, armed forces, including tanks, opened fire on a 5th century monastery (as churches are accused of "sorcery," monasteries are accused of stockpiling weapons). Likewise, as Muslims spent some twenty hours pulverizing the church at Sool with sledge hammers, neither the military, nor state security ever appeared—and this near Cairo, Egypt's capital, not some inaccessible village.

Coptic protesters at Maspiro
Where has the Egyptian and Arab media been in all this? Not only have they tried to bypass all of these unpleasantries with scant or euphemistic mention ("sectarian strife"); but they also failed to cover the massive protests in front of Egypt's State TV building in Maspiro, where Copts rallied in an effort to get the world's attention, demanding the return of the church (which is now called "Mercy Mosque") and the return of the Copts back to their village. By some accounts, there were nearly two million protestors—including many Egyptian Muslims who rose up in support of their Christian countrymen. One would have thought all this newsworthy. As Wahid of the Arabic show Al Dalil put it:

Al Jazeera focused on every detail of Tahrir Square for twenty days. Where is Al Jazeera when Christians are attacked in Egypt, protesting and sleeping in the streets for ten days—or are they infidels, no good, or irrelevant dhimmis? You claim that you represent an objective and fair media in the Middle East—but where were you regarding what happened in Maspiro in Egypt? This confirms to us that you are one of the most terrible medias—a discriminating organization that treats events based on whether they deal with Muslims or not. But if it's about Christians, then we [i.e., Al Jazeera] don't deal with it. This is a media crisis of huge proportions. Till this day we do not have any media in the Middle East that is objective and that portrays the news as it truly is. (My translation.)

Aside from what all this bodes for the Copts, Western observers should also be concerned. For starters, that the Western media closely followed Al Jazeera's lead during the Tahrir Square protests, while being virtually clueless of these massive Christian uprisings, suggests that, when it comes to information on the Middle East, the Western mainstream media is heavily dependent on the Arab media, especially Al Jazeera. This is not to say that the West agrees with the point of view put forth by Al Jazeera. But it is to say that whether an issue even makes it to the Western media—makes it to the West's knowledge—is very much dependent on whether Islamist-leaning Al Jazeera wants to publicize it or not.

Mass protests in front of State TV lasted ten days
More troubling, these events unequivocally betray the Egyptian military's Islamist inclinations. This should not be surprising: as a grassroots movement, the Muslim Brotherhood has long been infiltrating Egypt's culture so that some of the youth—who make up the bulk of the army—have naturally been indoctrinated in an Islamist worldview. Indeed, the military, which keeps imprisoned some of the secular youth who initiated the original revolution, has just released a number of jihadists, including al-Zomar, who reasserted in his first interview the need for Egypt's Christians to pay the jizya tax, thereby confirming their inferior status under Muslim rule. Al-Zomar, of course, was not imprisoned because of his anti-Christian views, but because he was closely involved in the assassination of former President Sadat for making peace with Israel.

Thus the Egyptian military's Islamist leanings suggest that changes for the worse are coming—not just for the Copts, but internationally as well. Because the Islamist worldview is interrelated, Egypt's leadership may well prove to be as anti-American and anti-Israel for the very same reason it is anti-Christian—all are infidels, all are the enemy. The only difference is that the Copts are weak, whereas America and Israel are currently not—thus unabashed animosity for the former, latent hostility for the latter.

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Muslims in the West: Loyal to Whom?

2011-03-13T14:26:00.000-07:00

A briefing by Mark Durie

January 20, 2011
http://www.meforum.org/2848/muslims-in-the-west-loyal

Listen to the Audio Recording

Mark Durie is a theologian, human rights activist, and pastor of an Anglican church in Australia. He has held visiting appointments at the University of Leiden, MIT, UCLA, and Stanford. During his years in Indonesia, he observed a society in which a Muslim majority tried to enforce Islamic law on its sizable Christian minority, leading to his acclaimed 2010 book, The Third Choice, which examines the status of non-Muslims under Islamic rule. On January 20 he spoke to the Middle East Forum in New York on the topic of loyalty.

By understanding how Muslim scholars address the question of loyalty, Westerners may better understand why their nations often have problems assimilating their Muslim populations, asserts Mr. Durie.

The question of loyalty has had tragic implications: Mr. Durie cited the case of Major Nidal Hasan as an expression of isolation and tension commonly experienced between Muslim minorities residing in Western communities. He states that whereas Western Judeo-Christian ethics separated religion and state centuries ago, Islam intertwines religion and state into an inseparable whole. In fact, scholars of Islamic jurisprudence have never concretely settled the lawfulness of a Muslim living in the West, or Dar al-Harb—the "House of War."

Mr. Durie next tackled several proposed solutions to this problem. Traditional Islamic jurisprudence justifies living in Dar al-Harb (permissible only for a few days) if fleeing from religious persecution. A contemporary solution, then, leans on the Muslim principle that "necessity abrogates the obligatory." Mr. Durie states that if, for example, a Muslim does not have access to halal food, he can eat non-halal food out of necessity. In the same fashion, a Muslim fleeing persecution may settle in the West out of necessity to practice Islam freely (hence the many Islamists who settle in the West to escape persecution from their autocratic opponents). In fact, Mr. Durie cited some Islamic scholars who consider the United States more "Islamic" than majority-Muslim nations, because the U.S. allows for complete religious freedom. He points out, however, that many Islamic scholars agree that a Muslim must think of himself as a Muslim first and a citizen of his country second.

Mr. Durie proposes that Islam adopt a theology of the brotherhood of humanity, wherein all can benefit through mutual assistance—rather than Muslims solely benefiting through ideological domination. He concluded by stating that, if we do not wish to surrender Muslim Americans to foreign law on our own soil, concessions to Islamic law must not be made. During question-and-answer, Mr. Durie implored the West to have the "guts" to understand Islam as a religious-political system—and to take the steps necessary to change our own understandings, not just those of Muslims living in the West.

Summary by MEF intern William Aquilino
This text may be reposted or forwarded so long as it is presented as an integral whole with complete information provided about its author, date, place of publication, and original URL.

Murder of Shahbaz Bhatti — "Now who will fight for our rights?"

2011-03-02T04:48:00.000-08:00

I was deeply saddened to read of the murder of Shahbaz Bhatti, Pakistan Minister for Minorities. A courageous Christian leader and advocate for justice, he had been outspoken against Pakistan's blasphemy law. The report below comes from Assist News Service.

========

Wednesday, March 2, 2011

Pakistan Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti shot dead
Bhatti predicted his death and defended his faith in a video four months ago
By Michael Ireland
Chief Correspondent, ASSIST News Service
ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN (ANS) -- Pakistani Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti has been shot dead by gunmen who ambushed his car in broad daylight in the capital Islamabad.

Police said he was traveling to work through a residential district when his vehicle was sprayed with bullets, the BBC reported on its website.

Mr Bhatti, the cabinet's only Christian minister, had received death threats for urging reform to blasphemy laws.

In January, Punjab Governor Salman Taseer, who had also opposed the law, was shot dead by one of his bodyguards.

The BBC said the blasphemy law carries a death sentence for anyone who insults Islam. Critics say it has been used to persecute minority faiths.

The Vatican condemned the murder of the Catholic politician as an "unspeakable" act of violence, the BBC report stated.

Mr Bhatti, 42, a leader of the ruling Pakistan People's Party (PPP), had just left home in a suburb of the capital when three to four gunmen surrounded his vehicle and sprayed it with bullets, according to the BBC report.

One witness, Gulam Rahim, told AP news agency that two of the attackers had opened the door and tried to pull Mr Bhatti out, while another man fired a Kalashnikov into the car.

Bhatti was taken to the nearby Shifa hospital, but was dead on arrival, the BBC said.

The gunmen, who were wearing shawls, escaped in a white Suzuki car, according to witnesses.

Police chief Wajid Durrani told reporters that the minister was not accompanied by his guards when the attack happened, although he said Mr Bhatti had been provided with a security detail, the BBC report said.

The BBC went on to report that pamphlets by al-Qaeda and Tehrik-i-Taliban Punjab, a branch of the Taliban in Pakistan's most populous province, were found at the ambush site.

Tehrik-i-Taliban told BBC Urdu they carried out the attack.

"This man was a known blasphemer of the Prophet [Muhammad]," said the group's deputy spokesman Ahsanullah Ahsan.

"We will continue to target all those who speak against the law which punishes those who insult the prophet. Their fate will be the same."

The BBC said security has been stepped up on all main roads in Islamabad.

In January, Mr Bhatti told the BBC he would defy death threats he had received from Islamist militants for his efforts to reform the blasphemy law.

A government spokesman condemned the assassination.

"This is a concerted campaign to slaughter every liberal, progressive and humanist voice in Pakistan," Farahnaz Ispahani, an aide to President Asif Ali Zardari, told AP news agency.

"The time has come for the federal government and provincial governments to speak out and to take a strong stand against these murderers to save the very essence of Pakistan."

In January, Governor Taseer was shot dead, also in Islamabad, by one of his own police bodyguards. The killer has been hailed by many in the country as a hero.

The governor had backed a private member's bill in parliament by Sherry Rehman, a female MP, to amend the blasphemy law in an attempt to make miscarriages of justice less likely and remove its death penalty. But in the face of strident popular opposition, the federal government said it would not support the proposed reforms.

Ms Rehman said last month she was receiving death threats every half hour by e-mail and telephone.

The BBC stated that Christians, who make up an estimated 1.5 percent of Pakistan's 185 million population, were left reeling by Mr Bhatti's death.

"We have been orphaned today!" Rehman Masih, a Christian resident of Islamabad, told AP news agency. "Now who will fight for our rights?"

Pakistan's blasphemy law has been in the spotlight since a Christian, Asia Bibi, was sentenced to hang in Punjab last November, the BBC explained.

Bibi denies claims she insulted the Prophet Muhammad during a row with Muslim women villagers about sharing water.

Thr BBC also said that although no-one convicted under the law has been executed, more than 30 accused have been killed by lynch mobs.

Critics say that convictions under the law hinge on witness testimony, which is often linked to grudges.

** Michael Ireland is Chief Correspondent for ANS. He is an international British freelance journalist who was formerly a reporter with a London (United Kingdom) newspaper and has been a frequent contributor to UCB UK, a British Christian radio station. While in the UK, Michael traveled to Canada and the United States, Albania,Yugoslavia, Holland, Germany,and Czechoslovakia. He has reported for ANS from Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Israel, Jordan, China,and Russia. Michael's volunteer involvement with ASSIST News Service is a sponsored ministry department -- 'Michael Ireland Media Missionary' (MIMM) -- of A.C.T. International of P.O.Box 1649, Brentwood, TN 37024-1649, at: Artists in Christian Testimony (A.C.T.) International where you can donate online to support his stated mission of 'Truth Through Christian Journalism.' If you have a news or feature story idea for Michael, please contact him at: ANS Chief Reporter
** You may republish this story with proper attribution.

ASSIST News Service (ANS) - PO Box 609, Lake Forest, CA 92609-0609 USA
Visit our web site at: www.assistnews.net -- E-mail: assistnews@aol.com

Opening church doors to Muslim acts of worship takes neighborliness a bridge too far

2011-02-23T23:44:00.000-08:00

This article has been published in the Washington Times as "Stop opening churches to Muslims"

This past week Fox News posted a report that Heartsong church in Cordova, Tennessee and Aldersgate United Methodist Church in Alexandra, Virginia have made their church buildings available to Muslims to use as places of worship.

Critics of these outreach initiatives, such as Mike Huckabee, have been accused of ignorance. However the contents of Muslim prayers, and teachings about Isa, the Islamic Jesus, give reasonable grounds for churches to reject such arrangements.

A prominent element in Islamic daily prayers is the recitation of Al-Fatihah 'The Opening', the first chapter of the Koran. Often described as a blessing, Al-Fatihah has a sting in its tail. After introductory praises, the final sentence of al-Fatihah is a request for guidance 'in the straight path' of Allah's blessed ones, not the path 'of those against whom You are wrathful, nor of those who are astray.'

Who are the ones who are said to be under Allah's wrath or have gone astray from his straight path? According to the revered commentator Ibn Kathir, Muhammad himself gave the answer: 'Those who have earned the anger are the Jews and those who are led astray are the Christians.'

Al-Fatihah is as central to Islamic devotion as the Lord's prayer is to Christians: it is recited at least 17 times a day as part of daily Muslim prayers. Yet according to Muhammad himself, this prayer, which is on the lips of every pious Muslim day and night, castigates Christians as misguided and Jews as objects of Allah's wrath.

Another good reason for churches not to host Muslim worship is, paradoxically, their veneration of Isa, the Islamic Jesus.

Muslims venerate Jesus, but as a Muslim prophet. In the pages of the Koran the disciples of the Muslim Jesus declare 'We are Muslims' (Sura 5:111). The Islamic Jesus is not the Christian Son of God, a divine suffering saviour who died on the cross for the sins of the world.

Certainly there are some similarities between Isa of the Koran and Jesus of the Gospels. The Koran calls Jesus al-Masih 'the Messiah', and both figures are said to have been born of a virgin, performed miracles of healing, and raised the dead. Yet here the similarities end. Isa of the Koran was not crucified, and did not die, but was raised up by Allah (Sura 4:157-158).

It is in Muhammad's vision of the end-times that the role of the Muslim Jesus comes into sharp focus. Muhammad taught that when Isa returns, he 'will fight for the cause of Islam. He will break the cross, kill pigs, and abolish the poll-tax. Allah will destroy all religions except Islam.' (Sunan Abu Dawud 27:4310)

What does this saying mean? The cross is a symbol of Christianity. Breaking the cross means abolishing Christianity. According to Islamic law the poll-tax or jizya buys protection of the lives and property of Christians (and Jews). Abolishing this tax will mean that jihad will be restarted against Christians, and no more protection shall be afforded to those who do not submit to Islam.

The Egyptian jurist Ahmad bin Naqib stated in his compendium of sharia, The Reliance of the Traveller that the toleration of Christians living under Islamic law only applies 'before the final descent of Jesus… After his final coming, nothing but Islam will be accepted from them, for taking the poll tax is only effective until Jesus' descent … for he will rule by the law of Muhammad … as a follower of our Prophet' (trans. Nuh Ha Mim Keller, pp.603-4).

In this end-times scenario, the Islamic Jesus becomes the ultimate destroyer of Christianity, when by his sword he compels all followers of the Christ of the Gospels to become Muslims and live in accordance with the sharia of Muhammad.

Churches should not welcome into their buildings the veneration of Isa the Islamic Jesus, who as a true Muslim is intended to bring about the final, violent destruction of Christianity. By all means let Christians show kindliness to their Muslim neighbours, but the sentiments embedded in Islamic daily prayers, which curse Jews and Christians respectively as under Allah's wrath and gone astray, can have no place in a Christian church, even if recited in the cadences of classical Arabic.

======
Mark Durie is an Anglican priest, theologian and human rights activist. He is the author of Revelation: Do we worship the same God? and The Third Choice: Islam, dhimmitude and freedom.

Fear of Islam: Facts Fuel Growing Unease. A View from Australia.

2011-02-16T03:47:00.000-08:00

This article is published in the February 2011 edition of ViewPoint Magazine.

Fear of Islam in the News
Fear of Islam has become news. Time magazine’s cover story of August 2010 was “Is America Islamophobic?” Bobby Ghosh wrote:

“… where ordinary Americans meet Islam, there is evidence that suspicion and hostility are growing. To be a Muslim in America now is to endure slings and arrows against your faith.”

In Australia, SBS dedicated its final Insight progam of 2010 to ‘Fear of Islam’. The episode’s internet page received a stellar number of viewer comments, topping all previous shows of the year including such high-interest topics as climate change, the national broadband network, the Federal election, education, boat people, Afghanistan, hospitals, and sexual attraction. The only show which came close to ‘Fear of Islam’ in viewer response levels was ‘Banning the Burqa’.

Comments posted by Australian viewers to the SBS site revealed deep concerns about Islam. For example Mark from Sunshine commented, ‘Islam is incompatible with liberal, secular, democracy. A story of oil and water.’ 97 viewers agreed, and only 12 disagreed.

Islam's Bad Press
Just when fear of Islam is becoming a hot issue, Islam has been receiving a lot of bad press, from all around the world.

From Iraq there was news of the massacre of more than forty worshippers on October 31 at the Our Lady of Salvation Syriac Catholic Cathedral in Baghdad. Al Qaida claimed responsibility for the attack and issued a statement that ‘All Christian centers, organisations and institutions, leaders and followers, are legitimate targets for the mujahideen wherever they can reach them.’ The ancient Christian community of Iraq has shrunk alarmingly in recent years, due to continued targeting of Christians by Islamic militants.

In Egypt, Coptic Christians were protesting minor bureaucratic planning code objections to alternations for the Church of St. Mary and St. Michaels in Talbiya, Giza, when they were attacked by around 5,000 armed government security personnel on November 24, some of whom were chanting Allahu Akbar (‘Allah is greater!’). Three Christians were killed by bullet wounds, a young child died from tear gas thrown into a chapel, and over 150 others were arrested. This was followed by a bomb attack on New Year’s Eve against the Saints Church in Alexandria, which resulted in 23 deaths, and over 90 wounded. Muslim passers by reportedly cried Allahu Akbar as they walked past the scene.

Massive international protests have risen up over Iran’s proposed stoning of Sakineh Ashtiani, accused of adultery, and an ex-Muslim, Pastor Youcef Nadarkhani is also on death row in Iran for converting to Christianity.

In Pakistan two Christians who had been accused of blasphemy were murdered last July by masked gunmen while under police custody in Faisalbad. More recently, Imam Maulana Yousuf Qureshi, in his sermon on Friday 3 December, offered a $6,000 bounty to anyone who will murder Asia Bibi, a Christian woman who has also been accused of “blaspheming Allah”. Then on January 4, Punjab Governor, Salman Taseer, was slain by his own body guard. Taseer’s attacker, Mumtaz Qadri, has been praised by distinguished religious leaders from both mainstream schools of Pakistani Islam (the Deobandis and Barelvis), and when Qadri was being led to court on January 6, four hundred Muslim lawyers showered him with rose petals, offering him their services to manage his legal defense free of charge.

On December 10, the Dunia al-Watan posted a video of a woman being publicly whipped by two uniformed Sudanese police outside Khartoum Central Police station. This video has caused a storm of protest throughout the Arabic-speaking media. The police derive obvious pleasure from whipping the woman all over her body as she screams and wriggles around to avoid the blows. The penalty of public flogging was introduced into the Sudanese statutes in 1983 under the presidency of Gaafar Nimeiry, as part of his nation-wide imposition of the Islamic sharia, which mandates flogging for some offenses.

News stories which link Islam with violence are not isolated, rare occurrences: they could be multiplied many times over. For Western readers they occur against the backdrop of the past decade of terrorist atrocities, including the 2002 Bali bombings, the Moscow Theatre Hostage Crisis of October 2003, the Beslan school hostage crisis of September 2004, the 7/7 London bombings in 2005, and of course the 9/11 atrocity of 2001. All these crimes were perpetrated by religious Muslims who claimed to be inspired by their faith.

Offensive Commentary
The offense of these violent acts has been compounded by the spokespeople for radical causes, such as Abu Bakar Bashir, who called upon Australians to convert to Islam if they wanted to be safe from terrorist attacks.

Another example of offensive commentary was the February 2006 London protest against the Danish Muhammad cartoons, organized by the Al Ghurabaa organisation, in which Muslim protestors carried placards with messages such as “Massacre those who insult Islam”, “Butcher those who mock Islam”, “Be prepared for the real holocaust”, “Europe you will pay, your 9/11 is on the way”, and “Freedom go to hell”.

Muslims Behaving Badly
Muslims behaving badly have also contributed to Islam’s bad press. As far back as the early 1990’s two Muslim children were photographed demonstrating on the streets of Sydney carrying ‘Kill Rushdie’ signs.

The Daily Mail reported on January 5, 2011 concerning what experts have referred to as a ‘tidal wave’ of sexual exploitation of hundreds of white young girls aged 11 to 16, by gangs of men ‘predominantly from the British Pakistani community’ in the Midlands and the North of England: of the 56 men convicted since 1997, 50 have been Asian Muslims.

In July 2001 the Sydney Morning Herald ran a story that 70 women had been gang raped in the Bankstown area: the victims were non-Muslims, the perpetrators Muslims. A few of the victims found the courage to face their accusers in court, and a group of Lebanese Muslim young men were given long jail sentences.

Throughout this crisis and its aftermath, comments from Muslim leaders added fuel to the fires of public discontent by suggesting a religious basis to these acts. Sheikh Al-Hilali compared a woman who does not conform to Islam’s dress code to meat left uncovered which a cat might take. The attacks, he implied, were the fault of the victims. Many Muslims spoke up to denounce the Sheikh’s comments, but the damage had been done.

Among the comments left by viewers on SBS’s 2010 ‘Fear of Islam’ Insight program there was a remark from Samir of Bankstown that western women ‘who don’t cover their hair’ and ‘dress immodestly’ ‘deserve what they get’, and, ‘if Western women dressed properly without revealing their form, they would have nothing to fear’. In other words: women who don’t follow sharia requirements should fear assault, but they only have themselves to blame.

To Fear or Not to Fear?
Such events, and commentary upon them by some Muslims, provide fuel for fear. But is this fear based on ignorance, or is it well-founded?

And what about the opposing fear, that airing such issues will incite hatred against Muslims? In response to the recent UK news reports of Muslim sexual predators, the Association of Pakistani Lawyers (UK) issued a statement that ‘linking criminal activity to a particular race, colour and nationality may be counterproductive and may attract verbal and physical abuse against those communities and may act as a tool to be exploited by hard-line political groups who play politics on racial tensions, and anti community cohesion steps threatening the multiculturalism which is the fine fabric of British Society.’

Fear itself is morally neutral – it is neither right nor wrong. It can be a virtue when the capacity to fear is protective. There is such a thing as sensible fear. It is rational to fear to step out in front of speeding traffic, walk along a cliff topic, catch a towering wave in the surf, or climb a broken ladder.

A Moral Panic?
However, the fear of others can also involve a dimension of moral panic, when a particular group is regarded as a threat to the social order. In such circumstances, fear can reach epidemic proportions, and have little connection to evidence and rationality. Nazi manipulation of Judeophobia was a case in point.

Yet moral panic can itself be feared, something which provides fertile opportunities for exploitation. As Pascal Bruckner has pointed out, the label Islamophobia was coined to convey the implication that fear of Islam is irrational.

The To Kill a Mockingbird World View
Western understandings of ‘fear of the other’ have been profoundly shaped by To Kill a Mockingbird, Harper Lee’s great novel about racial prejudice and coming of age. Published in 1960 it has been enormously influential in shaping the world view of young people for the past half century. To Kill a Mockingbird’s message is that knowledge of others increases sympathy and respect for them. In its final pages, the young girl Scout says to her father about a misunderstood character in a novel she had been reading: “when they finally saw him, why he hadn’t done any of those things ... Atticus, he was real nice,” to which Atticus responds, “Most people are, Scout, when you finally see them.” In other words, if one can only “see” others – that is, understand them – then despite the evident human capacity for evil, it is possible to believe that people are “real nice”.

The world view of To Kill a Mockingbird underpins the western concept of ‘prejudice’. According to it, the root cause of fear and hatred is ignorance. If someone truly gets to know others, sympathy for them will grow. Looking out at the world through this frame, criticism of Islam and indeed fear of Muslims is portrayed as an irrational phobia based on ignorance. In this vein, Time magazine called those who link Islam to terrorism ‘unthinking’.

The Key Question
This then is the heart of the matter: Is fear of Islam rational, reasonable and protective, or is it an irrational phobia? Does the evident fact that such fear exists and is growing reflect ignorance and prejudice, or is it a symptom of a problem with Islam?

In reality, both are true. Fear of Islam is fact-based, but it can also have features of a ‘moral panic’.

To illustrate the first possibility, consider the story of Ahmer Khokar, a Pakistani Muslim who converted to Christianity in the UK, and then emigrated to Australia in order to find a safe place to live. He wrote in January 2003 in the Times about his conversion to Christianity and its impact on his life.

Khokar described his feelings when he first doubted Islam and believed that Christianity was true: “That night I went to bed terrified.” What he feared most was the anger of his family. He said “if I was living in an Islamic country I would be killed for converting to Christianity”.

It is impossible to call Ahmer’s terror ‘Islamophobia’. He was not ignorant of Islam, having been schooled in it by his devout father from his earliest years. His fear was a rational one, based upon an intimate familiarity with his family’s beliefs.

A flaw with the To Kill a Mocking Bird world view is that at times ignorance is bliss. Getting to know another person better does not necessarily increase respect. Like fear, stereotypes are in essence morally neutral. Of course unfounded negative stereotypes can cause great damage, racism being the classic example. Yet positive stereotypes can also be all too rosy and optimistic. Ignorance can result in naïve gullibility, just as easily as hateful prejudice.

The West Awakens to Islam: Some Find Reasons to Fear
In recent years Westerners have had many opportunities to learn more about Islam. Some have taken advantage of these opportunities and become Muslims as a result: they liked what they saw.

For others however, familiarity has only increased their disquiet. Many who have sought to dispel their own ignorance about Islam have found solid reasons to continue to regard Islam as a threat.

One is Islam’s history of empire and conquest, the product of a supremacist theological vision that Islam must dominate other religions.

Another is the well-attested desire of some (but by no means all) Muslims to work for a society in which Islam dominates. Such was the sentiment expressed by internationally renowed Muslim jurist, and deputy chair of the Islamic Fiqh (Jurisprudence) Academy of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, M. Taqi Usmani, in his description of the purpose of jihad:

… the purpose of Jehad … aims at breaking the grandeur of unbelievers and establish that of Muslims. As a result no one will dare to show any evil designs against Muslims on one side and on the other side, people subdued from the grandeur of Islam will have an open mind to think over the blessings of Islam. … I think that all Ulema (religious scholars) have established the same concept about the purpose of Jehad. (M. Taqi Usmani. Islam and Modernism, Adam Publishers & Distributors, India, 2005, pp.133-134.).

This is along the lines of the views of the influential Indian scholar Abul A’la Mawdudi:

What Islam demands from those who submit to God as the real Sovereign, their only Ruler, and who accept to abide by His laws as brought by His Prophet, blessings and peace be on him is quite obvious. … wherever you are, in whichever country you live, you must strive to change the wrong basis of government, and seize all powers to rule and make laws from those who do not fear God. … The name of this striving is Jihad. (Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi. Let us be Muslims. Trans. & ed. Khurram Murad. The Islamic Foundation, A.S. Noordeen, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Third Reprint 1991, p.290.)

Another reason to fear Islam is objectionable public statements issued by Muslims, including in sermons and ‘fatwas’. A recent example was the ruling from leading Pakistani scholars on behalf of the Jamaate Ahle Sunnat Pakistan, a prominent and influential mainstream Muslim organization, that slain governor Salman Taseer should go unmourned: “No Muslim should have attended the funeral or even try to pray for Salman Taseer or even express any kind of regret or sympathy over the incident.”

Sheikh Al-Hilaly’s sermons have provided further examples to the Australian public.

Another reason for fear is the opinion polls. For example, a poll conducted in the UK in 2006 found that a quarter of British Muslims thought the 7/7 bombing was justified, and a third said they would prefer to live under the sharia law. Strikingly, the younger the respondents, the more radical their views. It seems that the home-grown younger generation of Muslims in the UK are more antagonistic to British ways than their immigrant parents.

Another reason for fear of Islam is the poor treatment of non-Muslims and women in many Islamic societies, and the fact that some who mete out this treatment attribute this to the teachings of Islam. For example, more than a million non-Muslim guest workers in Saudi Arabia are denied basic human rights, including freedom of worship.

And finally, there are the teachings of the Koran and the example of Muhammad, which together form the foundations of Islam.

It is self-evident that some Koranic verses encourage violence. Consider, for example, a verse which implies that fighting is “good for you”: “Fighting is prescribed upon you, and you dislike it. But it may happen that you dislike a thing which is good for you, and it may happen that you love a thing which is bad for you. And Allah knows and you know not” (Sura 2:216). Such verses are matched by the words and deeds of Muhammad, who commanded his followers to offer three choices to non-Muslims: conversion to Islam, surrender to the armies of Islam, or the sword.

While some of the acts of Muhammad were commendable, including showing generosity and compassion to orphans, many are deeply disturbing and cannot be reconciled with any contemporary ethical standards, apart from those of the sharia. For example, the assassination of Salman Taseer has clear precedents in the life of Muhammad, who authorized the assassinations of people who had mocked him, and declared those who killed “blasphemers” to be innocent of blood guilt. This explains the widespread support for the killing among Pakistani Muslim scholars and mainstream Islamic organizations. Another example is Muhammad’s marriage to the nine-year old Aisha, which established the basis in sharia law for child-brides, so that in Iran today, the marriage age for girls is nine.

Today, non-Muslims who investigate such matters for themselves, by studying authentic Islamic sources on the life and teaching of Muhammad, find no shortage of material which causes them to be more, and not less, concerned about Islam.

What about Australia?
However a question which must be asked, is whether the fear of Islam is rational or fanciful in the context of contemporary Australia. Even if it is rational for non-Muslims in Iraq, Pakistan or Egypt to fear Islam, because sharia principles discriminate against them, depriving them of basic human rights, is such a fear also rational here in Australia?

It all depends. Such factors as levels of immigration, birth rates, conversion rates, the kind of Islam taught in Australia, and the resistance of the general population will all have an influence on the final outcome.

For example, do Australian Muslims show any signs of desiring to implement a sharia-compliant social system? In reality, as Abdullah Saeed has pointed out in Islam in Australia, Australian Muslims are divided on this issue. Some Australian Muslims believe and teach that Muslim believers must work to establish Islam as the foundation of the political system wherever they live. However other Muslims have come to this land as refugees from political Islam, and want nothing to do with such a project.

Is it fanciful to entertain the possibility that Islam could grow to be a major political force in Australia? Surely not. If anyone had predicted fifty years ago the extent of Islamic influence in Europe today, they would have been ridiculed by all except the most ardent Muslim visionaries. Yet Islam is now well on its way to being established as a dominant force across all of western Europe.

It remains to be seen whether Bernard Lewis’ 2004 prediction is fulfilled, that Europe will be Islamic by the end of the twenty first century ‘at the very latest’, becoming a ‘part of the Arabic west, of the Maghreb’. But such a proposal can no longer be considered laughable. Given the widespread and growing support for sharia implementation among European Muslims – especially among younger Muslims – it is only to be expected that political maturity and gains in democratic representation will go hand in hand with a long-term process of societal transformation to remake nations in the image of the sharia. The only question will be, according to Bassam Tibi, a prominent German moderate Muslim, “is not whether the majority of Europeans is Islamic, but rather which Islam – sharia Islam or Euro-Islam – is to dominate in Europe.”

It is as yet far from clear that non-Muslim Europeans have the will to resist Islamisation. Already the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Nicholas Phillips, has recommend ‘embracing Sharia law’ (‘Equality before the law.’ Speech presented at the East London Muslim Centre, 3 July, 2008), and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, has stated ‘it’s not as if we’re bringing in an alien and rival system.’

Islamisation is a process which can take many decades – or indeed centuries – and Australia is not so far down this path as Europe, including England and France. However, just because it is still early days yet, it is unwise to keep deferring public debate about whether the advance of Islam and sharia implementation will be a good thing for Australia. A growing number of Australians have taken a good look at Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia – and even at western Europe – and are suggesting that these countries can be considered useful indicators of what an Islamic Australia could look like. Many find this prospect deeply troubling.

An End to Fear?
Australians will no longer fear Islam when self-confessed Islamic states such as Pakistan, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia stop abusing human rights in the name of Islam. They will no longer fear Islam when Al-Qaida shuts up shop and disbands its terror cells. They will no longer fear Islam when tensions over the advance of Islam across Europe subside.

In reality, fear of Islam is something which is unlikely to go away for a long time to come.

A Dozen Bad Ideas for the 21st Century

2011-02-09T16:34:00.000-08:00

Here is a list of false beliefs and modes of thought which make it hard for people in the West to come to terms with the challenge of Islam today. If you are deeply attached to any of these ideas or ways of thinking, you will have difficulty accepting the truth about Islam's teachings and their impact.

The belief that all religions are the same. They are not. Different faiths make different claims about what is true, and about what is right and wrong and produce radically different societies. The same is true for different political ideologies: consider the different trajectories of North and South Korea. Atheists have helped entrench this belief, because to acknowledge material differences between religions would undermine the atheist (and radical secularist) narrative.
The belief that religion is irrelevant as a cause of anything. According to this view, religion can be exploited or hijacked as an excuse or an instrument (e.g. of oppression – such as an ‘opiate of the masses’), but not an underlying cause of anything. Marxist ideology has made a significant contribution to establishing this belief. In accordance with this assumption, security analysts all over the Western world presuppose that religion cannot be the cause of terrorism: so they and the politicians they advise must say that terrorists have ‘hijacked’ religion.
The belief that we all worship the same God. We do not. Thousands of different gods are worshipped by people on this earth. These gods manifest different characteristics, and make different demands. The worship of them forms very different kinds of people and communities.
The belief that one can justify anything from any sacred text. This is not true. It is a postmodern fallacy that all meaning is in the eye of the beholder. Certain texts lends themselves to supporting particular beliefs and practices much more than others.
The belief that the Christian Reformation was a progressive movement. This is not true. In fact the Christian Reformers aimed to go back to the example and teaching of Christ and the apostles. Throughout the whole medieval period reformatio always meant renewing the foundations by going back to one’s origins. Understanding ‘reformation’ in this way, Al Qa'ida is a product of an Islamic reformation, i.e. it is an attempt to go back to the example and teaching of Muhammad.
The belief that dispelling ignorance will increase positive regard for the other. This was the message of Harper Lee’s powerfull novel To Kill a Mockingbird (pub. 1960). Although it is true that racial hatred can feed on and exploit ignorance, accurately dispelling ignorance sometimes rightly increases the likelihood of rejecting the beliefs or practices of another. It is illogical to assume that those opposed to a belief are the ones who are most ignorant about it. Ignorance can breed positive regard for what is wrong just as easily as it can breed prejudice against what is good.
The belief that everyone is good and decent, and if you just make a sincere effort to get to know another person, you will always come to respect them. This is not universally true. Holding this view is a luxury. Those who have experienced life under evil governments or in dysfunctional societies are shocked at the naivety of this assumption.
The belief that putting something in context will always produce a more innocuous interpretation.This is not true. Attending properly to context can make a text even more offensive than it would otherwise have been. Conversely, if you take something out of context you may regard it more positively than you ought to. In reality, radical interpretations of the Qur’an, such as are used to support terrorism, almost always involve an appeal to a rich understanding of the context in which the Qur’an was revealed, including the life of Muhammad. On the other hand, many have taken peaceful verses of the Qur’an out of context, in order to prove that Islam is a peaceful religion.
The belief that extremism is the problem, and moderation the solution. Warnings against taking things to extremes are as old as Aristotle. More recently the idea was promoted by Eric Hoffer, in The True Believer (pub. 1951) that mass movements are interchangeable, and an extremist is just as likely to become a communist or a fascist. He claimed that it was the tendency to extremism itself which is the problem. This idea has become very unhelpful and generates a lot of confusion. ‘Moderation’ or ‘laxity’ in belief or practice can be destructive and even dangerous, e.g. in medical surgery or when piloting a plane. Ideas that are good and true deserve strong, committed support, and the best response to bad ideas is rarely lukewarm moderation.
The belief that the West is always guilty. This irrational and unhelpful idea is taught in many schools today and has become embedded in the world views of many. It is essentially a silencing strategy, sabotaging critical thinking.
Two wrongs make a right reasoning. E.g. Someone says that jihad is a bad part of Islam, to which a defender of Islam says ‘What about the crusades?’ Someone says the Qur’an incites violence, to which someone else replies ‘But there are violent verses in the Bible.’ This kind of reasoning is a logical fallacy.
A specific sub-type of this fallacy is tu quoque reasoning:
Tu quoque (‘you too’) reasoning: you can’t challenge someone else’s beliefs or actions if you (or your group) have personally ever done anything wrong or have objectionable characteristics. E.g. A Catholic says jihad is bad, but someone counters that popes supported the Crusades. This is a sub-type of the ‘two wrongs make a right’ reasoning: it too is a logical fallacy.
Belief in progress: everything will always get better in the end. This is a false, though seductive bit of wishful thinking. Bad ideas have bad consequences. Good societies can easily become bad ones if they exchange good ideas for bad ones. Bad situations can last for a very long time, and keep getting progressively worse. Many countries have deteriorated for extended periods during the past 100 years. It is not true that ideologies or religions will inevitably improve or become more ‘moderate’ as time passes, as if by some magical process of temporal transformation. But things are not always going to get better.

The NY Times' affection: for Khomeini (1979) and the Muslim Brotherhood (2011)

2011-02-06T16:50:00.000-08:00

I am indebted to Andrew Bostom for reminding us (here, with extended commentary) of Princeton Emeritus Professor Richard Falk's eulogy to the Ayatollah Khomeini, published in the New York Times, February 16, 1979, of which excerpts are re-posted below.

Such sentiments seem entirely consistent with the affection currently being extended to the Muslim Brotherhood through the pages of the NY Times by America's political elites.

Consider Western leaders who are so eager to hand Egypt over to the Brotherhood – and whose forerunners were so ardent for Iran's religious reformation 40 years ago. Would they be equally welcoming of the Islamization of America itself? Do such cold-blooded and heartless fantasies truly mean that America is on the verge of an irreversible intellectual and political decline?

Richard Falk, professor of international law at Princeton University, recently visited the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in France.

Part of the confusion in America about Iran’s social revolution involves Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. More than any third-world leader, he has been depicted in a manner calculated to frighten.

… In recent months, before his triumphant return to Tehran, the Ayatollah gave numerous reassurances to non-Moslem communities in Iran.

… He also indicated that the non-religious left will be free to express its views in an Islamic republic and to participate in political life, provided only that it does not “commit treason against the country” by establishing foreign connections—a lightly-veiled reference to anxiety about Soviet interference.

To suppose that Ayatollah Khomeini is dissembling seems almost beyond belief. His political style is to express his real views defiantly and without apology, regardless of consequences. He has little incentive suddenly to become devious for the sake of American public opinion. Thus the depiction of him as fanatical, reactionary and the bearer of crude prejudices seems certainly and happily false. What is also encouraging is that his entourage of close advisers is uniformly composed of moderate progressive individuals…[T]hey are widely respected in Iran outside religious circles, share a notable record of concern for human rights and seem eager to achieve economic development that results in a modern society oriented on satisfying the whole population’s basic needs.

… Ayatollah Khomeini said recently, in France, that in any well-governed society “the ruler does not live very differently from the ordinary person.” For him, to be religious is to struggle for these political goals, yet the religious leader’s role is to inspire politics, not to govern. Hence, it is widely expected that he will soon go to the holy city of Qum, at a remove from the daily exercise of power. There he will serve as a guide or, if necessary, as a critic of the republic.

In looking to the future, Ayatollah Khomeini has spoken of his hopes to show the world what a genuine Islamic government can do on behalf of its people.

... Despite the turbulence, many non-religious Iranians talk of this period as “Islam’s finest hour.” Having created a new model of popular revolution based, for the most part, on non-violent tactics. Iran may yet provide us with a desperately-needed model of humane governance for a third-world country. If this is true, then indeed the exotic Ayatollah may yet convince the world that “politics is the opiate of the people.”

Again from Bostom's post, compare these arrant falsehoods with Khomeini's own words, published 37 years before the 1979 NY Times editorial:

Those who study jihad will understand why Islam wants to conquer the whole world. All the countries conquered by Islam or to be conquered in the future will be marked for everlasting salvation. For they shall live under Allah’s law (Sharia). … Islam says: ‘Kill [the non-Muslims], put them to the sword and scatter their armies.’ Islam says: 'Whatever good there is exists thanks to the sword and in the shadow of the sword! People cannot be made obedient except with the sword! The sword is the key to paradise, which can be opened only for holy warriors (jihadists)!’ There are hundreds of other Koranic psalms and hadiths (sayings of the prophet) urging Muslims to value war and to fight. Does all that mean that Islam is a religion that prevents men from waging war? I spit upon those foolish souls who make such a claim. … Those who know nothing of Islam pretend that Islam counsels against war. Those [who say this] are witless.